Auditory hindsight bias

People who know the outcome of an event tend to overestimate their own prior knowledge or others' na?ve knowledge of it. This hindsight bias pervades cognition, lending the world an unwarranted air of inevitability. In four experiments, we showed how knowing the identities of words causes people to overestimate others' na?ve ability to identify moderately to highly degraded spoken versions of those words. We also showed that this auditory hindsight bias occurs despite people's efforts to avoid it. We discuss our findings in the context of communication, in which speakers overestimate the clarity of their message and listeners overestimate their understanding of the message.     

Behavioral Health Adjustment in Reserve Component Soldiers During a Noncombat Deployment to Africa

This study benchmarked rates of mental health problems, adjustment difficulties, and perceptions of unit climate among 505 U.S. soldiers (primarily National Guard) deployed to the Horn of Africa in 2012. In addition, the study examined whether differences across these outcomes exist between combat veterans (n = 239) and noncombat veterans (n = 242). Rates of mental health problems among soldiers on this noncombat deployment were lower than rates typically found among soldiers on combat deployments. Furthermore, soldiers without previous combat experience had lower rates of mental health problems and aggression than combat veterans. Similar differences were evident when adjustment difficulties and unit climate variables were compared. Although combat veterans could be valuable in training new soldiers, the results of this study indicate that combat veterans may need more targeted resources to facilitate their adjustment if they are to be optimally utilized.     

Preferential processing of visual trauma-film reminders predicts subsequent intrusive memories

This study used an analogue design to test the hypothesis that preferential processing of visual trauma reminders in the aftermath of a stressful or traumatic event gives rise to subsequent intrusive memories. Shortly after the presentation of a stressful film fragment, participants (n=36) were asked to detect neutral targets (rotated buildings or nature scenes) in a single target rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm. During half of the streams, the target was preceded by a distracter. The distracters consisted of visual images extracted from an earlier presented stressful film (e.g., persons and objects that figured in the film). The degree of interference by these film reminders predicted subsequent intrusions recorded in a one-week diary. The results provide evidence that a deficient ability to obtain attentional control over perceptual “trauma” reminders during goal-directed behaviour may set people at risk for persistent intrusive memories. Implications for research investigating attentional bias and intrusive memories in context of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are discussed.     

Visually guided grasping of common objects: Effects of priming

Priming effects were tested on the planning of the grasping of common objects under full vision during action performance. Healthy participants took part in four experiments which manipulated the nature of the prime (objects, circular block, rectangular bar) and priming context (blocked vs. mixed). Each experiment relied on four priming conditions: (1) congruent orientation, (2) incongruent orientation, (3) neutral prime, and (4) no prime. Priming was observed to have a facilitating effect on visually guided grasping when the object to be grasped was primed by a congruently oriented identical object. This effect was rather independent of the priming context (experimental set-up). Our data suggest an object's functional identity may contribute to the priming effect, as well as its intrinsic (e.g., shape, size) and extrinsic (orientation) visual characteristics. We showed that the planning of visually guided grasping is influenced by prior visual experience, and thus that grasping is not based exclusively on real-time processing of visual information.     

The imbibing idiot bias: Consuming alcohol can be hazardous to your (perceived) intelligence

Alcohol consumption and cognitive impairment frequently co-occur. We propose that the relationship is so familiar that exposure to alcohol cues primes expectations of cognitive impairment. Across five studies, we find that in the absence of any evidence of reduced cognitive performance, people who hold an alcoholic beverage are perceived to be less intelligent than those who do not, a mistake we term the imbibing idiot bias. In fact, merely priming observers with alcohol cues causes them to judge targets who hold no beverage at all as less intelligent. The bias is not driven by a belief that less intelligent people are more likely to consume alcohol. We find that the bias may be costly in professional settings. Job candidates who ordered wine during an interview held over dinner were viewed as less intelligent and less hireable than candidates who ordered soda. However, prospective candidates believe that ordering wine rather than soda will help them appear more intelligent.     

Transforming valences through transitive inference: How are faces emotionally dissonant?

Information that is emotionally incongruous with self-concepts can produce feelings of unease. This implies that embedding incongruous information in newly formed relational structures would have little effect on their previous emotive properties. Alternatively, Relational Frame Theory highlights the importance of contextualized stimulus-stimulus relations, where the structure of a relational series is key in determining the function of its elements. To see whether series membership can mitigate ‘dissonance’ when a salient element is employed, the present investigation trained and tested a seven-term relational series (X>A>B>C>D>E>Y) using blurred faces as stimuli. Specifically, Stimuli X, A, B, D, E and Y were blurred unfamiliar faces and Stimulus C constituted of the participant’s own blurred face, assumed to be more salient than the former. To assess how the valences of the related stimuli were transformed by relational series membership, self-report ratings and electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were collected before and after training the X>A>B>C>D>E>Y series. These pre vs. post contrasts revealed that, for unfamiliar faces, stimulus valence transformed as a function of relational structure. Conversely, the lack of difference in pre vs. post contrasts of Stimulus C, which maintained a high valence, suggest that relational series membership may not suffice to mitigate emotionally dissonant information.     

The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail...     

Inferred threat and safety: Symbolic generalization of human avoidance learning

Symbolic generalization of avoidance may underlie the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. The aim of the present study was to demonstrate inferred threat-avoidance and safety (non-avoidance) behaviours that occur in the presence of stimuli indirectly related to learned threat and safety cues. A laboratory experiment was conducted involving two symbolic stimulus equivalence relations consisting of three physically dissimilar stimuli (avoidance cues: AV1–AV2–AV3 and neutral cues: N1–N2–N3). During avoidance learning involving aversive images and sounds, a key-press avoidance response was trained for one member of one of the relations (AV2) and non-avoidance for another (N2). Inferred threat and safety behaviour and ratings of the likelihood of aversive events were tested with presentations of all remaining stimuli. Findings showed a significantly high percentage of avoidance to both the learned and inferred threat cues and less avoidance to both the learned and inferred safety cues. Ratings in the absence of avoidance were high during training and testing to threat cues and low to safety cues and were generally lower in the presence of avoidance. Implications for associative and behavioural accounts of avoidance, and modern therapies for anxiety disorders are discussed.