Cost-effectiveness of online positive psychology: Randomized controlled trial

As yet, no evidence is available about the cost-effectiveness of positive psychological interventions. When offered via the Internet, these interventions may be particularly cost-effective, because they are highly scalable and do not rely on scant resources such as therapists’ time. Alongside a randomized controlled trial of an online positive psychological intervention, a health-economic evaluation was conducted. Mild to moderately depressed adults seeking self-help and recruited in the general population were randomly assigned to the intervention group (n?=?143) and a waitlisted usual care group (n?=?141). Improved clinical outcomes were achieved in the intervention group (at least for depression) at higher costs. When outliers (the top 2.5%, n?=?5 in intervention group, n?=?2 in control group) were removed, cost-effectiveness was increased considerably. For positive psychology, economic evaluations may be a means to nudge policy decision-makers towards placing positive psychological interventions on the health agenda.     

Redeeming Apartheid's Legacy: Collective Guilt, Political Ideology, and Compensation

This paper reports two studies among white South African students on feelings of collective guilt about apartheid and attitudes to affirmative action. Study 1 reports on 21 in-depth interviews, Study 2 on results from 180 survey questionnaires. Substantial proportions of the participants in both studies displayed feelings of collective guilt. Among participants in both studies who identified strongly with white South Africans, some displayed strong feelings of collective guilt while others displayed no such feelings. Our survey data suggest that political ideology functions as a moderator. Strong feelings of guilt were found among students who identified strongly with white South Africans and defined themselves as liberals. If they defined themselves as conservatives then no feelings of collective guilt were observed. Strong feelings of collective guilt were accompanied by positive attitudes toward affirmative action. The influence of political ideology on attitudes toward affirmative action was mediated by collective guilt.     

Coping with an ego-threat: Monitoring and blunting during an intelligence test

This study investigated the predictive validity of the Miller Behavioral Style Scale (MBSS; Miller, 1987). Subjects had to work on an intelligence test. During this test, they could observe lights that informed them on how they were performing. There were two conditions: a low-stress condition (n = 37) in which the lights always indicated that the subject was performing well, and a high-stress condition (n.= 33) in which the lights signalled a deterioration of performance. In general, little support was found for the predictive validity of the MBSS.     

Interacting noradrenergic and corticosteroid systems shift human brain activation patterns during encoding

Emotionally arousing experiences are usually well retained, an effect that depends on the release of adrenal stress hormones. Animal studies have shown that corticosterone and noradrenaline – representing the two main stress hormone systems – act in concert to enhance memory formation by actions involving the amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex (PFC). Here we test whether interactions between these two stress hormone systems also affect human memory formation as well as the associated pattern of brain activation. To this end, forty-eight male human subjects received hydrocortisone, yohimbine or both before presentation of emotional and neutral pictures. Activity in the amygdala, hippocampus and PFC was monitored with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) during encoding of these stimuli, when hormonal levels were elevated. Memory performance was tested 1 week later. We investigated whether an increased level of one of the two hormone systems would lead to differential effects compared to the combined application of the drugs on brain activation and memory performance. We report that the application of cortisol led to an overall enhancing effect on recognition memory, with no significant additional effect of yohimbine. However, during encoding the brain switched from amygdala/hippocampus activation with either hormone alone, to a strong deactivation of prefrontal areas under the influence of the combination of both exogenous hormones. Although we did not find evidence that exogenous stimulation of the noradrenergic and corticosteroid systems led to significant interaction effects on memory performance in this experiment, we conclude that stress hormone levels during encoding did differentially determine the activation pattern of the brain circuits here involved.     

Treatment of acrophobia in virtual reality: the role of immersion and presence

In this study the effects of virtual reality exposure therapy (VRET) were investigated in patients with acrophobia. Feelings of presence in VRET were systematically varied by using either a head-mounted display (HMD) (low presence) or a computer automatic virtual environment (CAVE) (high presence). VRET in general was found to be more effective than no treatment. No differences were found in effectiveness between VRET using an HMD or CAVE. Results were maintained at 6 months follow-up. Results of VRET were comparable with those of exposure in vivo (Cyberpsychology and Behavior 4 (2001) 335). In treatment completers no relationship was found between presence and anxiety. Early drop-outs experienced less acrophobic complaints and psychopathology in general at pre-test. They also experienced less presence and anxiety in the virtual environment used in session one as compared to patients that completed VRET.     

