Explaining the ineffable

The 10th Anniversary Conference of the European Society for the Cognitive Sciences of Music was held at Liège, Belgium, on 5-8 April 2002.     

Conditioned inhibitory effects of discriminated Pavlovian training with food in rats depend on interactions of search modes,related repertoires,and response measures

Like other accounts of conditioned inhibition, behavior systems predicts (and Experiment 1 shows) that during summation and retardation tests, presentation of a negative conditioned stimulus (a CS-) created by discriminative Pavlovian food conditioning will interfere with a focal search response, such as nosing in the feeder. Unlike most other views, behavior systems predicts (and Experiment 2 shows) that the same CS- can potentiate a general search response, like attending to a moving artificial prey stimulus. Contacting the prey stimulus in extinction increased over baseline when a CS- but not a CS Novel preceded it. Experiment 3 showed this effect was not due to unconditioned qualities of the CS-. It appears that the effects of a discriminative CS- depend on the interaction of the training contingency with search modes related to the unconditioned stimulus (US), their perceptual-motor repertoires and environmental support, and the choice of response measure.     

Attentional resource and processing speed limitations during sentence processing in Parkinson's disease

Several studies have suggested that patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) have sentence comprehension difficulty in part because of their limited executive resources. However, these assessments confound the executive resources contributing to sentence comprehension with the resources needed for task performance. In the present study, we used a word detection technique that minimizes task demands in order to evaluate attentional and processing speed resources during the comprehension of simple sentences without subordinate clauses and sentences containing subject-relative and object-relative center-embedded subordinate clauses. We found that PD patients have poor sensitivity to phonetic errors embedded in unbound grammatical morphemes, regardless of the clausal structure of the sentence, suggesting difficulty attending to grammatical morphemes. We also found that PD patients are significantly slowed in their sensitivity to phonetic errors in content words embedded in object-relative center-embedded sentences. Slowed sensitivity to content words in object-relative sentences was correlated with timed executive measures of planning. On a traditional measure of comprehension, these PD patients were impaired for sentences containing object-relative center-embedded clauses compared to sentences with subject-relative center-embedded clauses, and comprehension of object-relative sentences was correlated with executive measures. Our findings are consistent with the claim that limited executive resources for strategic attention and processing speed contribute to the sentence comprehension difficulties of PD patients.     

Accepting Testimony

I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider two alternative weaker principles as complements to local reductionism; one yields counter–intuitive results unless we accept (APT) as well, while the other is too weak to enable local reductionism to avoid scepticism.     

Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth

This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has theresources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussioncenters on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one isincorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesnt statea fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If itdoes, it can be explained.     

Revitalizing Narcissistic Perfectionism: Evidence of the Reliability and the Validity of an Emerging Construct

Theorists have long speculated about narcissistic perfectionism—an outwardly directed need for perfection marked by grandiosity, entitlement, and lofty expectations for others. This study provides evidence of reliability and predictive validity for an emerging model of narcissistic perfectionism using two waves of measurement and multiple data sources (self-report and informant-report) in a sample of 155 undergraduate students. As hypothesized, confirmatory factor analysis showed manifest indicators of narcissistic perfectionism cohered together as a constellation of traits while showing reliability and factorial validity across time and source. Hierarchical multiple regression indicated narcissistic perfectionism uniquely and incrementally predicted anger beyond competing measures of other-oriented perfectionism and narcissism. Informant-reports of narcissistic perfectionism uniquely predicted anger beyond self-reports. These results offer promising empirical support for the often discussed, but seldom tested, concept of narcissistic perfectionism.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.