Spatial and feature-based memory representation in free-flying homing pigeons

The memory-based recognition of a goal is a capacity well demonstrated in birds, and understanding this ability often involves determining the relative importance of spatial and feature information in representing the properties of a goal. However, surprisingly little avian research has examined goal recognition in a field setting. Here, we demonstrate that homing pigeons can be successfully trained outdoors to fly to and land on a goal platform located in an array of other platforms at a distance on the order of 100 m. They can do so under conditions when the properties of the goal are stable in time as well as when the properties of the goal periodically change; the latter condition indicating that homing pigeons can rapidly adapt their memory representations to take into account changing environmental conditions. When probed for preferential use of either spatial (location) or feature-based (color) information, the pigeons demonstrated an indifferent capacity to use both independent of task demands. The homing pigeon memory systems that support goal recognition appear to be opportunistic with respect to the information exploited, using spatial and feature information equally to guide their behavior. Therefore, and despite strong natural and artificial selection for navigational ability, spatial information is no more important than feature cues in representing a goal location for homing pigeons flying outdoors.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.     

Evidence‐Based Human Trafficking Policy: Opportunities to Invest in Trauma‐Informed Strategies

Human trafficking is a critical social issue characterized by chronic trauma among victims, and frequently preceded by traumatic experiences that contribute to risk of victimization. Therefore, the research‐based practice of trauma‐informed care is a highly appropriate lens for both prevention and intervention. This work examines federal legislation in the United States related to human trafficking for references to trauma, as well as how the use of research could implicitly direct public policy responses toward trauma‐informed approaches. Legislation on human trafficking has risen substantially since 1989, and the use of research and trauma language within these policies has also observed substantial increases. While the use of trauma language was associated with limited progression in the policy process, legislation using research language was more likely to pass out of Committee and become enacted. Moreover, legislation may leverage research in ways that have the potential to bolster trauma‐informed practice among human trafficking victims. Specifically, research can be used to describe the problem and causal mechanisms (e.g., impact of trauma), guide “best practice” for service delivery, and generate knowledge through studies and evaluations that guide future policy. Therefore, human trafficking legislation that implicitly guides trauma‐informed practice via the use of research may be particularly promising for the field.     

III—Faultless Disagreement

There seem to be topics on which people can disagree without fault. For example, you and I might disagree on whether Picasso was a better artist than Matisse, without either of us being at fault. Is this a genuine possibility or just apparent? In this paper I pursue two aims: I want to provide a systematic map of available responses to this question. Simultaneously, I want to assess these responses. I start by introducing and defining the notion of a faultless disagreement. Then I present a simple argument to the conclusion that faultless disagreement is not possible. Those who accept the argument have to explain away apparent cases of faultless disagreement. Those who want to maintain the possibility of faultless disagreement must deny one of the argument's premisses. The position I want to promote belongs to the latter category and is a form of genuine relativism.     

Work-Family Conflict and Work-Related Withdrawal Behaviors

This survey study explored the effects of work-to-family conflict and family-to-work conflict on withdrawal behaviors at work (family interruptions at work, lateness to work, and absenteeism) among both members of 359 dual-earner couples. Using a systems theory framework, regression analyses revealed significant individual-level and crossover effects for both types of work-family conflict on withdrawal behaviors. Theoretical and practical implications of the study of work-family conflict crossover effects on withdrawal behaviors at work are discussed.     

Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game,the Acquiring a Company problem,and multiparty ultimatums

This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions of the other parties, the rules of the game, and the interaction among the parties in light of these rules. In addition, we show that the failure to consider these effects explains common decision failures across all three games. Finally, we suggest that this systematic focusing error in competitive contexts can serve to explain and improve our understanding of many additional, seemingly disparate, competitive decision‐making failures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.