Task switching and response correspondence in the psychological refractory period paradigm

Three experiments examined the effects of task switching and response correspondence in a psychological refractory period paradigm. A letter task (vowel-consonant) and a digit task (odd-even) were combined to form 4 possible dual-task pairs in each trial: letter-letter, letter-digit, digit-digit, and digit-letter. Foreknowledge of task transition (repeat or switch) and task identity (letter or digit) was varied across experiments: no foreknowledge in Experiment 1, partial foreknowledge (task transition only) in Experiment 2, and full foreknowledge in Experiment 3. For all experiments, the switch cost for Task 2 was additive with stimulus onset asynchrony, and the response-correspondence effect for Task 2 was numerically smaller in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. These outcomes suggest that reconfiguration for Task 2 takes place after the central processing of Task 1 and that the crosstalk correspondence effect is due to response activation by way of stimulus-response associations.     

Proactive versus reactive task-set inhibition: Evidence from flanker compatibility effects

Two converging tests were used to determine whether people proactively inhibit recently performed tasks when switching to new tasks. A task-cuing paradigm was used. In each trial, the relevant stimulus was accompanied by flankers belonging either to the task performed on the immediately preceding trial (lag 1) or a more distant trial (lag 21). If the just-performed task is inhibited when switching to another task, and this inhibition declines across trials, then flanker interference should be smaller with lag 1 flankers than with lag 21 flankers. Experiment 1, following the methods of Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2003), failed to confirm this prediction. The prediction was confirmed in Experiment 2, however, using a design modified to provide greater incentives for task-set inhibition. The results provide evidence that inhibition can be applied proactively, to reduce the ability of an abandoned task to interfere with the performance of other tasks.     

Processing visual words with numbers: Electrophysiological evidence for semantic activation

Perea, Duñabeitia, and Carreiras (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 34:237–241, 2008) found that LEET stimuli, formed by a mixture of digits and letters (e.g., T4BL3 instead of TABLE), produced priming effects similar to those for regular words. This finding led them to conclude that LEET stimuli automatically activate lexical information. In the present study, we examined whether semantic activation occurs for LEET stimuli by using an electrophysiological measure called the N400 effect. The N400 effect, also known as the mismatch negativity, reflects detection of a mismatch between a word and the current semantic context. This N400 effect could occur only if the LEET stimulus had been identified and processed semantically. Participants determined whether a stimulus (word or LEET) was related to a given category (e.g., APPLE or 4PPL3 belongs to the category “fruit,” but TABLE or T4BL3 does not). We found that LEET stimuli produced an N400 effect similar in magnitude to that for regular uppercase words, suggesting that LEET stimuli can access meaning in a manner similar to words presented in consistent uppercase letters.     

On the limits of advance preparation for a task switch: do people prepare all the task some of the time or some of the task all the time?

This study investigated the nature of advance preparation for a task switch, testing 2 key assumptions of R. De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage theory: (a) Task-switch preparation is all-or-none, and (b) preparation failures stem from nonutilization of available control capabilities. In 3 experiments, switch costs varied dramatically across individual stimulus-response (S-R) pairs of the tasks-virtually absent for 1 pair but large for others. These findings indicate that, across trials, task preparation was not all-or-none but, rather, consistently partial (full preparation for some S-R pairs but not others). In other words, people do not prepare all of the task some of the time, they prepare some of the task all of the time. Experiments 2 and 3 produced substantial switch costs even though time deadlines provided strong incentives for optimal advance preparation. Thus, there was no evidence that people have a latent capability to fully prepare for a task switch.     

Dual-task performance with ideomotor-compatible tasks: is the central processing bottleneck intact, bypassed, or shifted in locus?

The present study examined whether the central bottleneck, assumed to be primarily responsible for the psychological refractory period (PRP) effect, is intact, bypassed, or shifted in locus with ideomotor (IM)-compatible tasks. In 4 experiments, factorial combinations of IM- and non-IM-compatible tasks were used for Task 1 and Task 2. All experiments showed substantial PRP effects, with a strong dependency between Task 1 and Task 2 response times. These findings, along with model-based simulations, indicate that the processing bottleneck was not bypassed, even with two IM-compatible tasks. Nevertheless, systematic changes in the PRP and correspondence effects across experiments suggest that IM compatibility shifted the locus of the bottleneck. The findings favor an engage-bottleneck-later hypothesis, whereby parallelism between tasks occurs deeper into the processing stream for IM- than for non-IM-compatible tasks, without the bottleneck being actually eliminated.     

Nonautomatic emotion perception in a dual-task situation

Are emotions perceived automatically? Two psychological refractory period experiments were conducted to ascertain whether emotion perception requires central attentional resources. Task 1 required an auditory discrimination (tone vs. noise), whereas Task 2 required a discrimination between happy and angry faces. The difficulty of Task 2 was manipulated by varying the degree of emotional expression. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between Task 1 and Task 2 was also varied. Experiment 1 revealed additive effects of SOA and Task 2 emotion-perception difficulty. Experiment 2 replicated the additive relationship with a stronger manipulation of emotion-perception difficulty. According to locus-of-slack logic, our participants did not process emotional expressions while central resources were devoted to Task 1. We conclude that emotion perception is not fully automatic.     

Age-related emotional bias in processing two emotionally valenced tasks

Psychological Research - Previous studies suggest that older adults process positive emotions more efficiently than negative emotions, whereas younger adults show the reverse effect. We examined...     

On the nonautomaticity of visual word processing: electrophysiological evidence that word processing requires central attention

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine the degree to which people can process words while devoting central attention to another task. Experiments 1-4 measured the N400 effect, which is sensitive to the degree of mismatch between a word and the current semantic context. Experiment 5 measured the P3 difference between low- and high-frequency words. Because these effects can occur only if a word has been identified, both ERP components index word processing. The authors found that the N400 effect (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the P3 difference (Experiment 5) were strongly attenuated for Task 2 words presented nearly simultaneously with Task 1. No such attenuation was found when the Task 1 stimulus was presented but required no response (Experiment 2). Strong attenuation was also evident when the Task 2 word was presented before the Task 1 stimulus (Experiment 4), suggesting that central resources are not allocated to stimuli first-come, first-served but rather are strategically locked to Task 1. The authors conclude that visual word processing is not fully automatic but rather requires access to limited central attentional resources.     

Inhibition of task set: Converging evidence from task choice in the voluntary task-switching paradigm

This study looked for evidence of task-set inhibition in a voluntary task-switching paradigm. Participants performed one of three tasks on a digit: parity (even or odd), size (less than or greater than 5), or distance (near or far from 5). On each trial, they were allowed to choose which task to perform, with encouragement to perform each task equally often overall and in a random sequence. The question was whether participants would avoid performing a task that they had recently switched away from (e.g., the task performed on trial n22), because the task set was still inhibited. Results confirmed that participants strongly avoided performing the n22 task (e.g., ABA) in favor of performing other tasks (e.g., ABC). This occurred both when participants were required to switch tasks every trial (Experiment 1) and when they were allowed to repeat tasks (Experiment 2). The results suggest that a task set is inhibited during switching to a new task, reducing the likelihood that this task will be selected in the near future.     

Attention capture while switching search strategies: Evidence for a breakdown in top-down attentional control

Whereas capture experiments typically repeat a single task many times, real world cognition is characterized by frequent switching. Lien, Ruthruff, and Johnston (2010) reported that the attentional control system can rapidly and fully switch between different search settings (e.g., red to green), with no carryover and no intertrial priming. The present study examined whether this impressive flexibility is possible even when the switch is not between different features along the same dimension, but between mutually incompatible search modes. On each trial, participants were prompted to find and identify the letter that was in a specific colour (feature search mode) or was uniquely coloured (singleton search mode). Within each block, search mode was either pure or mixed; the mixed blocks contained a fixed AABB search sequence (singleton-singleton-feature-feature) in Experiment 1 and a random sequence in Experiment 2. The target display was preceded by a noninformative cue display containing a nontarget colour singleton. In pure feature search blocks, these irrelevant singleton cues were generally unable to capture attention, replicating previous findings of “contingent capture”. In mixed blocks, however, irrelevant colour singletons captured attention on feature search trials. This breakdown indicates a limitation in the sharpness of attentional control following mode switches, which might be common in the real world.