Belief and aims

Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395?C405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief??s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen??s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.     

What Assertion Doesn't Show

Abstract: Some recent arguments against the classical invariantist account of knowledge exploit the idea that there is a ‘knowledge norm’ for assertion. It is claimed that, given the existence of this norm, certain intuitions about assertability support contextualism, or contrastivism, over classical invariantism. In this paper I show that, even if we accept the existence of a knowledge norm, these assertability‐based arguments fail. The classical invariantist can accommodate and explain the relevant intuitions about assertability, in a way that retains the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm for assertion. When we consider the role of assertion as a conversational act, it becomes plausible that a subject's epistemic warrant to assert can be defeated even though she has knowledge. This defeasibility thesis is what allows the classical invariantist to accommodate and explain the kinds of intuitions on which assertability‐based arguments depend.     

Spatial working memory for locations specified by vision and audition: Testing the amodality hypothesis

Spatial working memory can maintain representations from vision, hearing, and touch, representations referred to here as spatial images. The present experiment addressed whether spatial images from vision and hearing that are simultaneously present within working memory retain modality-specific tags or are amodal. Observers were presented with short sequences of targets varying in angular direction, with the targets in a given sequence being all auditory, all visual, or a sequential mixture of the two. On two thirds of the trials, one of the locations was repeated, and observers had to respond as quickly as possible when detecting this repetition. Ancillary detection and localization tasks confirmed that the visual and auditory targets were perceptually comparable. Response latencies in the working memory task showed small but reliable costs in performance on trials involving a sequential mixture of auditory and visual targets, as compared with trials of pure vision or pure audition. These deficits were statistically reliable only for trials on which the modalities of the matching location switched from the penultimate to the final target in the sequence, indicating a switching cost. The switching cost for the pair in immediate succession means that the spatial images representing the target locations retain features of the visual or auditory representations from which they were derived. However, there was no reliable evidence of a performance cost for mixed modalities in the matching pair when the second of the two did not immediately follow the first, suggesting that more enduring spatial images in working memory may be amodal.     

Implicit measurement of positive and negative future thinking as a predictor of depressive symptoms and hopelessness

Research using explicit measures has linked decreased positive future thinking, but not increased negative future thinking, with clinical depression. However, individuals may be unable or unwilling to express thoughts about the future, and can be unaware of implicit beliefs that can influence their behavior. Implicit measures of cognition may shed light on the role of future thinking in depression. To our knowledge, the current study presents the first implicit measure of positive and negative future thinking. A sample of 71 volunteers (38 healthy; 33 with sub-clinical depression) completed both implicit and explicit measures of positive and negative future thinking. The findings indicate differences in the evaluation of both positive and negative future events between the two groups. However, group differences were more pronounced on the implicit measure. These findings point to the potential utility of an implicit measure of future thinking in mental health research and clinical practice.     

Comparative Investigation of Adolescents’ Generalized Pliance and Psychological Inflexibility across Cultural Contexts

The Psychological Record - Generalized pliance is a pattern of rule-governed behavior characterized by having social approval as the main source of reinforcement. Recent research has found that...     

Attributions and sex differences in achievement: Problems and new perspectives

The status of research on sex differences in attribution is reviewed in light of the articles published in this issue. The authors conclude that several widely held beliefs about sex differences in attributions may be unwarranted. Various explanations for the lack of consistent results in studies exploring situational and dispositional effects on sex differences in attributions are offered. The authors conclude that alternative attributional questions need to be raised and investigated in order to understand sex differences in achievement.     

Assessing the theoretical models for sex differences in causal attributions for success and failure

Three basic models of attributional sex differences are reviewed: General Externality, Self-Derogation, and Low Expectancy. Although all of the models predict that women are unlikely to attribute their successes to ability, the models were quite different in other predictions. A meta-analysis of 21 studies examining sex differences in success-failure attributions was done to determine which of these three models had the most empirical support. Wording of attribution questions was also assessed. Results indicated only two consistent sex differences: Men make stronger ability attributions than women regardless of the outcome when informational attributional wording is used; and men attribute their successes and failures less to luck. Empirically, none of the models was well supported.