The Meaning and Intensity of the Near-Death Experience

This is the second in a three-part study exploring the hypothesis that near-death experiences (NDErs) assign the meaning of the NDE by using causal (effect) and semantic (affect) attributions. To test this hypothesis, 32 spontaneous verbal accounts of NDEs were analyzed. Each statement comprising the account was coded and classified according to the six attributional types in the Norton-Sahlman matrices of attributional classification. On the bases of these findings, we conclude that NDErs abstract the most significant aspects of meaning from their experiences by the use of attributions expressing the purposes of the experience and the intentions of the participants. Second, the meaning and intensity of the experience derives from attributions of both effect (causality) and affective significance: the assignment of subjective meaning to objects and events (affect). Third, the findings demonstrate that there are significant changes in NDErs' overt and affective states, reinforcing our argument that meaning and intensity of the NDE is a function of how the experiencer assigns causation, in addition to the affective significance that the experiencer places on the events constituting the NDE.     

Iconic memory and visible persistence

There are three senses in which a visual stimulus may be said to persist psychologically for some time after its physical offset. First, neural activity in the visual system evoked by the stimulus may continue after stimulus offset (“neural persistence”). Second, the stimulus may continue to be visible for some time after its offset (“visible persistence”). Finally, information about visual properties of the stimulus may continue to be available to an observer for some time after stimulus offset (“informational persistence”). These three forms of visual persistence are widely assumed to reflect a single underlying process: a decaying visual trace that (1) consists of afteractivity in the visual system, (2) is visible, and (3) is the source of visual information in experiments on decaying visual memory. It is argued here that this assumption is incorrect. Studies of visible persistence are reviewed; seven different techniques that have been used for investigating visible persistence are identified, and it is pointed out that numerous studies using a variety of techniques have demonstrated two fundamental properties of visible persistence: theinverse duration effect (the longer a stimulus lasts, the shorter is its persistence after stimulus offset) and theinverse intensity effect (the more intense the stimulus, the briefer its persistence). Only when stimuli are so intense as to produce afterimages do these two effects fail to occur. Work on neural persistences is briefly reviewed; such persistences exist at the photoreceptor level and at various stages in the visual pathways. It is proposed that visible persistence depends upon both of these types of neural persistence; furthermore, there must be an additional neural locus, since a purely stereoscopic (and hence cortical) form of visible persistence exists. It is argued that informational persistence is defined by the use of the partial report methods introduced by Averbach and Coriell (1961) and Sperling (1960), and the term “iconic memory” is used to describe this form of persistence. Several studies of the effects of stimulus duration and stimulus intensity upon the duration of iconic memory have been carried out. Their results demonstrate that the duration of iconic memory is not inversely related to stimulus duration or stimulus intensity. It follows that informational persistence or iconic memory cannot be identified with visible persistence, since they have fundamentally different properties. One implication of this claim that one cannot investigate iconic memory by tasks that require the subject to make phenomenological judgments about the duration of a visual display. In other words, the so-called “direct methods” for studying iconic memory do not provide information about iconic memory. Another implication is that iconic memory is not intimately tied to processes going on in the visual system (as visible persistence is); provided a stimulus is adequately legible, its physical parameters have little influence upon its iconic memory. The paper concludes by pointing out that there exists an alternative to the usual view of iconic memory as a precategorical sensory buffer. According to this alternative, iconic memory is post-categorical, occurring subsequent to stimulus identification. Here, stimulus identification is considered to be a rapid automatic process which does not require buffer storage, but which provides no information about episodic properties of a visual stimulus. Information about these physical stimulus properties must, in some way, be temporarily attached to a representation of the stimulus in semantic memory; and it is this temporarily attached physical information which constitutes iconic memory.     

Children’s use of phonological encoding when reading for meaning

The role of phonological recoding in children’s reading was investigated by means of a task requiring comprehension of sentence meaning: The child’s task was to decide whether a sequence of printed letter strings was a meaningful sentence or not. Meaningless sentences that are meaningful when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran threw the street”) produced more incorrect responses than did meaningless sentences that remain meaningless when phonologically recoded (e.g., “He ran sew the street”). The difference in error rates between the two sentence types diminished as a function of age. Control experiments showed that these results were not due to visual similarity effects, nor to imperfect ability to spell homophones. It was concluded that very young readers rely extensively on phonological recoding when reading for meaning; as they grow older, reliance on visual encoding becomes progressively more important.     

Harmony,structure, and force in the Essai analytique sur les facultés de l'âcme of Charles Bonnet

The psychological works of Charles Bonnet of Geneva (1720–1793) have customarily been read as part of the mentalistic traditions of associationism or Leibnizianism. They are better understood as part of a campaign—directed against the radical Enlightenment —to reclaim the human body for religion by the paradoxical strategy of incorporating a materialist conception of the human mind into the framework of divine providence. Bonnet's embodied psychology treats the soul as an intrinsically indeterminate force, and attributes the capacity of the mind to organize experience to highly specialized fibers, providentially constructed to correspond to the created world.     

Speaker’s reference,stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers

Philosophical Studies - Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is...