Trained interpretive bias and anxiety

The relationship between anxiety and interpretive bias has been studied extensively, but the causal direction of this relationship remains largely unexplored. Do negative interpretations cause anxiety or is anxiety the cause of negative interpretations? Or are the two mutually reinforcing? The present study addressed this issue by experimentally inducing either a negative or a positive interpretive bias using Mathews and Mackintosh' [(2002). Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 604-615] training paradigm and then examining its impact on state anxiety and anxiety vulnerability. In addition, it was investigated as to whether the interpretive bias was trained implicitly. Results indicated that style of interpreting could be manipulated. That is, when confronted with ambiguous information after the training, participants (n=118) interpreted this information congruent with their (positive or negative) training condition. Data on the issue of implicitness showed that participants tended to be explicitly aware of the valence of their training stimuli. Effects of trained interpretive bias on anxiety were only marginal and absent on anxiety vulnerability. It appears that interpretive bias can be trained reliably, but its effects on mood and vulnerability require further explanation.     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

Working memory and the attentional blink: Blink size is predicted by individual differences in operation span

The attentional blink (AB) is often attributed to resource limitations, but the nature of these resources is commonly underspecified. Recent observations rule out access to short-term memory or storage capacity as limiting factors, but operation bottlenecks are still an option. We considered the operation span of working memory (WM) as a possible factor and investigated the relationship between individual WM operation span (as measured by OSPAN), fluid intelligence (as measures by Raven’s SPM), and the size of the AB. WM operation span was negatively correlated with the AB, whereas fluid intelligence was associated with higher overall accuracy but not with AB magnitude. These results support the idea that individual processing limitations (with regard to either attentional allocation policies or the speed of global cortical integration processes) play a key role in the AB.     

Anger proneness in women: Development and validation of the anger situation questionnaire

In the present series of studies existing hostility and anger trait questionnaires were examined. We found them to be unsuitable for our subjects and purpose, A new questionnaire based on novel principles, the Anger Situation Questionnaire (ASQ), was developed to measure anger proneness in women. The ASQ consists of 33 vignettes or scenarios, Each vignette has three dimensions: emotional experience, intensity of emotional experience, and action readiness mode. The ASQ was administered to 146 female students. Out of this sample two extreme groups were selected of 30 subjects each: one group scoring low on self-reported anger and angry readiness, the other group scoring high on both aspects. An anger-induction paradigm was developed consisting of essentially three elements: a physically aversive situation, the performance of some frustrative tasks, as well as an unpleasantly acting female experimenter. The ASQ was validated in this paradigm: subjects scoring high on the ASQ became more angry due to these manipulations; moreover, in most of the subjects at one moment or another a state of anger was induced. © 1994 wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Neural substrates of individual differences in human fear learning: Evidence from concurrent fMRI, fear-potentiated startle, and US-expectancy data

To provide insight into individual differences in fear learning, we examined the emotional and cognitive expressions of discriminative fear conditioning in direct relation to its neural substrates. Contrary to previous behavioral-neural (fMRI) research on fear learning--in which the emotional expression of fear was generally indexed by skin conductance--we used fear-potentiated startle, a more reliable and specific index of fear. While we obtained concurrent fear-potentiated startle, neuroimaging (fMRI), and US-expectancy data, healthy participants underwent a fear-conditioning paradigm in which one of two conditioned stimuli (CS(+) but not CS(-)) was paired with a shock (unconditioned stimulus [US]). Fear learning was evident from the differential expressions of fear (CS(+) > CS(-)) at both the behavioral level (startle potentiation and US expectancy) and the neural level (in amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and insula). We examined individual differences in discriminative fear conditioning by classifying participants (as conditionable vs. unconditionable) according to whether they showed successful differential startle potentiation. This revealed that the individual differences in the emotional expression of discriminative fear learning (startle potentiation) were reflected in differential amygdala activation, regardless of the cognitive expression of fear learning (CS-US contingency or hippocampal activation). Our study provides the first evidence for the potential of examining startle potentiation in concurrent fMRI research on fear learning.