Memory and epistemic conservatism

Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.     

Maternal and Paternal Depressive Symptoms and Child Maladjustment: The Mediating Role of Parental Behavior

This study examined parental behaviors as mediators in links between depressive symptoms in mothers and fathers and child adjustment problems. Participants were 4,184 parents and 6,048 10- to 15-year-olds enrolled in the 1998 and 2000 cycles of the Canadian National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth. Mothers and fathers self-reported symptoms of depression at Times 1 and 2 and their children assessed parental nurturance, rejection, and monitoring and self-reported internalizing and externalizing problems and prosocial behavior at Time 2. Hierarchical linear modeling showed evidence of mediation involving all three domains of parental behavior. Findings supported the hypothesis that the quality of the child's rearing environment is one mechanism that carries risk to children of depressed parents. Interventions for parents whose symptoms of depression interfere with parenting responsibilities could help reduce the risk of some childhood disorders.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.     

Cohen on ‘Epistemic’

Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper is that normativity is what’s hard to understand, not the term ‘epistemic.’     

Short forms of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and the Social Phobia Scale

Mattick and Clarke's (1998) Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) are commonly used self-report measures that assess 2 dimensions of social anxiety. Given the need for short, readable measures, this research proposes short forms of both scales. Item-level analyses of readability characteristics of the SIAS and SPS items led to the selection of 6 items from each scale for use in the short forms. The SIAS and SPS short forms had reading levels at approximately the 6th and 5th grade level, respectively. Results using nonclinical (Study 1: N = 469) and clinical (Study 2: N = 145) samples identified these short forms as being factorially sound, possessing adequate internal consistency, and having strong convergence with their full-length counterparts. Moreover, these short forms showed convergence with other measures of social anxiety, showed divergence from measures assessing related constructs, and predicted concurrent interpersonal functioning. Recommendations for the use of these short forms are discussed.     

Going Gaga: Investigating,Creating, and Manipulating the Song Stuck in My Head

Summary: Having a song stuck in your head is a commonly experienced intrusive thought. We explored the intrusive song phenomenon through a survey, an experimental diary study, and three laboratory experiments. Contrary to the belief that only obnoxious songs get stuck, we found that songs people know and like frequently became intrusive. We also found that intrusive songs followed environmental cues. In addition, if a song continued to play in someone's head immediately after listening to it, the song was likely to return as an intrusive song within the next 24 hours. Similar to mind wandering, the return of intrusive songs depended on cognitive resources: people reported that intrusive songs returned during low cognitive load activities, and we found that overloading the cognitive systems with challenging activities increased intrusive song frequency. Throughout our studies, we easily created and manipulated intrusive song experiences. Songs provide a valuable method to investigate intrusive thoughts. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inferential Errors in Taxometric Analyses of Ordered Three-Class Constructs

Hermann Rorschach's theory of perception is first presented, and then a method is described which was aimed at testing the theory's implications. Group Rorschach contents were selected, and two types of scoring procedures were worked out. In one case, a simple percentage of total responses was used, and in a second case a weighting was made according to whether or not the S was reporting an interpretation or a perception of the inkblot. Three all-male samples were studied, attending two different high schools. Both social class and racial differences were represented in the samples. Where one or the other of the two Rorschach scoring methods resulted in a significant correlation with independent measures of personality within the samples, it was the measure taking into consideration Rorschach's theory which reflected the over-all advantage.     

Short Forms of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and the Social Phobia Scale

Mattick and Clarke's (1998) Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) are commonly used self-report measures that assess 2 dimensions of social anxiety. Given the need for short, readable measures, this research proposes short forms of both scales. Item-level analyses of readability characteristics of the SIAS and SPS items led to the selection of 6 items from each scale for use in the short forms. The SIAS and SPS short forms had reading levels at approximately the 6th and 5th grade level, respectively. Results using nonclinical (Study 1: N = 469) and clinical (Study 2: N = 145) samples identified these short forms as being factorially sound, possessing adequate internal consistency, and having strong convergence with their full-length counterparts. Moreover, these short forms showed convergence with other measures of social anxiety, showed divergence from measures assessing related constructs, and predicted concurrent interpersonal functioning. Recommendations for the use of these short forms are discussed.