The effect ofsome andall on reaction time for semantic decisions

Two experiments tested a model proposed by Meyer (1970) to account for the times required to verify semantic-memory statements quantified byall orsome. Each S was presented with bothall andsome statements in a mixed list, and the discriminability of false statements of the two quantifier types was controlled. In Experiment I positive subset statements ("horses are animals") were verified more quickly when quantified byall rather thansome; the reverse ordering occurred for negative subset statements ("horses are not animals"). Sentences with pseudowords in subject or predicate position took longer to reject than false real-word sentences. These findings contradict :Meyer's theoretical predictions and suggest that his earlier results were artifactual. Experiment II replicated the faster verification of positive subset statements quantified byall. This result was further shown to be predictable from the frequency with which Ss gave the predicate as a completion ofAll/Some S are _. The production frequency of predicates which form subset statements was lower when the quantifier wassome rather thanall. However, holding predicate production frequency constant, sentences with different quantifiers were verified equally quickly.     

Describing our “humanness”: Can genetic science alter what it means to be “human”?

Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This paper inquires how “humanness” has been defined within various academic fields. The views of several legal theoreists, scientists, bioethicists, psychologists, philosophers and anthropologists whose works seem to best reflect how “humanness” is understood in their respective fields of study are considered. Our survey attempts to chart a path for a more detailed study on the meaning of “humanness” in the future. We assess four traits commonly identified in the literature as defining what it means to be human: cognition, biological or physiological composition, social interaction with other “human” beings, and spirituality. The nature of the relationship between these characteristics, in our view, is symbiotic: genetic intervention which alters one of them could have repercussions on one or more of the others. In conclusion, we offer guidance to those participating in genetic research and treatment regarding the parameters within which they may proceed without threatening the preservation of what is distinctively human.     

Item-specific effects in recognition failure: Reasons for rejection of the Tulving-Wiseman function

The present paper addresses the problems of whether recognition failure of recallable words is a function of both recognition and recall, and whether recognition failure is restricted to a small and specifiable subset of study items. A meta-analysis of the Nilsson—Gardiner database (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993) showed that recognition given recall was positively correlated with recognition and negatively correlated with recall. Two new experiments are reported, the first one using 48 word pairs for which recognition failure was found in previous studies. An item analysis of the data demonstrated that recognition failure occurred primarily with noun—adjective pairs. The second experiment compared Norwegian—American and American—Norwegian name pairs. Wide deviation from the Tulving—Wiseman function (Tulving & Wiseman, 1975) was observed for the latter condition. In both conditions, recognition failure occurred with only the items for which the beginnings of names shared three or more letters. It is concluded that recognition failure occurs when there exists a relationship between the members of an A—B pair that is independent of their pairing in the study context. The Tulving—Wiseman function is the result of collapsing across items in the analysis of previous studies.     

Harm-doing and victim's racial or orthopedic stigma as determinants of helping behavior.

Three experiments tested a prediction derived from an ambivalence theory of behavior toward the stigmatized. The prediction was that unintentional harm-doers would be more likely to make restitution by doing a favor for a stigmatized victim than for a nonstigmatized one. In Experiment 1 it was upheld for black versus white victims. In Experiment 2, where the victim of harm-doing was either physically handicapped or normal, the prediction was upheld only among older subjects, following the post hoc introduction of an age variable. Experiment 3 also used a physical disability variable. The data were consistent with the prediction, although the adequacy of the harm-doing manipulation was not checked empirically. On the whole, these results are seen as complementing previous findings of amplified post-harm-doing denigration of black and disabled victims. An assumption that the relationship between harm-doing and altruism was mediated by guilt arousal received only fragmentary support. That is, self-reports of guilt were highest in the harm-doing black confederate condition in Experiment 1, and self-reports of negative affect were highest in the harm-doing/wheelchair confederate condition in Experiment 3, but there were no significant relationships between individual differences in guilt or negative affect on the one hand, and amount of helping, on the other.     

Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood as measures of coherence as striking agreement, while the third measure represents coherence as agreement. Thus, prior (in)dependence can be used to distinguish different conceptions of coherence.     

Coherence measures and inference to the best explanation

This paper considers an application of work on probabilistic measures of coherence to inference to the best explanation (IBE). Rather than considering information reported from different sources, as is usually the case when discussing coherence measures, the approach adopted here is to use a coherence measure to rank competing explanations in terms of their coherence with a piece of evidence. By adopting such an approach IBE can be made more precise and so a major objection to this mode of reasoning can be addressed. Advantages of the coherence-based approach are pointed out by comparing it with several other ways to characterize ‘best explanation’ and showing that it takes into account their insights while overcoming some of their problems. The consequences of adopting this approach for IBE are discussed in the context of recent discussions about the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism.