Ideal evidence, relevance and second-order probabilities

Conclusion The concepts of supportive evidence and of relevant evidence seem very closely related to each other. Supportive evidence is clearly always relevant as well. But must relevant evidence be defined as evidence which is either supportive or weakeking? In an explicit or implicit manner, this is indeed the position of many philosophers. The paradox of ideal evidence, however, shows us that this is to restrictive. Besides increasing or decreasing the probability attached to some hypothesis, evidence can alter or interact with the background assumptions underlying the hypothesis.In most circumstances, the (post hoc) relevance of evidence can indeed be judged by its effect on the confidence one attaches to hypotheses. Occasionally, as in the circumstances described by Example I, and more generally called the Paradox of Ideal Evidence, the relevance of evidence to an hypothesis can only be understood by appeal to a broader sense.In Memory of My Father. Yehoshua Bar-HillelThe author wishes to thank Haim Gaifman for a most thoughtful and constructive review of an earlier draft of this paper.     

A device for teaching the theory of technique.

The usefulness of comparing dream psychology and neurosis psychology is demonstrated in the teaching of a course on the theory of technique at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Institute. Candidates are assigned the task of writing a five-minute segment of free associations using assigned background material, resistances to be demonstrated, and assigned current and past conflicts. The candidates then present their free associations to the class for analysis. Explication of educational and developmental issues is given.     

Optimistic bias among potential perpetrators and victims of youth violence

This study furthers the current understanding of optimistic bias regarding youth violence among high school students. Results from a survey of 387 urban high school students indicate a wide range of predictors of optimistic bias, including experience, demographics, and attitudes. Linkages to other developmental frameworks (personal fable and self-efficacy) suggest future directions for additional research.     

Neuroticism as mental noise: a relation between neuroticism and reaction time standard deviations

Those higher in neuroticism are often more variable in their behavior and experience. On the basis of this observation, the authors hypothesized that the trait of neuroticism might be correlated with the variability of performance pertaining to relatively basic cognitive operations. Three studies involving 242 college undergraduates supported this prediction in that neuroticism correlated positively with the variability of performance across trials of reaction time tasks. These results link neuroticism to cognitive noise that intervenes between stimulus and response. Such noise has been associated with executive dysfunctions (e.g., frontal lobe injury) in previous research. The present findings are potentially useful for understanding why neuroticism often correlates with variations in the functionality of cognition and behavior.     

Don't worry, be happy? Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and performance

People regulate their affect either to feel good or to achieve instrumental success. The present experiments show that when driven by performance goals, people can be motivated to experience unpleasant affect when it is trait-consistent, because of its instrumental benefits (e.g., M. Tamir & M. D. Robinson, 2004). In 4 studies, individuals high in neuroticism were more likely than those low in neuroticism to choose to increase their level of worry, as indicated by self-reported preferences (Study 1) and by behavioral choices in experimental settings (Studies 2-4). As predicted, such preferences were evident when expecting to perform demanding tasks but not when expecting an undemanding task (Study 2). Study 4 suggests that such preferences for short-term unpleasant affect may be beneficial to performance.     

Changing views about personality disorders: Comment about the prospective studies CIC, CLPS, and MSAD

Three large-scale prospective studies (Children in the Community Study [CIC; Cohen, Crawford, Johnson, & Kasen, this issue], Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study [CLPS; Skodol et al., this issue], and the McLean Study of Adult Development [MSAD; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, & Silk, this issue]) are discussed with respect to the following issues: shared and complementary features of the study designs, evidence for stable and changing personality disorder features, methodological issues (reliability, stability, and invariance), the relationship between Axis I and II disorders, and dimensional versus categorical representations of personality disorders.     

A neural network model of foraging decisions made under predation risk

This article develops the cognitive—emotional forager (CEF) model, a novel application of a neural network to dynamical processes in foraging behavior. The CEF is based on a neural network known as the gated dipole, introduced by Grossberg, which is capable of representing short-term affective reactions in a manner similar to Solomon and Corbit’s (1974) opponent process theory. The model incorporates a trade-off between approach toward food and avoidance of predation under varying levels of motivation induced by hunger. The results of simulations in a simple patch selection paradigm, using a lifetime fitness criterion for comparison, indicate that the CEF model is capable of nearly optimal foraging and outperforms a run-of-luck rule-of-thumb model. Models such as the one presented here can illuminate the underlying cognitive and motivational components of animal decision making.     

Poor recall of eye-movement signals from Stage 2 compared to REM sleep: implications for models of dreaming

An ongoing assumption made by sleep researchers is that since dreams are more often recalled on awakening from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, dreams must occur more often during this stage of sleep. An alternative hypothesis is that cognition occurs throughout sleep, but the recall of this mentation differs on awakening. When a dream is not reported on awakening, there is no method of establishing whether it did not happen or was forgotten. The aim of the present study was to investigate this issue using an eye movement (EM) signal verification technique. Participants were instructed to produce an EM signal whenever they heard a tone. Tones were presented at increasing volume during Stage 2 and REM sleep until EM signal verification was observed. Ninety seconds after signal verification, participants were awakened and asked if they remembered hearing the tone or responding with the EM signal. Such recollection of signal verified tone (SVT) presentations was significantly less after Stage 2 sleep (65%) compared to REM sleep (100%) presentations. Furthermore, SVT recall was significantly correlated with reported dream recall frequency, suggesting the same processes involved in recalling SVTs might also underlie dream recall.