Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior

People often make judgments about the ethicality of others’ behaviors and then decide how harshly to punish such behaviors. When they make these judgments and decisions, sometimes the victims of the unethical behavior are identifiable, and sometimes they are not. In addition, in our uncertain world, sometimes an unethical action causes harm, and sometimes it does not. We argue that a rational assessment of ethicality should not depend on the identifiability of the victim of wrongdoing or the actual harm caused if the judge and the decision maker have the same information. Yet in five laboratory studies, we show that these factors have a systematic effect on how people judge the ethicality of the perpetrator of an unethical action. Our studies show that people judge behavior as more unethical when: (1) identifiable vs. unidentifiable victims are involved and (2) the behavior leads to a negative rather than a positive outcome. We also find that people’s willingness to punish wrongdoers is consistent with their judgments, and we offer preliminary evidence on how to reduce these biases.     

Neural correlates of olfactory learning: Critical role of centrifugal neuromodulation

The mammalian olfactory system is well established for its remarkable capability of undergoing experience-dependent plasticity. Although this process involves changes at multiple stages throughout the central olfactory pathway, even the early stages of processing, such as the olfactory bulb and piriform cortex, can display a high degree of plasticity. As in other sensory systems, this plasticity can be controlled by centrifugal inputs from brain regions known to be involved in attention and learning processes. Specifically, both the bulb and cortex receive heavy inputs from cholinergic, noradrenergic, and serotonergic modulatory systems. These neuromodulators are shown to have profound effects on both odor processing and odor memory by acting on both inhibitory local interneurons and output neurons in both regions.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.     

Evidence‐Based Human Trafficking Policy: Opportunities to Invest in Trauma‐Informed Strategies

Human trafficking is a critical social issue characterized by chronic trauma among victims, and frequently preceded by traumatic experiences that contribute to risk of victimization. Therefore, the research‐based practice of trauma‐informed care is a highly appropriate lens for both prevention and intervention. This work examines federal legislation in the United States related to human trafficking for references to trauma, as well as how the use of research could implicitly direct public policy responses toward trauma‐informed approaches. Legislation on human trafficking has risen substantially since 1989, and the use of research and trauma language within these policies has also observed substantial increases. While the use of trauma language was associated with limited progression in the policy process, legislation using research language was more likely to pass out of Committee and become enacted. Moreover, legislation may leverage research in ways that have the potential to bolster trauma‐informed practice among human trafficking victims. Specifically, research can be used to describe the problem and causal mechanisms (e.g., impact of trauma), guide “best practice” for service delivery, and generate knowledge through studies and evaluations that guide future policy. Therefore, human trafficking legislation that implicitly guides trauma‐informed practice via the use of research may be particularly promising for the field.     

III—Faultless Disagreement

There seem to be topics on which people can disagree without fault. For example, you and I might disagree on whether Picasso was a better artist than Matisse, without either of us being at fault. Is this a genuine possibility or just apparent? In this paper I pursue two aims: I want to provide a systematic map of available responses to this question. Simultaneously, I want to assess these responses. I start by introducing and defining the notion of a faultless disagreement. Then I present a simple argument to the conclusion that faultless disagreement is not possible. Those who accept the argument have to explain away apparent cases of faultless disagreement. Those who want to maintain the possibility of faultless disagreement must deny one of the argument's premisses. The position I want to promote belongs to the latter category and is a form of genuine relativism.     

Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game,the Acquiring a Company problem,and multiparty ultimatums

This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions of the other parties, the rules of the game, and the interaction among the parties in light of these rules. In addition, we show that the failure to consider these effects explains common decision failures across all three games. Finally, we suggest that this systematic focusing error in competitive contexts can serve to explain and improve our understanding of many additional, seemingly disparate, competitive decision‐making failures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.