“We Now Control Our Evolution”: Circumventing Ethical and Logical Cul-de-Sacs of an Anticipated Engineering Revolution

Philosophers, scientists, and other researchers have increasingly characterized humanity as having reached an epistemic and technical stage at which “we can control our own evolution.” Moral–philosophical analysis of this outlook reveals some problems, beginning with the vagueness of “we.” At least four glosses on “we” in the proposition “we, humanity, control our evolution” can be made: “we” is the bundle of all living humans, a leader guiding the combined species, each individual acting severally, or some mixture of these three involving a market interpretation of future evolutionary processes. While all of these glosses have difficulties under philosophical analysis, how we as a species handle our fate via technical developments is all-important. I propose our role herein should be understood as other than controllers of our evolution.     

Minimal functional brain differences between older adults with and without mild cognitive impairment during the stroop

This investigation compared the neural correlates of inhibition in normal older adults (OAs) and OAs with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). It was hypothesized the MCI group would require a greater amount of resources for inhibition, and therefore display greater functional activation in specific regions of interest (ROIs). Twenty-six OAs without and 17 with MCI completed the Stroop task during functional neuroimaging, and completed additional out-of-scanner neuropsychological measures. During inhibition, there were minimal functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) differences found between groups in a priori specified ROIs and with post-hoc multiple regression analyses. However, these minimal differences did not survive corrected thresholds. Robust differences were found with several tasks of a neuropsychological screening battery. The results of this study suggest only very minimal group differences in fMRI activation during inhibition which may not reliably identify MCI, and this condition may be best detected by traditional neuropsychological techniques.     

Beyond Skills and Structure: Justice Dispositions as Antecedents of Young Citizens' Volunteering and Political Participation

Community involvement is usually attributed to opportunity structures and individuals' ability to be involved. Building on psychological justice research, this paper proposes that justice dispositions add to explaining why young citizens become active in their communities or not. Furthermore, it is argued that justice dispositions help to understand why most studies find only moderate relationships between youth volunteering and forms of political involvement. In a sample of 321 young Swiss volunteers, this study shows justice centrality and belief in a just world to predict the extent of volunteering and political participation, even after controlling for civic skills and opportunity structures. However, scrutinising the motivations to volunteer, self‐oriented motivations (enhancement, social, career and understanding) more strongly affected the level of volunteering than motivations related to justice dispositions (political responsibility and social responsibility). These findings have implications for the attraction and retention of volunteers as well as for the politics of volunteering and community development in general. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alexithymia and Early Maladaptive Schemas in chronic pain patients

Psychological factors have an impact on subjective pain experience. The aim of this study was to explore the occurrence of alexithymia and Early Maladaptive Schemas in a sample of 271 first visit chronic pain patients of six pain clinics. The patients completed the study questionnaire consisting of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale‐20, the Finnish version of the Young Schema Questionnaire short form‐extended, the Beck Depression Inventory‐II, and pain variables. Alexithymic patients scored higher on Early Maladaptive Schemas and had more pain intensity, pain disability and depression than nonalexithymic patients. Both alexithymia and depression correlated significantly with most Early Maladaptive Schemas. The co‐occurrence of alexithymia, Early Maladaptive Schemas and depression seems to worsen the pain experience. Screening of alexithymia, depression and Early Maladaptive Schemas may help to plan psychological treatment interventions for chronic pain patients.     

Naive Probability: Model‐Based Estimates of Unique Events

We describe a dual‐process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non‐numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, for conjunctions of events, and for inclusive disjunctions of events, by taking a primitive average of non‐numerical probabilities. It computes conditional probabilities in a tractable way, treating the given event as evidence that may be relevant to the probability of the dependent event. A deliberative system 2 maps the resulting representations into numerical probabilities. With access to working memory, it carries out arithmetical operations in combining numerical estimates. Experiments corroborated the theory's predictions. Participants concurred in estimates of real possibilities. They violated the complete joint probability distribution in the predicted ways, when they made estimates about conjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A and B), disjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A or B or both), and conditional probabilities P(A), P(B), P(B|A). They were faster to estimate the probabilities of compound propositions when they had already estimated the probabilities of each of their components. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of probabilistic reasoning.     

A generalized distance function for preferential choices

Many cognitive theories of judgement and decision making assume that choice options are evaluated relative to other available options. The extent to which the preference for one option is influenced by other available options will often depend on how similar the options are to each other, where similarity is assumed to be a decreasing function of the distance between options. We examine how the distance between preferential options that are described on multiple attributes can be determined. Previous distance functions do not take into account that attributes differ in their subjective importance, are limited to two attributes, or neglect the preferential relationship between the options. To measure the distance between preferential options it is necessary to take the subjective preferences of the decision maker into account. Accordingly, the multi‐attribute space that defines the relationship between options can be stretched or shrunk relative to the attention or importance that a person gives to different attributes describing the options. Here, we propose a generalized distance function for preferential choices that takes subjective attribute importance into account and allows for individual differences according to such subjective preferences. Using a hands‐on example, we illustrate the application of the function and compare it to previous distance measures. We conclude with a discussion of the suitability and limitations of the proposed distance function.