Comparison of forced-choice and subjective probability scales measuring behavioral intentions

Three surveys compared the accuracy of predictions based on forced-choice and subjective probability scales. The latter produced significantly more accurate election predictions and significantly reduced the percentage of undecided, or "Don't Know" responses, compared to forced-choice scales in all three surveys. Analysis indicates subjective probability scales decrease sampling error and confirms there is an inherent source of error in traditional forced-choice questions about voting intentions not attributable to sampling error. The results are discussed with respect to (1) sampling and measurement errors in forced-choice and subjective probability scales measuring behavioral intentions, (2) their practical application, and (3) cognitive theory, especially support theory.     

“All About How You Couch It:” African American Fathers’ Visions of Interventions for their Sons

Journal of Child and Family Studies - The current study seeks to contribute to the growing yet limited literature informing intervention development tailored for African American fathers of sons...     

Decision to Leave Scale: Perceived Reasons to Stay In or Leave Violent Relationships

The 30-item Decision to Leave Scale (DLS) was developed with 631 college women and 420 college women and women in shelters. Seven DLS subscales emerged for concerns in deciding to stay or leave: Fear of Loneliness, Child Care Needs, Financial Problems, Social Embarrassment, Poor Social Support, Fear of Harm, Hopes Things Change. Mean internal reliability was .73, mean test-retest reliability was .70. Discriminant validity was demonstrated by expected associations between DLS concerns and self-esteem, children, and violence. Criterion validity was demonstrated by greater DLS concerns for women in shelters than for college women. Women in violent relationships who decided to stay reported more Fear of Loneliness than women who decided to leave.     

What is Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason?

Sidgwick's 'Dualism of Practical Reason' has attracted the attention of many interpreters, and the Dualism itself seems to be an historically important version of the view, recently defended by Thomas Nagel, Susan Wolf, and others, that there exists a fundamental fragmentation of value – that the 'cosmos of duty is reduced to chaos,' in Sidgwick's words. In this paper, I consider and reject the leading interpretations of Sidgwick's Dualism, and propose an alternative reading. I conclude by offering what I hope is a plausible but Sidgwickian way out of the Dualism.     

Movement and proximity constrain miscombinations of colour and form.

A relatively frequent error when reporting brief visual displays is to combine presented features incorrectly. It has been proposed that Gestalt grouping constrains such errors so that miscombined features tend to come from the same perceptual group. In three experiments it was examined whether this principle applies to grouping by motion, and to grouping by proximity. Miscombinations of colour and form were more likely to consist of a colour and form that had moved in the same direction than features which had moved in opposite directions. Miscombinations were also more likely for adjacent items. The implications of these results for the mechanisms of feature integration are discussed.