Expertise,Argumentation, and the End of Inquiry

This paper argues that the problem of expertise calls for a rapprochement between social epistemology and argumentation theory. Social epistemology has tended to emphasise the role of expert testimony, neglecting the argumentative function of appeals to expert opinion by non-experts. The first half of the paper discusses parallels and contrasts between the two cases of direct expert testimony and appeals to expert opinion by our epistemic peers, respectively. Importantly, appeals to expert opinion need to be advertised as such, if they are to sway an epistemic peer. The second half of the paper sketches a theoretical framework for thinking about assessments of expertise in a unified way, via a ‘default and challenge’ model that emphasises the need for a version of conversational scorekeeping. It is through such scorekeeping that interlocutors can track and coordinate their differences in epistemic outlook. The paper concludes with a genealogical perspective on the function of (attributions of) expertise: acceptance of another’s appeal to expert opinion may be construed as tacit agreement that inquiry, for now, has been taken far enough.     

Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Self‐concepts of Intelligence Predict Performance on Tests of Intelligence

Three studies investigated the correspondence between implicit and explicit self‐concepts of intelligence and how that correspondence is related to performance on different intelligence tests. Configurations of these two self‐concepts were found to be consistently related to performance on intelligence tests in all three studies. For individuals who self‐reported high intelligence (high explicit self‐concept), a negative implicit self‐concept (measured with the Implicit Association Test) led to a decrease in performance on intelligence tests. For participants whose self‐report indicated a low self‐concept of intelligence, positive automatic associations between the self and intelligence had a similar effect. In line with a stress hypothesis, the results indicate that any discrepant configuration of self‐concepts will impair performance. Importantly, the prediction of performance on intelligence tests by the self‐concept of intelligence was shown to be independent of self‐esteem (Study 3). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Manipulating attentional load in sequence learning through random number generation

Implicit learning is often assumed to be an effortless process. However, some artificial grammar learning and sequence learning studies using dual tasks seem to suggest that attention is essential for implicit learning to occur. This discrepancy probably results from the specific type of secondary task that is used. Different secondary tasks may engage attentional resources differently and therefore may bias performance on the primary task in different ways. Here, we used a random number generation (RNG) task, which may allow for a closer monitoring of a participant's engagement in a secondary task than the popular secondary task in sequence learning studies: tone counting (TC). In the first two experiments, we investigated the interference associated with performing RNG concurrently with a serial reaction time (SRT) task. In a third experiment, we compared the effects of RNG and TC. In all three experiments, we directly evaluated participants' knowledge of the sequence with a subsequent sequence generation task. Sequence learning was consistently observed in all experiments, but was impaired under dual-task conditions. Most importantly, our data suggest that RNG is more demanding and impairs learning to a greater extent than TC. Nevertheless, we failed to observe effects of the secondary task in subsequent sequence generation. Our studies indicate that RNG is a promising task to explore the involvement of attention in the SRT task.     

The dependency of the validity of information integration on cognitive variables and the judgement task

Simple models of information integration focus essentially on the combination of the components of information. This research investigated whether cognitive variables in the constructs of intelligence and cognitive complexity, as well as concentration, could predict the conditions of simple models of judgement. As additional predictors, the two qualitative variables [type of information] and [experience of the judgement task] were introduced. Subjects judged three types of stimuli using the pair comparison method. The conditions of the judgement models were analysed in the framework of the conjoint-measurement approach. Five different regression functions provided mediocre approximations to the 10 conditions of the models, when the 9 cognitive variables were considered. The small differences did not favour one of the five functions. The introduction of the qualitative predictor [type of information] improved the estimations more clearly than the experience of the judgement task, the effect of which was small.     

