The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes

Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. A related bias was shown to exist in the observers' social inferences. Thus, raters estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actors' distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to the raters' own responses; responses differing from those of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.     

Laterality differences and practice effects under central backward masking conditions

Two experiments were conducted to examine laterality differences and practice effects under various central backward masking conditions. Critical stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was determined for subjects on 3 consecutive days using single letters as target stimuli (TS) and a pattern masking stimulus (MS). There was a right visual field (RVF) advantage on Day 1 but no difference between the visual fields on following days. The decline in the RVF advantage appeared to be dependent upon prior experience with laterally located letters, to be independent of initial experience with a particular set of letters, and to be more pronounced for females than for males. In addition, large improvements in performance were found, particularly between the first and second testing sessions. These practice effects were discussed in terms of the possible development of strategies for enhancing TS features or attenuating MS features.     

Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited

This paper defends the heretical view that sometimes we ought to assign legal liability based on statistical evidence alone. Recent literature focuses on potential unfairness to the defending party if we rely on bare statistics. Here, I show that capitulating in response to ‘epistemic gaps’—cases where there is a group of potential harmers but an absence of individuating evidence—can amount to a serious injustice against the party who has been harmed. Drawing on prominent civil law litigation involving pharmaceutical and industrial negligence, the overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls stemming from the popular idea that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.     

Harmony,structure, and force in the Essai analytique sur les facultés de l'âcme of Charles Bonnet

The psychological works of Charles Bonnet of Geneva (1720–1793) have customarily been read as part of the mentalistic traditions of associationism or Leibnizianism. They are better understood as part of a campaign—directed against the radical Enlightenment —to reclaim the human body for religion by the paradoxical strategy of incorporating a materialist conception of the human mind into the framework of divine providence. Bonnet's embodied psychology treats the soul as an intrinsically indeterminate force, and attributes the capacity of the mind to organize experience to highly specialized fibers, providentially constructed to correspond to the created world.     

Speaker’s reference,stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers

Philosophical Studies - Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is...