Reducing an in‐group bias in preschool children: the impact of moral behavior

How impressionable are in‐group biases in early childhood? Previous research shows that young children display robust preferences for members of their own social group, but also condemn those who harm others. The current study investigates children's evaluations of agents when their group membership and moral behavior conflict. After being assigned to a minimal group, 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children either saw their in‐group member behave antisocially, an out‐group member act prosocially, or control agents, for whom moral information was removed. Children's explicit preference for and willingness to share with their in‐group member was significantly attenuated in the presence of an antisocial in‐group member, but not a prosocial out‐group member. Interestingly, children's learning decisions were unmoved by a person's moral behavior, instead being consistently guided by group membership. This demonstrates that children's in‐group bias is remarkably flexible: while moral information curbs children's in‐group bias on social evaluations, social learning is still driven by group information.     

Implicit meaning in 18‐month‐old toddlers

A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that infants understand the meaning of spoken words from as early as 6 months. Yet little is known about their ability to do so in the absence of any visual referent, which would offer diagnostic evidence for an adult‐like, symbolic interpretation of words and their use in language mediated thought. We used the head‐turn preference procedure to examine whether infants can generate implicit meanings from word forms alone as early as 18 months of age, and whether they are sensitive to meaningful relationships between words. In one condition, toddlers were presented with lists of words taken from the same taxonomic category (e.g. animals or body parts). In a second condition, words taken from two other categories (e.g. clothes and food items) were interleaved within the same list. Listening times were found to be longer in the related‐category condition than in the mixed‐category condition, suggesting that infants extract the meaning of spoken words and are sensitive to the semantic relatedness between these words. Our results show that infants have begun to construct the rudiments of a semantic system based on taxonomic relations even before they enter a period of accelerated vocabulary growth.     

Teen Dating Abuse: A Paradigm for Mental Health Counselors

Teen dating abuse (TDA) is a serious public health problem affecting almost half of all adolescents in the United States. Because of the developmental characteristics of adolescence such as identity confusion and rejection of adult authority figures, counseling adolescents who are experiencing TDA can be particularly challenging. This article describes the types of abuse, the early warning signs of abuse, and effective strategies that mental health counselors can use to counsel and educate teen victims of TDA and others.     

Evaluation of the attentional capacities and working memory of early and late blind persons

Although attentional processes and working memory seem to be significantly involved in the daily activities (particularly during navigating) of persons who are blind and who use these abilities to compensate for their lack of vision, few studies have investigated these mechanisms in this population. The aim of this study is to evaluate the selective, sustained and divided attention, attentional inhibition and switching and working memory of blind persons. Early blind, late blind and sighted participants completed neuropsychological tests that were designed or adapted to be achievable in the absence of vision. The results revealed that the early blind participants outperformed the sighted ones in selective, sustained and divided attention and working memory tests, and the late blind participants outperformed the sighted participants in selective, sustained and divided attention. However, no differences were found between the blind groups and the sighted group in the attentional inhibition and switching tests. Furthermore, no differences were found between the early and late blind participants in this set of tests. These results suggest that early and late blind persons can compensate for the lack of vision by an enhancement of the attentional and working memory capacities.     

Perceived shared understanding in teams: The motivational effect of being ‘on the same page’

This study examines the role of perceived shared understanding with regard to team performance, taking into account the motivational mechanisms (i.e., group potency and team effort) involved in this relationship and the moderating role of task routineness. Using a multisource approach and a team‐level design, we collected data from 101 teams (i.e., 381 members and their 101 immediate superiors) working in a Canadian public safety organization. The results support the mediating role of group potency and team effort in the relationship between perceived shared understanding and team performance. Moreover, the results show that the relationship between team effort and team performance is moderated by task routineness, such that this relationship is stronger when task routineness is high. On the whole, the findings of this study help to better understand why and under what circumstances perceived shared understanding may enhance team performance.     

Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement

Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection for rational agency. Interestingly enough, there is no clear account of how and why self-reflection plays such an important role for these views. My aim in this paper is to address this underappreciated problem for constitutivist views and to determine whether constitutivist self-reflection is normatively oriented. Understanding its normative features will allow us to evaluate a potential way that constitutivism may meet its purported metaethical promise. I begin by showing why constitutivism, as exemplified by Korsgaard’s and Velleman’s respective views, takes self-reflection to be a constitutive feature of rational agency. Closer examination of this claim suggests three underappreciated problems for the constitutivist’s apparent reliance on self-reflection. First, we have no picture of the specific role that self-reflection plays. Second, it is unclear in what sense it is a requirement for full-fledged agency and, thereby, for self-constitution. Third, it is not clear whether it has any necessary normative features, even given the often cited moral normativity associated with constitutivism. In §1, I will address the first and second questions. §2 will be dedicated to considering the third question.