The influence of haptic size information upon visual judgments of absolute distance

When O views a blank triangle of light under completely reduced conditions, he is able to use information about the size of this visual stimulus conveyed via the haptic modality when he is attempting to judge the absolute distance of the visual stimulus. However, distance is consistently underesti-mated in this situation. When haptically-indicated size is held constant, judged distance varies inversely with retinalsubtense, even though the different retinal subtenses are viewed by different Os. A variant of the size-distance invariance hypothesis also appears to hold in these circumstances.     

Same-different judgments with words and nonwords: The differential effects of relative size

Words were paired with words and nonwords with nonwords in a simultaneous matching task requiring a same-different judgment. A difference in size slowed “same” RTs for both words and nonwords, while “differ” RTs for both words and nonwords were unaffected. These results do not support Bruder and Silverman’s 1974 conclusion that the word processing system filters size. The effects of relative size differences were discussed in terms of (a) normalization procedures and (b) changes in states of evidence leading to alterations in a response selection stage.     

Book reviews

Ribsbn, A. H. The Developmental Neurqpsychology of Sensory Deprivation. London: Academic Press. 1975. Pp. xiii and 303. £7.90. ISBN 012 588550 4.

Kennedy, A. and Wilkes, A. Studies in Long Term Memory. London: Wiley, 1975. Pp. xiii + 358. £10,00. ISBN 0471 46905 X.

Osherson,D. N. Logical Abilities in Children. Vols. I, Ii and III. Ptomoac, Md: Erlbaum 1974, 1974, 1975. Pp. 162, 272. £5.45, £5.45, £9.20.

Kaufman L., Sight and Mind: an Introduction to Visual Perception. Oxford University Press. 197s. Pp. ix + 580. £8.75.

McCormick,E. J. Human Factors in Engineering and Design. Fourth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. Pp. xi + 491. £13.70.

Chapman, T. and Foot, H. (Eds). Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applicatim. London: Wiley. 1976. Pp. 348. £9.50 ISBN 0471 14612 9.

Estes,W. K. (Ed.). Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes. Vol. I. Introduction to Concepts and Issues. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum Associates. 1975. £9.20. ISBN 0470 24585 9.

Markel, J. D. and Gray, Jr., A. H. Linear Prediction of Speech. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 1976. Pp. 288. $30.00.     

John McDowell on Experience: Open to the Sceptic?

The aim of this paper is to show that John McDowell's approach to perception in terms of "openness"remains problematically vulnerable to the threat of scepticism. The leading thought of the openness view is that objects, events and others in the world, and no substitute, just are what is disclosed in perceptual experience. An account which aims to defend this thought must show, therefore, that the content of perceptual experience does not "all short" of its objects. We shall describe how McDowell defends the openness view with reference to the disjunctive analysis of appearances (sections II and III); argue that his defence includes features which are both inconsistent with and unnecessary for the openness view (section IV); and show how those features call into question the success of McDowell's route of response to sceptical arguments (section V). Finally, we sketch an alternative approach to openness and conclude that the explosive effect of letting loose the conception of experience advanced by the openness view has yet to be felt in the English-speaking world (section VI).     

Verification of Statements about Story Worlds That Deviate from Normal Conceptions of Time: What Is True aboutEinstein''s Dreams?

College students read chapters from a novel written by Alan Lightman (Einstein's Dreams) and later provided verification judgments on the truth/falsity of test statements. Each chapter described a different fictional village that incorporated assumptions about time that deviate from our normal TIME schema, e.g., citizens knowing exactly when the world will end, time flowing backward instead of forward. These novel assumptions about time provided interesting insights about life and reality. In two experiments, we examined whether readers could accurately incorporate these novel assumptions about time in the fictional story worlds, as manifested in the verification judgments for statements after story comprehension. The test statements included verbatim typical, verbatim atypical, inference typical, and inference atypical information from the perspective of mundane reality that meshes with a normal TIME schema. Verification ratings were collected on a 6-point scale in Experiment 1, whereas Experiment 2 used a signal–response technique in which binary true/false decisions were extracted at −.5, 1.5, 3.5, 5.5, and 10.0 s. The college students were measured on literary expertise, reading skill, working memory span, and reading time. Readers with comparatively high literary expertise showed truth discrimination scores that were compatible with aschema copy plus tagmodel, which assumes that readers are good at detecting and remembering atypical verbatim information; this model predicts better (and faster) truth discrimination for verbatim atypical statements than for verbatim typical statements. In contrast, fast readers with comparatively low literary expertise were compatible with afilteringmodel; this model predicts that readers gloss over (or suppress) atypical verbatim information and show advantages for verbatim typical information. All groups of readers had trouble inferentially propagating the novel assumptions about time in a fictional story world, but the slower readers were more accurate in their verification of the atypical inferences. Aconstruction–integrationmodel could explain the interactions among literary expertise, reading time, and the typicality of test statements.