Decision-making under risk conditions is susceptible to interference by a secondary executive task

Recent research suggests two ways of making decisions: an intuitive and an analytical one. The current study examines whether a secondary executive task interferes with advantageous decision-making in the Game of Dice Task (GDT), a decision-making task with explicit and stable rules that taps executive functioning. One group of participants performed the original GDT solely, two groups performed either the GDT and a 1-back or a 2-back working memory task as a secondary task simultaneously. Results show that the group which performed the GDT and the secondary task with high executive load (2-back) decided less advantageously than the group which did not perform a secondary executive task. These findings give further evidence for the view that decision-making under risky conditions taps into the rational-analytical system which acts in a serial and not parallel way as performance on the GDT is disturbed by a parallel task that also requires executive resources.     

Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven? Dissociated behavioural and emotional responses in the Ultimatum Game task

The “irrational” rejections of unfair offers by people playing the Ultimatum Game (UG), a widely used laboratory model of economical decision-making, have traditionally been associated with negative emotions, such as frustration, elicited by unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003, van’t Wout et al., 2006). We recorded skin conductance responses as a measure of emotional activation while participants performed a modified version of the UG, in which they were asked to play both for themselves and on behalf of a third-party. Our findings show that even unfair offers are rejected when participants’ payoff is not affected (third-party condition); however, they show an increase in the emotional activation specifically when they are rejecting offers directed towards themselves (myself condition). These results suggest that theories emphasizing negative emotions as the critical factor of “irrational” rejections (Pillutla & Murninghan, 1996) should be re-discussed. Psychological mechanisms other than emotions might be better candidates for explaining this behaviour.     

Predicting Creativity Based on the Facets of the Theoretical Intellect Framework

The present study investigates how the construct intellect, according to the Theoretical Intellect Framework (TIF), predicts creativity. The TIF is a theoretical model describing the structure of the construct intellect, a sub‐dimension of the Big Five domain openness to experience. People (N = 2709) from two sub‐samples (undergraduate students and Amazon MTurkers) completed one of three creativity tasks (self‐reported, remote associates, or rated photo caption) and the Intellect Scale. The results support hypotheses derived from the TIF, as the operation Create, rather than the operations Think or Learn, significantly and in some cases uniquely predicted the self‐reported creativity indicators. Creativity indicators with a strong cognitive load (remote associates test and rated photo caption), however, were predicted by the operation Think. Results are discussed with regards to the nomological net of the operation Create and the construct validity of the creativity assessments. We provide implications for applied purposes and call for further examination of the TIF with additional creativity measures. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Emotions and appraisals: can you have one without the other?

In his commentary on M. Siemer and R. Reisenzein (2007), B. Parkinson (2007) raised a number of important questions concerning the process of emotion inference and the scope of appraisal theories. Siemer and Reisenzein first examine the alternative explanations of their findings proposed by Parkinson and then look at the alternative "situated" view of emotions proposed by him. The main conclusion is that the issues raised by Parkinson can be dealt with by (suitable extensions of) appraisal theory.     

Management of Test Anxiety Among Pupils in Basic Science Using Music-Based Cognitive Behavior Therapy Intervention: Implication for Community Development

Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy - Effectiveness of music-based cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) intervention has been established on various participants such as...     

Dignity and Dissent in Humans and Non-humans

Science and Engineering Ethics - Is there a difference between human beings and those based on artificial intelligence (AI) that would affect their ability to be subjects of (human-like) dignity?...     

Affective Processing and Emotion Regulation in Dysphoria and Depression: Cognitive Biases and Deficits in Cognitive Control

In this article, we take a closer look at the cognitive processing of emotional material in dysphoria and depression and link cognitive biases and deficits to individual differences in emotion regulation, an important risk factor for depression. Specifically, we propose that cognitive biases are associated with individual differences in the initial appraisal and reappraisal of emotion‐eliciting events. In addition, deficits in cognitive control result in prolonged processing of negative, goal‐irrelevant aspects of information as well as in decreased accessibility of mood‐incongruent material. These deficits further affect people’s ability to regulate negative affect by setting the stage for ruminative responses and by interfering with the use of reappraisal after the onset of an emotional response. This article provides a brief summary of findings that support these propositions and outlines implications for future research on the relation among affective processing, cognitive control, and emotion regulation in dysphoria and depression.