Intuitive Perceptions of Decision-making Strategy: Naive Assessors' Concepts of Integrative Complexity

Although there are measurable differences in integrative complexity among solutions that individuals generate in dealing with problems, it is uncertain to what extent people comprehend, recognize, and have preferences among different levels of complexity. Integrative complexity is a function of differentiation (the perception of several attributes within, or perspectives about, a topic) and integration (combining the differentiated characteristics in an interactive or synthesizing solution). The current paper reports two experiments dealing with how university students perceive, interpret, and choose among solutions differing in complexity. Experiment 1 showed that subjects accurately rated the complexity of described solutions differing along the continuum, but that their assessment of their own responses differed from the results of expert scoring. Their self-estimated complexity was highly correlated with their preferences, and preferred complexity was reliably higher than either expert- or self-assessed complexity of subject-generated solutions. Subjects were able to hypothesize quite accurately about environmental and endogenous factors likely to affect complexity. Experiment 2 found that in response to problem scenarios, solutions selected as being potentially most effective were consistently more complex than solutions that participants considered themselves most likely to use. The idea of complexity seems to be intuitively recognizable and understandable by untrained subjects: They can and do distinguish among problem solutions (self-generated or presented) that vary on that dimension, and are able to assess accurately the effects of relevant variables. Such subjects also share the bias shown by experts in favour of the superiority of more complex approaches.     

The Meaning and Intensity of the Near-Death Experience

This is the second in a three-part study exploring the hypothesis that near-death experiences (NDErs) assign the meaning of the NDE by using causal (effect) and semantic (affect) attributions. To test this hypothesis, 32 spontaneous verbal accounts of NDEs were analyzed. Each statement comprising the account was coded and classified according to the six attributional types in the Norton-Sahlman matrices of attributional classification. On the bases of these findings, we conclude that NDErs abstract the most significant aspects of meaning from their experiences by the use of attributions expressing the purposes of the experience and the intentions of the participants. Second, the meaning and intensity of the experience derives from attributions of both effect (causality) and affective significance: the assignment of subjective meaning to objects and events (affect). Third, the findings demonstrate that there are significant changes in NDErs' overt and affective states, reinforcing our argument that meaning and intensity of the NDE is a function of how the experiencer assigns causation, in addition to the affective significance that the experiencer places on the events constituting the NDE.     

Validation of a full body 3-D dynamic linked segment model

In studies related to human movement, linked segment models (LSM's) are often used to quantify forces and torques, generated in body joints. Some LSM's represent only a few body segments. Others, for instance used in studies on the control of whole body movements, include all body segments. As a consequence of the complexity of 3-dimensional (3-D) analyses, most LSM's are restricted to one plane of motion. However, in asymmetric movements this may result in a loss of relevant information. The aim of the current study was to develop and validate a 3-D LSM including all body segments. Braces with markers, attached to all body segments, were used to record the body movements. The validation of the model was accomplished by comparing the measured with the estimated ground reaction force and by comparing the torques at the lumbo-sacral joint that resulted from a bottom-up and a top-down mechanical analysis. For both comparisons, reasonable to good agreement was found. Sources of error that could not be analysed this way, were subjected to an additional sensitivity analysis. It was concluded that the internal validity of the current model is quite satisfactory.     

Meaning,amount of processing,and memory for words

Two experiments were carried out in order to try to resolve the controversy about whether the semantic processing of a word necessarily involves all the elements of its meaning. In the first experiment, subjects categorized a list of auditorially presented words according to whether or not they were natural consumable solids (e.g., “apple“). They were then given an unexpected test of their ability to recall the whole list, which contained equal numbers of words with none, one, two, or all three of the target components. The results confirmed the prediction that the greater the number of components a word has in common with a target category, the better it will be recalled. The second experiment used a visual presentation of a list of words, which subjects scanned for members of a particular target category. There were four different target categories assigned to independent groups of subjects. The results again confirmed the prediction. On the assumption that memorability in such tasks is determined by amount of processing, we conclude that some elements of the meaning of a word can be processed without having to process all of them.     

A new computational method to fit the weighted euclidean distance model

This paper describes a computational method for weighted euclidean distance scaling which combines aspects of an analytic solution with an approach using loss functions. We justify this new method by giving a simplified treatment of the algebraic properties of a transformed version of the weighted distance model. The new algorithm is much faster than INDSCAL yet less arbitrary than other analytic procedures. The procedure, which we call SUMSCAL (subjectivemetricscaling), gives essentially the same solutions as INDSCAL for two moderate-size data sets tested.Comments by J. Douglas Carroll and J. B. Kruskal have been very helpful in preparing this paper.     

