从档案资料看民国时期的救世新教

救世新教是20世纪20年代出现的集宗教与慈善于一身的新兴宗教。它由迷信色彩浓厚的悟善社改组而成,并通过向政府备案而获得了合法性。从悟善社到救世新教,前后历时约三十年,在彼时风云激荡、云谲波诡、纷繁复杂的社会大环境下,救世新教经历了兴起、发展、改组、挫折、变革、衰落等曲折的发展轨迹,在与政府的妥协及自身的不断调整过程中,它最终没有突破社会环境不断变革的束缚,随着南京国民政府的结束而退出历史舞台。     

Prototetyka St. Lesniewskiego

Streszczenie Prototetyka St. Len'ewskiego jest uogólnieniem dwuwartociowego rachunku zda. Wystpuj w niej obok terminów tego rachunku funktory (zarówno stae jak i zmienne) tych wszystkich kategorii semantycznych, jakie mog by zdefiniowane, gdy punktem wyjcia jest kategor a zda.W pracy zreferowane s trzy systemy prototetyki. Terminem pierwotnym dwu z nich jest implikacja, terminem pierwotnym systemu trzeciego jest równowano. Systemy o terminie pierwotnym implikacji róni s. reguami wnioskowania. W jednym z nich obowizuje regua weryfikacji, w drugim regua ekstensjonalnoci. Pierwsza z tych regu jest uogólnieniem nastpujcej reguy rachunku zda, wzbogaconego o terminy 0 i 1:Wyraenie jest tez systemu, gdy tezami systemu s oba wyraenia powstae z przez podstawienie za pewn jego zmienn symboli 0 i 1.W myl reguy ekstensjonalnoci tezami systemu s prawa ekstensjonalnoci, sformuowane dla funktorów dowolnych kategorii semantycznych wac-wych prototetyce.W pracy podaj dowody równowanoci trzech systemów prototetyki i dowód ich zupenoci.Znaczna cz wyników Leniewskiego, zreferowanych w pracy, nie bya dotd opublikowana. Opracowujc te wyniki opieraem si na notatkach z wykadów Leniewskiego, spisanych przez jego uczniów. Oryginalne notatki Leniewskiego ulegy zniszczeniu w czasie powstania warszawskiego.     

О правилах исчисления предложе ий

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Evaluation of drug toxicity in clinical trials

An increasing number of drugs removed from the market because of unacceptable toxicity raises concerns regarding preapproval testing of drug safety. In the present paper it is postulated that the non-inferiority type of trial should be abandoned in favor of the superiority trial with active controls and less stringent (p<0.1, both for efficacy and toxicity) statistics. This approach will increase sensitivity of detection of drug-induced adverse effects at the expense of increasing false positive results regarding the difference in efficacy between the tested and reference drug. Such a move will increase the protection of future patients. In addition, the proposed design is far more acceptable from the clinical (e.g. no need to specify the statistically expected “unimportant” number of deaths) and ethical points of view, as well as being favored by the strong incentive of involved parties. In the second part of this paper arguments are presented in favor of the hypothesis that placebo (still used in some superiority trials) does not induce adverse effects. The assertion that placebo may induce adverse effects is probably biased by the nature of the clinical experiment. Such a conclusion is supported by studies indicating that placebo-induced adverse effects are disease — and treatment — specific. The modification of clinical trials according to the proposed changes may increase the trials’ sensitivity at detecting adverse effects of drugs. A lecture on the subject of this paper was presented at the 6th International Bioethics Conference on the subject of ‘The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research’, held in Warsaw, Poland, 3–4 June 2005.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

Approximative truth of fact-statements,laws, and theories

Summary The paper is a sketch of a conception of approximative truth (or verisimilitude). The concepts of relative error, and degree of inadequacy are introduced. By means of them the concept of truth-content of quantitative facts-statements, laws and theories is defined. Laws and theories accepted in science have a high truth-content, i.e. they are approximately true.     

The lattice of strengthenings of a strongly finite consequence operation

First, we prove that the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is both atomic and coatomic, it has finitely many atoms and coatoms, each coatom is strongly finite but atoms are not of this kind — we settle this by constructing a suitable counterexample. Second, we deal with the notions of hereditary: algebraicness, strong finitisticity and finite approximability of a strongly finite consequence operation. Third, we formulate some conditions which tell us when the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is finite, and subsequently we give some applications of them.This paper was read at the Third Autumn School on Strongly Finite Sentential Calculi organized by the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, in Ustronie (Poland), November 1979.     

Towards a topological philosophy

This article examines the use of mathematical concepts in philosophy, focusing on topology, which may be viewed as a modern supplement to geometry. We show that Plato and Parmenides were already employing geometric ideas in their research, and discuss three examples of the application of topology to philosophical problems: the first concerns the analysis of the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, the second the ontology of possible worlds of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the third Leibniz's monadology. We also consider the role of topology in mathematical explanations of the sort found in science, arguing that it can perform a role in philosophy that is of comparable importance.