I Am so Happy ‘Cause My Best Friend Makes Me Feel Unique: Friendship, Personal Sense of Uniqueness and Happiness

Decades of empirical research leave no doubt that friendship experiences are consistent correlates of happiness. Yet, little is known about how friendships are related to happiness. The present study examined personal sense of uniqueness as a mediator of the relationship between same-sex best friendship quality and happiness in three samples each employing a different measure of happiness (n = 2,429). Results provided support to the mediational model in every sample and showed that it was gender invariant. The findings suggest that one reason why the quality of friendships is related to happiness is because friendship experiences promote individuals’ feelings of uniqueness. The implications of the findings for friendship and happiness research are discussed and directions for future research are outlined.     

BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION IN A PATIENT WHO EXPERIENCED TORTURE IN A PRISONER OF WAR CAMP: NARCISSISM AND SURVIVAL

Post-traumatic stress disorder has been described as a syndrome from which an individual may suffer as a result of extraordinary trauma. Torture of prisoners of war in Serbian camps during the war in Croatia is just such a stressful situation that requires mobilization of all defense mechanisms of an individual. The authors present a case study of a former prisoner of war who acquired acute myelogenous leukemia several months after release and was treated with bone marrow transplantation. On release the patient was medically examined, like all prisoners of war, and the findings did not suggest any disease. Because of the situation, the patient was in psychotherapeutic observation and treatment after his illness was diagnosed and throughout the transplantation treatment.     

Intentional and Non-Intentional Assessments of Emotion Experiences: Comparisons of Old and New Measures

In two studies, we compared intentional and non-intentional measures of emotional well-being in terms of reliability and validity. In the first study, we expanded on the findings of ?im?ek (2011 ?im?ek, Ö. F. (2011). An Intentional Model of Emotional Well-Being: The Development and Initial Validation of a Measure of Subjective Well-Being. Journal of Happiness Studies, 12, 421–442. [Google Scholar]) by showing that an intentional measure of emotional well-being, namely the Emotional Well-Being Scale, accounted for unique variance in both negative and positive mental health indicators above and beyond the variance accounted for by Larsen and Diener's Scales (1992), which measures all dimensions of affect circumplex. The correlated traits-correlated uniqueness model results showed that the original-intentional version of the Emotional Well-Being Scale explained more variance in the measurement model than the non-intentional version. The second study showed that the results were similar for the intentional vs. non-intentional versions of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (Watson, Clark &; Tellegen, 1988 Watson, D., Clark, L. A., &; Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063–1070. [Google Scholar]). The intentional version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedules accounted for more variance in the criteria than the non-intentional version.     

Bocheński on authority

Józef Maria Bocheński introduced an important distinction between deontic and epistemic authority. A typical example of epistemic authority is the relation of a teacher to his students; a typical example of deontic authority is the relation between an employer and his employee. The difference between the two lies in domains of authority: declarative sentences make up the domain in the case of epistemic authority, orders—in the domain of deontic authority. In the article, I analyze in detail the concepts of the two kinds of authority and propose some new explications. The concept of epistemic authority is distinguished from the concept of infallibility and expertise; and the concept of deontic authority is distinguished from the concept of sovereign. I interpret various kinds of deontic authority in the light of the theory of imperative sentences. The concepts of gradation and de-gradation of authority are introduced and explicated.     

Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.     

Kuhn and the Question of Pursuit Worthiness

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn’s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.     

You Can Only Die Thrice: Death and Dying of a Human Body in Psychoanalytical Perspective

This paper compares the (cultural) necessity of death/dying, perceived as a sequence of Imaginary—Real—Symbolic, to Van Gennep’s three-staged rite of passage. If this logic is disrupted, the subject responsible necessitates attribution of special social status and can come to embody the imagery of a life worth living. This philosophical framework, which includes epistemologies borrowed from medical anthropology, demonstrates there is more for humans to lose than biological (Real) life; a far greater loss is to exist without (Symbolic) reason to live. A critique of prevalent quantitative methodology in assessing links between spirituality and the human body is added.     

“One is what one does”: from pragmatic to performative disclosure of the who

Continental Philosophy Review - After taking into consideration the most relevant criticisms questioning the capacity of the thinking “I” to grasp itself in a transparent and...