On Gratitude to Nature

In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In particular, I argue that it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest a level of final care toward one beyond what can be legitimately expected or demanded of them. However, because nature does not manifest any level of goodwill or care, it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I end by noting that it can still be fitting to be grateful that certain things are true about nature (e.g. that it provides many benefits to humans).     

Risk Factors,Warning Signs,and Drivers of Suicide: What Are They,How Do They Differ,and Why Does It Matter?

Research investigating suicide attempts and deaths by suicide has yielded many specific risk factors and warning signs for future suicidal behaviors. Yet, even though these variables are each valuable for suicide prevention efforts, they may be limited in their applicability to clinical practice. The differences among risk factors, warning signs, and “drivers,” which are person‐specific variables that lead individuals to desire death by suicide, are highlighted. The scarce evidence on drivers is described and specific recommendations for conducting future drivers‐focused research and targeting them in clinical practice are suggested.     

The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Beleif Revision: Harman on 'Change in View'

In Change of View: Principles of Reasoning , Gilbert Harman argues that (i) all genuine reasoning is a matter of belief revision, and that, since (ii) logic is not "specially relevant" to belief revision, (iii) logic is not specially relevant to reasoning, either. Thus, Harman suggests, what is needed is a "theory of reasoning"–which, incidentally, will be psychologistic, telling us both how we do and how we should reason. I argue that Harman fails to establish the need for such a theory, because (a) reasoning is not always a matter of belief revision, and (b) logic is, in fact, of the utmost relevance to both reasoning and belief revision.