Iconic memory and visible persistence

There are three senses in which a visual stimulus may be said to persist psychologically for some time after its physical offset. First, neural activity in the visual system evoked by the stimulus may continue after stimulus offset (“neural persistence”). Second, the stimulus may continue to be visible for some time after its offset (“visible persistence”). Finally, information about visual properties of the stimulus may continue to be available to an observer for some time after stimulus offset (“informational persistence”). These three forms of visual persistence are widely assumed to reflect a single underlying process: a decaying visual trace that (1) consists of afteractivity in the visual system, (2) is visible, and (3) is the source of visual information in experiments on decaying visual memory. It is argued here that this assumption is incorrect. Studies of visible persistence are reviewed; seven different techniques that have been used for investigating visible persistence are identified, and it is pointed out that numerous studies using a variety of techniques have demonstrated two fundamental properties of visible persistence: theinverse duration effect (the longer a stimulus lasts, the shorter is its persistence after stimulus offset) and theinverse intensity effect (the more intense the stimulus, the briefer its persistence). Only when stimuli are so intense as to produce afterimages do these two effects fail to occur. Work on neural persistences is briefly reviewed; such persistences exist at the photoreceptor level and at various stages in the visual pathways. It is proposed that visible persistence depends upon both of these types of neural persistence; furthermore, there must be an additional neural locus, since a purely stereoscopic (and hence cortical) form of visible persistence exists. It is argued that informational persistence is defined by the use of the partial report methods introduced by Averbach and Coriell (1961) and Sperling (1960), and the term “iconic memory” is used to describe this form of persistence. Several studies of the effects of stimulus duration and stimulus intensity upon the duration of iconic memory have been carried out. Their results demonstrate that the duration of iconic memory is not inversely related to stimulus duration or stimulus intensity. It follows that informational persistence or iconic memory cannot be identified with visible persistence, since they have fundamentally different properties. One implication of this claim that one cannot investigate iconic memory by tasks that require the subject to make phenomenological judgments about the duration of a visual display. In other words, the so-called “direct methods” for studying iconic memory do not provide information about iconic memory. Another implication is that iconic memory is not intimately tied to processes going on in the visual system (as visible persistence is); provided a stimulus is adequately legible, its physical parameters have little influence upon its iconic memory. The paper concludes by pointing out that there exists an alternative to the usual view of iconic memory as a precategorical sensory buffer. According to this alternative, iconic memory is post-categorical, occurring subsequent to stimulus identification. Here, stimulus identification is considered to be a rapid automatic process which does not require buffer storage, but which provides no information about episodic properties of a visual stimulus. Information about these physical stimulus properties must, in some way, be temporarily attached to a representation of the stimulus in semantic memory; and it is this temporarily attached physical information which constitutes iconic memory.     

Children’s use of phonological encoding when reading for meaning

The role of phonological recoding in children’s reading was investigated by means of a task requiring comprehension of sentence meaning: The child’s task was to decide whether a sequence of printed letter strings was a meaningful sentence or not. Meaningless sentences that are meaningful when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran threw the street”) produced more incorrect responses than did meaningless sentences that remain meaningless when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran sew the street”). The difference in error rates between the two sentence types diminished as a function of age. Control experiments showed that these results were not due to visual similarity effects, nor to imperfect ability to spell homophones. It was concluded that very young readers rely extensively on phonological recoding when reading for meaning; as they grow older, reliance on visual encoding becomes progressively more important.     

Validity and quantification in intuitionism

We distinguish three different readings of the intuitionistic notions of validity, soundness, and completeness with respect to the quantification occurring in the notion of validity, and we establish certain relations between the different readings. For each of the meta-logical notions considered we suggest that the most natural reading (which is not the same for all cases) is precisely the one which is required by the recent intuitionistic completeness theorems for IPC.This paper was partly written while the first author, H. C. M. de Swart, was a Visiting Fellow at Princeton University for the academic year 1976–1977. This opportunity was given to him by the Niels Stensen Stichting in Amsterdam, the department of philosophy of the Catholic University in Nijmegen and by Princeton University. He is happy to express his appreciation for that opportunity.