Relationship between flanker identifiability and compatibility effect

What is the relation between the identifiability of masked flankers and their ability to induce compatibility effects in a letter classification task? Using a within-subjects design (n=8), we first determined identification performance for two flankers (H or N) around an irrelevant target letter as a function of the time (stimulus onset asynchrony, or SOA) after which the flankers were masked. In a second condition, subjects classified the central letter of the same stimulus patterns irrespectively of the identity of the flankers. The compatibility effects increased with increasing identification performance as a function of SOA, and we found a significant compatibility effect even at an SOA at which the identifiability of the flankers did not differ significantly from zero. We discuss the statistical power of our design and an interpretation of our results in terms of a dissociation between perceptual processes and processes directly activating the motor system (direct parameter specification; cf. Neumann, 1990).     

The efficiency of holistic template matching in the recognition of unconstrained handwritten digits

Summary Psychological evidence suggests that simple visual patterns can be recognized by the use of internal representations as holistic templates, but the efficiency of holistic template matching in the recognition of real-life patterns, such as handwritten characters, has been doubted. To clarify this issue, we measured the efficiency of holistic template matching in machine recognition of totally unconstrained handwritten digits. Our learning and recognition algorithm was simple; no previous knowledge of handwritten digits was presupposed, and preprocessing was limited to Gaussian smoothing and normalization with respect to position, size, and orientation. For patterns presented in a known orientation, recognition rates were .69, .77, and .88, respectively, when about 5, 10, or 50 templates had been learned for each type of digit. For patterns presented in unknown orientations, recognition rates were slightly lower. High levels of reliability could be attained by the discounting of classifications based on weak evidence. Apparently, in high reliability recognition, holistic template matching can be used as a first operation by which recognition is achieved for most of the handwritten digits that are seen in real life.     

Sequence learning in a dual-stimulus setting

Is sequence learning an autonomous process that relies on independent resources? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question by exploring whether sequence learning occurs even despite the availability of reliable explicit information about the material to be learned. I report on a series of experiments during which participants performed a sequential choice reaction task. On each trial, participants were exposed to a stimulus and to a cue of varying validity which, when valid, indicated where the next stimulus would appear. Participants could therefore optimize their performance either by implicitly encoding the sequential constraints contained in the material or by explicitly relying on the information conveyed by the cue. Some theories assume that implicit learning does not rely on the same processing resources as those involved in explicit learning. Such theories would thus predict that sensitivity to sequential constraints should not be affected by the presence of reliable explicit information about sequence structure. Other theories, by contrast, would predict that implicit learning would not occur in such cases. The results are consistent with the former theories, but simulation work meant to enable the implications of these contrasting theories to be explored suggests that such results are also obtainable in architectures in which two processing pathways share resources.     

Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches

The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications.     

Rigorous results,cross-model justification,and the transfer of empirical warrant: the case of many-body models in physics

This paper argues that a successful philosophical analysis of models and simulations must accommodate an account of mathematically rigorous results. Such rigorous results may be thought of as genuinely model-specific contributions, which can neither be deduced from fundamental theory nor inferred from empirical data. Rigorous results provide new indirect ways of assessing the success of models and simulations and are crucial to understanding the connections between different models. This is most obvious in cases where rigorous results map different models on to one another. Not only does this put constraints on the extent to which performance in specific empirical contexts may be regarded as the main touchstone of success in scientific modelling, it also allows for the transfer of warrant across different models. Mathematically rigorous results can thus come to be seen as not only strengthening the cohesion between scientific strategies of modelling and simulation, but also as offering new ways of indirect confirmation.     

INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONY

Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The present paper argues that local reductionism is unsuccessful in its attempt to steer a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. In particular, it challenges local reductionism 'from within', without appealing to anti-reductionist intuitions. By offering novel arguments to the effect that local reductionism fails by its own standards, the present paper considerably strengthens the case against this version of reductionism. Local reductionism, it is argued, fails for three main reasons. First, it cannot account for the rationality of testimonial rejection in paradigmatic cases, even though the possibility of rational rejection is thought to be of central justificatory importance. Second, it does not provide a sufficiently distinct non-testimonial basis to which testimonial justification can be successfully reduced. Finally, local reductionism is shown to be an intrinsically unstable position, in danger of collapsing into full-fledged 'credulism' of the kind historically associated with Thomas Reid.