Presentism and the Notion of Existence

The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance.     

Data-driven and conceptually driven processes in partial-word identification and recognition

Three experiments examined priming in partial-word identification (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968) and its relation to recognition memory. The results showed that changes in modality of presentation between study and test reduced performance on both identification and recognition. In contrast, changes in elaborative processing enhanced recognition but had no effect on identification. Furthermore, when explicit memory instructions were given, identification was changed to a cued recall test and was consequently affected by elaborative processing. We also found that the time course of forgetting in priming was different from that in recognition; priming in identification did not change over a 24-hr interval, whereas recognition declined rapidly during this interval. Overall, these results suggest that identification relies primarily on data-driven processing, whereas recognition can rely on both data-driven and conceptually driven processing.     

Associations between emotional avoidance,anxiety sensitivity,and reactions to an observational fear challenge procedure

Research has shown that emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity are associated with more self-reported fear and distress in response to laboratory fear challenge procedures. The present study aimed to expand upon this work and examined how emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity are related to emotional and physiological responses to an observational fear challenge procedure. To accomplish this aim, a carefully screened, non-clinical sample (N = 43) was administered the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ), a measure of emotional avoidance, and the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI). Participants then engaged in an observational fear challenge paradigm. During the fear challenge, participants watched mock panic attacks while emotional (e.g., fear and panic) and skin conductance levels were assessed. Consistent with expectation, emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity were positively associated with more self-reported fear and more severe panic symptoms to the challenge procedure. However, anxiety sensitivity was more highly associated with self-reported fear and panic symptoms in response to the challenge procedure than emotional avoidance. Emotional avoidance and anxiety sensitivity were not associated with levels of physiological arousal to the observational fear challenge procedure. Discussion focuses on the interplay between emotional avoidance, anxiety sensitivity, and the development of vicarious fear responses and how these constructs may contribute to the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders.     

The Practicality of Ancient Virtue Ethics: Greece and China

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics “practical science.” How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion.