The dynamics of learning and allocation of study time to a region of proximal learning

In contrast to the dominant discrepancy reduction model, which favors the most difficult items, people, given free choice, devoted most time to medium-difficulty items and studied the easiest items first. When study time was experimentally manipulated, best performance resulted when most time was given to the medium-difficulty items. Empirically determined information uptake functions revealed steep initial learning for easy items with little subsequent increase. For medium-difficulty items, initial gains were smaller but more sustained, suggesting that the strategy people had used, when given free choice, was largely appropriate. On the basis of the information uptake functions, a negative spacing effect was predicted and observed in the final experiment. Overall, the results favored the region of proximal learning framework.     

Is study time allocated selectively to a region of proximal learning?

Five experiments investigated whether people allocate their study time according to the discrepancy reduction model (i.e., to the most difficult items; J. Dunlosky & C. Hertzog, 1998) or to items in their own region of proximal learning. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, as more time was given, people shifted toward studying more difficult items. Experts, whether college students or Grade 6 children, devoted their time to items that were more difficult than did novices. However, in a multiple-trials experiment, people regressed toward easier items on Trial 2 rather than shifting to more difficult items, perhaps because Trial 1 feedback revealed poor learning of the easiest items. These findings are in opposition to the discrepancy reduction model and support the region of proximal learning hypothesis.     

Metacognitive and control strategies in study-time allocation

This article investigates how people's metacognitive judgments influence subsequent study-time-allocation strategies. The authors present a comprehensive literature review indicating that people allocate more study time to judged-difficult than to judged-easy items--consistent with extant models of study-time allocation. However, typically, the materials were short, and participants had ample time for study. In contrast, in Experiment 1, when participants had insufficient time to study, they allocated more time to the judged-easy items than to the judged-difficult items, especially when expecting a test. In Experiment 2, when the materials were shorter, people allocated more study time to the judged-difficult materials. In Experiment 3, under high time pressure, people preferred studying judged-easy sonnets; under moderate time pressure, they showed no preference. These results provide new evidence against extant theories of study-time allocation.     

Switch costs and the operand-recognition paradigm

Experimental research in cognitive arithmetic frequently relies on participants’ self-reports to discriminate solutions based on direct memory retrieval from use of procedural strategies. Given concerns about the validity and reliability of strategy reports, Thevenot et al. in Mem Cogn 35:1344–1352, (2007) developed the operand-recognition paradigm as an objective measure of arithmetic strategies. Participants performed addition or number comparison on two sequentially presented operands followed by a speeded operand-recognition task. Recognition times increased with problem size following addition but not comparison. Thevenot et al. argued that the complexity of addition strategies increases with problem size. A corresponding increase in operand-recognition time occurs because, as problem size increases, working memory contains more numerical distracters. However, because addition is substantially more difficult than comparison, and difficulty increases with problem size for addition but not comparison, their findings could be due to difficulty-related task-switching costs. We repeated Thevenot et al. (Experiment 1) but added a control condition wherein participants performed a parity (odd or even) task instead of operand recognition. We replicated their findings for operand recognition but found robust, albeit smaller, effects of addition problem size on parity judgements. The results indicate that effects of strategy complexity in the operand-recognition paradigm are confounded with task-switching effects, which complicates its application as a precise measure of strategy complexity in arithmetic.     

Errors committed with high confidence are hypercorrected.

The relation between people's confidence in the accuracy of an erroneous response and their later performance was investigated. Most models of human memory suggest that the higher a person's confidence, the stronger the item (in the context of the eliciting cue) that is retrieved from memory. In recall, stronger associates to a cue interfere with competing associates more than do weaker associates. This state of affairs implies that errors endorsed with high, rather than low, confidence should be more difficult to correct by learning the correct response feedback. In contrast to the authors' expectations, highly confident errors were the most likely to be corrected in a subsequent retest. Participants nearly always endorsed the correct response in cases in which both the correct response and the original erroneous response were generated at retest, suggesting that people possess a refined metacognitive ability to know what is correct and incorrect.