Multi-Informant Assessment of High-Achieving Students’ Behavioral and Emotional Strengths

Journal of Child and Family Studies - Multi-informants, such as parents and teachers, are commonly considered as resources when evaluating students’ emotional and behavioral skills. This...     

Attentional dwelling and capture by color singletons

Can salient stimuli—such as color singletons and abrupt onsets—involuntarily capture spatial attention? We previously reported evidence that abrupt onsets can capture attention, but the effects of this capture can become latent under easy visual search. The present experiments examined whether a similar pattern of latent capture occurs for task-irrelevant color singletons. Participants searched for a perfect circle among oval distractors. We manipulated search difficulty by varying the width of the oval distractors, making them more or less target-like (i.e., more or less circular). With search displays of homogeneous distractors, cue validity effects increased linearly with search difficulty, indicating capture by color singletons (Experiments 1 and 2). With heterogeneous distractors, however, discouraging the use of singleton-detection mode to find the target circle, cue validity effects from color singletons were negligible at all difficulty levels (Experiment 3). Using these exact same heterogeneous search displays, meanwhile, abrupt onsets produced very large cue validity effects (Experiment 4). We conclude that whereas abrupt onsets can capture attention based purely on salience, static color singletons capture attention only when made task-relevant by promoting singleton-detection mode (i.e., contingent capture). The data further support an attentional dwelling account of capture costs and reinforce the recommendation that, to ensure sensitivity to detect the presence (or absence) of attention capture, capture experiments should employ a difficult visual search.

     

Looking at the past through a telescope: adults postdated their earliest childhood memories

ABSTRACT

Our previous studies have consistently shown a telescoping error in children’s dating of earliest childhood memories. Preschool children through adolescents systematically date their earliest memories at older ages, in comparison with the age estimates provided by their parents or by themselves previously. In the current study, we examined the dating of earliest childhood memories in two samples of college adults and collected independent age estimates from their parents. Consistent with our findings with children, adults significantly postdated their earlier memories by approximately 12 months (Study 1) and 6 months (Study 2). The actual age of earliest memories was 2.5 years after adjusted for telescoping errors, 1 year earlier than what is commonly believed at 3.5 years. These findings challenge commonly held theoretical assumptions about childhood amnesia and highlight critical methodological issues in the study of childhood memory.     

Sexual desire,not hypersexuality,predicts self-regulation of sexual arousal

A person's ability to control their own sexual arousal is important both to reduce the risks associated with some sexual behaviours and to respond sexually with intimate partners. A lack of control over sexual urges is a proposed feature of “hypersexual disorder”, though some evidence suggests that sexual desire predicts the self-regulation of sexual arousal better than hypersexuality. In the current study, a sample (N = 116) of men and women recruited from community ads viewed a series of 20-second neutral and sexual films. Before each sexual film, participants were instructed to increase their sexual arousal, decrease their sexual arousal or respond as usual. Higher levels of desire for sex with a partner consistently predicted failures to downregulate sexual arousal. Hypersexuality was unrelated. These findings replicate Winters et al.'s study and extend their findings by including upregulation, women, a new measure of hypersexuality and a higher-trial design.     

Human reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models, or both?

A good deal of energy is currently being expended into discovering the fundamental machinery underlying deductive reasoning. Is it based upon mental models (arrays) or deduction rules (propositions)? The appeal of finding a “grand unified theory” of reasoning is obvious, but the likelihood of achieving this must also be considered.

This paper discusses the use of experimental psychology in attempts to discover the processes associated with the fundamental reasoning mechanism. One particular problem is that individuals can use different strategies to solve reasoning problems. The consequences of this are assessed in relation to: (1) the assumptions underlying the experiments, (2) the choice of tasks and task presentations intended to enable the fundamental reasoning processes to be viewed directly, and (3) the power status of the theories and the nature of the evidence required to show that either theory is superior. Under close scrutiny the debate appears to be unresolvable by using empirical techniques. However, although the main conclusions are negative, it is suggested that approaches that directly investigate individual differences are likely to be useful alternatives.     

Inspection times, the change task, and the rapid-response selection task

Three experiments are reported, which are based upon the Wason four-card selection task inspection time paradigm, in which subjects solve computer-presented trials while using a mouse to indicate the card currently under consideration. Evans (1996) had shown that selected cards were inspected for longer than non-selected cards, and this was taken as support for the existence of pre-conscious heuristic processes that direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem. However, Roberts (1998b) suggested that this inspection time effect is artefactual, due to task format induced biases. Experiment 1 utilized a "change" task: Cards were presented either as selected or not selected, and subjects changed these where necessary. This demonstrated an association between card selection and inspection time independently of one between the act of response and inspection time. Experiment 2 utilized a standard selection task, but subjects either responded within 2 s of each card presentation, or made selections with no time pressure. The curtailment of thinking time increased matching behaviour—more cards matching the terms in the rules were selected—and was replicated in Experiment 3 using a within-subjects design. Overall, the data support Evans' heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats.