Latent state–trait theory: An application in sport psychology

ObjectiveQuestionnaires are often applied in sports psychology to measure a person's trait or state. However, the extent to which the questionnaire captures differences because of trait or state influences is often unclear. The latent state–trait (LST) theory offers the opportunity to separate both variance sources. This separation allows estimating specific reliability coefficients.DesignThe present paper gives a theoretical introduction to LST and its basic ideas. Using a real data set with N = 156 athletes we exemplify the steps necessary to derive the LST coefficients. All athletes filled out a comprehensive inventory assessing competitive anxiety on two occasions.MethodThe data are analysed with structural equation models based on LST principles.ResultsThe results confirm the questionnaire's trait saturation.ConclusionFinally, results are discussed in light of practical and theoretical implications.     

Same situation--different emotions: how appraisals shape our emotions

Appraisal theories of emotion hold that it is the way a person interprets a situation--rather than the situation itself--that gives rise to one emotion rather than another emotion (or no emotion at all). Unfortunately, most prior tests of this foundational hypothesis have simultaneously varied situations and appraisals, making an evaluation of this assumption difficult. In the present study, participants responded to a standardized laboratory situation with a variety of different emotions. Appraisals predicted the intensity of individual emotions across participants. In addition, subgroups of participants with similar emotional response profiles made comparable appraisals. Together, these findings suggest that appraisals may be necessary and sufficient to determine different emotional reactions toward a particular situation.     

Two Notions of Scientific Justification

Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for their interrelation are explored.     

Realizing complex delayed intentions in young and old adults: The role of planning aids

Although it has been suggested that the delayed realization of intended actions should benefit from appropriate intention planning, empirical evidence on this issue is scarce. In three experiments, we examined whether and which planning aids provided in the intention formation phase affect delayed intention realization in young and old adults. One finding was that intention planning directly affected delayed intention realization: instructing participants to include the cue for appropriate intention initiation in their plans benefited delayed performance. Another finding was that older adults' performance was improved when they were guided in structuring their plan in combination with guidance in implementing this plan after a delay. In sum, the results point to the importance of plan-related factors for understanding the delayed realization of intended actions.     

Are you looking at me? Measuring the cone of gaze

The processing of gaze cues plays an important role in social interactions, and mutual gaze in particular is relevant for natural as well as video-mediated communications. Mutual gaze occurs when an observer looks at or in the direction of the eyes of another person. The authors chose the metaphor of a cone of gaze to characterize this range of gaze directions that constitutes "looking at" another person. In 4 experiments using either a real person or a virtual head, the authors investigated the influences of observer distance, head orientation, visibility of the eyes, and the presence of a 2nd head on the perceived direction and width of the gaze cone. The direction of the gaze cone was largely affected by all experimental manipulations, whereas its angular width remained comparatively stable.     

Die logizistische Grundlegung der Mathematik

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