Investigating the Dimensionality of Counterproductive Work Behavior

The study investigated the dimensionality of counterproductive work behavior (CWB) by examining the relationships between various counterproductive behaviors. Utilizing a university alumni sample (N = 343), data was collected through both self–report and direct judgments of the likelihood of co–occurrence. Eleven categories of CWB were examined: (1) Theft and Related Behavior; (2) Destruction of Property; (3) Misuse of Information; (4) Misuse of Time and Resources; (5) Unsafe Behavior; (6) Poor Attendance; (7) Poor Quality Work; (8) Alcohol Use; (9) Drug Use; (10) Inappropriate Verbal Actions; and (11) Inappropriate Physical Actions. CWB items and categories were generally positively related. Multidimensional scaling analysis suggests that the CWB categories vary on two dimensions: an Interpersonal–Organizational dimension and a Task Relevance dimension.     

Two Egocentric Sources of the Decision to Vote: The Voter's Illusion and the Belief in Personal Relevance

The decision to vote in a national election requires a choice between serving a social good and satisfying one's self-interest. Viewed as a cooperative response in a social dilemma, casting a vote seems irrational because it cannot have a discernible effect on the electoral outcome. The findings of two studies with undergraduate samples suggest that some people vote not because they set aside self-interest, but because they expect their own behaviors to matter. Two psychological processes contribute to this belief: the voter's illusion (the projection of one's own choice between voting and abstention to supporters of the same party or candidate), and the belief in personal relevance (the belief that one's own vote matters regardless of its predictive value for the behavior of others). The rationality of these two egocentric mechanisms depends on the normative framework invoked. Their relevance for actual voting behavior is indicated by their ability to account for four types of variation in turnout rates.     

Experience and information loss in auditory and visual memory

Recent studies show that recognition memory for sounds is inferior to memory for pictures. Four experiments were conducted to examine the nature of auditory and visual memory. Experiments 1–3 were conducted to evaluate the role of experience in auditory and visual memory. Participants received a study phase with pictures/sounds, followed by a recognition memory test. Participants then completed auditory training with each of the sounds, followed by a second memory test. Despite auditory training in Experiments 1 and 2, visual memory was superior to auditory memory. In Experiment 3, we found that it is possible to improve auditory memory, but only after 3 days of specific auditory training and 3 days of visual memory decay. We examined the time course of information loss in auditory and visual memory in Experiment 4 and found a trade-off between visual and auditory recognition memory: Visual memory appears to have a larger capacity, while auditory memory is more enduring. Our results indicate that visual and auditory memory are inherently different memory systems and that differences in visual and auditory recognition memory performance may be due to the different amounts of experience with visual and auditory information, as well as structurally different neural circuitry specialized for information retention.     

Stuck on semantics: Processing of irrelevant object-scene inconsistencies modulates ongoing gaze behavior

People have an amazing ability to identify objects and scenes with only a glimpse. How automatic is this scene and object identification? Are scene and object semantics—let alone their semantic congruity—processed to a degree that modulates ongoing gaze behavior even if they are irrelevant to the task at hand? Objects that do not fit the semantics of the scene (e.g., a toothbrush in an office) are typically fixated longer and more often than objects that are congruent with the scene context. In this study, we overlaid a letter T onto photographs of indoor scenes and instructed participants to search for it. Some of these background images contained scene-incongruent objects. Despite their lack of relevance to the search, we found that participants spent more time in total looking at semantically incongruent compared to congruent objects in the same position of the scene. Subsequent tests of explicit and implicit memory showed that participants did not remember many of the inconsistent objects and no more of the consistent objects. We argue that when we view natural environments, scene and object relationships are processed obligatorily, such that irrelevant semantic mismatches between scene and object identity can modulate ongoing eye-movement behavior.     

Children's understanding of belief as a normative concept

The variety of accounts of theory of mind development, arising from distinct theoretical perspectives, have focused on children's causal-explanatory views on the mind and have not developed accounts of children's normative judgments of the mental domain. This review maintains that such a focus is unfortunate and leaves our understanding of belief as a concept incomplete. First, by presenting an alternative framework that treats belief as a normative concept, this account discusses the central importance of children's understanding of epistemic justification and their appreciation of the normative significance of others’ reasons for belief. Next, this review of the relevant theory of mind literature proposes a new way of thinking about the findings of various domains in this field and gives particular attention to prior work on false belief, origins or sources of belief, and the distinctions between fantastical and epistemic states. On the basis of this review, it is concluded that in order to accurately assess the development of the concept of belief, further research is required on children's views of how beliefs ought to be formed, their evaluation of justified and unjustified believers, and the notions of duty or responsibility they associate with epistemic agents.     

Attitudes Toward Prostitution and Acceptance of Rape Myths1

Rape myths and prostitution myths are a component of culturally supported attitudes that normalize violence against women. Prostitution myths justify the existence of prostitution, promote misinformation about prostitution, and contribute to a social climate that exploits and harms not only prostituted women, but all women. This study investigated the relationship between prostitution myth acceptance and rape myth acceptance in a sample of university undergraduates. Rape myth acceptance was positively correlated with prostitution myth acceptance among 783 university undergraduates from California, Iowa, Oregon, and Texas. College men were significantly more accepting of prostitution myths than were college women. Results suggest that acceptance of prostitution myths are a component of attitudes that justify violence against women.