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21.
Alfred R. Mele 《Philosophical Studies》2014,170(2):359-375
Do people sometimes exercise self-control in such a way as to bring it about that they do not act on present-directed motivation that continues to be motivationally strongest for a significant stretch of time (even though they are able to act on that motivation at the time) and intentionally act otherwise during that stretch of time? This paper explores the relative merits of two different theories about synchronic self-control that provide different answers to this question. One is due to Sripada (Noûs 1–38, 2012) and the other to Mele (Irrationality, 1987; Autonomous agents, 1995; Motivation and agency, 2003). Special attention is paid to evidence Sripada offers for an affirmative answer to the question, and some guidance is offered on the project of finding evidence for an affirmative answer. 相似文献
22.
Alfred R. Mele 《The Journal of Ethics》2016,20(1-3):69-82
This article identifies and assesses a way of thinking that might help to explain why some compatibilists are attracted to what is variously called an internalist, structuralist, or anti-historicist view of moral responsibility—a view about the bearing of agents’ histories on their moral responsibility. Scenarios of two different kinds are considered. Several scenarios feature heavy-duty manipulation that radically changes an agent’s mature moral personality from admirable to despicable or vice versa. These “radical reversal” scenarios are contrasted with a scenario featuring “original design”: a supernatural designer determines exactly how an agent’s life will go before the agent comes into existence. It is explained why scenarios of these two different kinds generate very different challenges to compatibilism. Partly in light of that explanation, it is argued that the way of thinking at issue is misguided. 相似文献
23.
Bullying almost always occurs in the presence of peers, most of whom do not intervene to stop it. This study examined the role of attachment, empathy, and gender in predicting the behavior of 105 middle school students who reported being either (a) defenders who actively intervened to stop bullying, or (b) outsiders who were either not involved or stood by passively. It was hypothesized that gender, attachment to mother, attachment to father, and empathy would predict whether children nominated themselves as defenders in bullying situations. A hierarchical logistic regression analysis indicated that these variables together significantly predicted whether children nominated themselves as defenders or outsiders. Gender was not a unique significant predictor. Attachment to mother contributed significant unique variance to the model, but attachment to father did not after accounting for gender and attachment to mother. Empathy contributed significant unique variance to the model even after accounting for all other variables. Results suggest that middle school personnel should openly discuss with students their roles in bullying interactions. In addition, teaching empathy towards others and involving parents may be critical components in comprehensive prevention programs. 相似文献
24.
Alfred R. Mele 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(5):630-648
Abstract: This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action‐producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt‐style case for Chisholm's views of free will and moral responsibility and for libertarianism in general. It is suggested that Chisholm's efforts will and should continue to offer important assistance to libertarians who are determined to succeed where he apparently fell short. 相似文献
25.
Alfred Mele 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):161-181
To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer. 相似文献
26.
Alfred R. Mele 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2021,102(3):559-573
This article has two primary aims. The first is to identify relationships among direct control, direct moral responsibility for an action, and directly free action. The second is to provide a partial map depicting the bearing of some familiar competing views about moral responsibility and free action – traditional compatibilism, semicompatibilism, and event-causal libertarianism – on differences in conceptions of direct and indirect species of moral responsibility and free action. 相似文献
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Mele AR 《The Behavioral and brain sciences》1997,20(1):91-102; discussion 103-36
Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar "paradoxes" about the dynamics of self-deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-deception are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of self-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs. 相似文献
30.
Philosophical Studies - This article explores the alleged “selectivity problem” for Alfred Mele’s deflationary position on self-deception, a problem that can allegedly be solved... 相似文献