Working memory, fluid intelligence, and impulsiveness in heavy media multitaskers

Ophir, Nass, and Wagner (Proceedings of the National Association of Sciences 106:15583–15587, 2009) reported that individuals who routinely engage in multiple forms of media use are actually worse at multitasking, possibly due to difficulties in ignoring irrelevant stimuli, from both external sources and internal representations in memory. Using the media multitasking index (MMI) developed by Ophir et al., we identified heavy media multitaskers (HMMs) and light media multitaskers (LMMs) and tested them on measures of attention, working memory, task switching, and fluid intelligence, as well as self-reported impulsivity and self-control. We found that people who reported engaging in heavy amounts of media multitasking reported being more impulsive and performed more poorly on measures of fluid intelligence than did those who did not frequently engage in media multitasking. However, we could find no evidence to support the contention that HMMs are worse in a multitasking situation such as task switching or that they show any deficits in dealing with irrelevant or distracting information, as compared with LMMs.     

Anxiety and Creativity

Abstract

Man parses through the present with his eyes blindfolded. He is permitted merely to sense and guess at what he is actually experiencing. Only later when the cloth is untied can he glance at the past and find out what he has experienced and what meaning it has had.     

Subjective Uncertainty as a Predictor of Specific Exploration

This study compared two measures of subjective uncertainty to a measure of experimenter-defined uncertainty in their prediction of specific exploration in children (N = 93 boy and girls aged 6–7 to 10–11 years old). As suggested by Berlyne, subjective uncertainty was hypothesized to be a more effective measure in predicting specific exploratory behavior than experimenter-defined uncertainty, since it accounts for the contributions of the individual engaged in the exploration. Results supported the hypothesis, indicating that both measures of subjective uncertainty were significantly better predictors of specific exploration than an experimenter-defined measure.     

Negotiating Health-Related Uncertainties: Biomedical and Religious Sources of Information and Support

This article explores how people experience health-related uncertainties and how they look to biomedical and religious sources of information in response. Data were gathered in a larger project focused on spirituality in everyday life. Respondents were not asked any direct questions about their health or health care, but almost all of the 95 participants brought up the topics in response to other questions. About one-third spoke of being uncertain about some aspect of their health or healthcare. We explore the health-related topics about which people were uncertain and how they looked to biomedical and religious sources of information, most often seeing the religious as a support for the biomedical. We outline the range of ways they experienced God in this process pointing to the multiple complex ways they make sense of health-related uncertainties.     

Habituality and Undecidability: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on the Decision

This essay examines the relationship that obtains between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida through exploring an interesting point of dissension in their respective accounts of decision-making. Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy emphasizes the body-subject's tendency to seek an equilibrium with the world (by acquiring skills and establishing what he refers to as 'intentional arcs'), and towards deciding in an embodied and habitual manner that minimizes any confrontation with what might be termed a decision-making aporia. On the other hand, in his later writings, Derrida frequently points towards a constitutive 'undecidability' involved in decision-making. He insists that a decision, if it is genuinely to be a decision, must involve a leap beyond all prior preparations, and this ensures that an aporia surrounds any attempt to decide. One must always decide without any equilibrium or stability, and yet these are precisely the things that Merleau-Ponty claims that our body moves us towards. Most of this essay will explore the significance of this disparity, and it will be argued that many of Merleau-Ponty's insights challenge the Derridean conception of the undecidability involved in decision-making. This becomes most obvious when comparing the decision-making processes of those expert in a particular field to those who are merely competent (for example chess), and this essay will attempt to establish that the aporia that Derrida discerns can actually be seen to constrict.     

Shared Expectations and Implicit Coordination in Tennis Doubles Teams

Very little of the existing research on team cognition has looked at sports teams. The purpose of this study was to extend previous research to the sports domain, and empirically test the relationship between one aspect of team cognition—shared expectations—and implicit coordination in 71 American tennis doubles teams. We tested a model hypothesizing a link between prior experience, shared expectations, and implicit coordination. Prior experience influenced implicit coordination directly, as well as through a positive relationship with shared expectations. The findings highlight the potential of using behavioral measures of team coordination in sport psychology.     

Predicting Burnout Among HIV/AIDS and Oncology Health Care Workers

Abstract

This study examined the relationship between repressive coping, controllability, self-esteem and comparative optimism for health-related events. Repressors (low trait anxiety-high defensiveness) compared with both (a) specific control groups on anxiety and defensiveness (e.g., low-anxious, high-anxious and defensive high anxious) and (b) total nonrepressors were significantly more comparatively optimistic for health-related events. Repressors remained significantly more comparatively optimistic than total nonrepressors when self-esteem was partialled out.

For individual events, repressors differed in comparative optimism for events which were rated as high controllability. It is concluded that repressors are exhibiting comparative optimism over and above nonrepressor groups for events which are rated as controllable. These results suggest that comparative optimism findings may be exaggerated by not controlling for the disproportionate influence of repressors in skewing sample means. Suggestions for future studies are discussed.     

Regressive Imagery in Creative Problem‐Solving: Comparing Verbal Protocols of Expert and Novice Visual Artists and Computer Programmers

We applied computer‐based text analyses of regressive imagery to verbal protocols of individuals engaged in creative problem‐solving in two domains: visual art (23 experts, 23 novices) and computer programming (14 experts, 14 novices). Percentages of words involving primary process and secondary process thought, plus emotion‐related words, were tabulated. Visual art protocols were higher in primary process thought and emotion‐related words; those from programming were higher in secondary process thought. Almost no main effects of expertise or interactions were found. Correlations between the measures (particularly those involving emotion‐related words) also varied as a function of task. This pattern suggests cognitive processes vary considerably across different creative problem‐solving tasks or domains, and that a more domain‐specific approach to creative cognition may be advisable. Further implications for integrating and consolidating some extant lines of creativity research are discussed.     

Counterfactual and Factual Reflection: The Influence of Past Misdeeds on Future Immoral Behavior

Though the decision to behave immorally is situated within the context of prior immoral behavior, research has provided contradictory insights into this process. In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that the effects of prior immoral behavior depend on how individuals think about, or reflect on, their immoral behavior. In Experiment 1, participants who reflected counterfactually on their prior moral lapses morally disengaged (i.e., rationalized) less than participants who reflected factually. In Experiment 2, participants who reflected counterfactually on their prior moral lapses experienced more guilt than those who reflected factually. Finally, in Experiments 3 and 4, participants who reflected counterfactually lied less on unrelated tasks with real monetary stakes than those who reflected factually. Our studies provide important insights into moral rationalization and moral compensation processes and demonstrate the profound influence of reflection in everyday moral life.