Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Using the shifting standards model of stereotype-based judgments to examine the impact of race on compensation decisions

The Shifting Standards Model (SSM) of stereotypic judgments is presented as a model of implicit bias that produces a psychological mechanism contributing to continued racial wage disparities. The SSM is used to explain race-based differences in subjective evaluations of compensation decisions. We report three experimental studies in which research participants made compensation decisions for either a White or Black employee. Across three studies, participants judged a Black employee's raise as subjectively better than a comparably described White employee's raise. Participants who work in Human Resources fields (Study 3) and those with experience making compensation decisions (Study 2) were as likely as other participants to show evidence of the shifting standards effect. The findings are discussed in the context of individual implicit biases contributing to continued wage disparities and potential organizational practices to ameliorate these influences.     

The Greta Thunberg Effect: Familiarity with Greta Thunberg predicts intentions to engage in climate activism in the United States

Despite Greta Thunberg's popularity, research has yet to investigate her impact on the public's willingness to take collective action on climate change. Using cross-sectional data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N = 1,303), we investigate the “Greta Thunberg Effect,” or whether exposure to Greta Thunberg predicts collective efficacy and intentions to engage in collective action. We find that those who are more familiar with Greta Thunberg have higher intentions of taking collective actions to reduce global warming and that stronger collective efficacy beliefs mediate this relationship. This association between familiarity with Greta Thunberg, collective efficacy beliefs, and collective action intentions is present even after accounting for respondents’ overall support for climate activism. Moderated mediation models testing age and political ideology as moderators of the “Greta Thunberg Effect” indicate that although the indirect effect of familiarity with Greta Thunberg via collective efficacy is present across all age-groups, and across the political spectrum, it may be stronger among those who identify as more liberal (than conservative). Our findings suggest that young public figures like Greta Thunberg may motivate collective action across the U.S. public, but their effect may be stronger among those with a shared political ideology. Implications for future research and for broadening climate activists’ appeals across the political spectrum are discussed.     

Pierre Hadot,Albert Camus and the orphic view of nature

Continental Philosophy Review - Albert Camus repeatedly denied the label “existentialist,” and pointed to his formative experiences of natural beauty and his early introduction to...     

Understanding fish cognition: a review and appraisal of current practices

Animal Cognition - With over 30,000 recognized species, fishes exhibit an extraordinary variety of morphological, behavioural, and life-history traits. The field of fish cognition has grown...     

On the Structure of the Non-dominated Set for Bicriteria Programmes

In multiple-objective programming, a knowledge of the structure of the non-dominated set can aid in generating efficient solutions. We present new concepts which allow for a better understanding of the structure of the set of non-dominated solutions for non-convex bicriteria programming problems. In particular, a means of determining whether or not this set is connected is examined. Both supersets and newly defined subsets of the non-dominated set are utilized in this investigation. Of additional value is the use of the lower envelope of the set of outcomes in classifying feasible points as (properly) non-dominated solutions.     

Reducing drug and alcohol use and improving well-being for Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians using the Community Reinforcement Approach: A feasibility and acceptability study

There is a lack of evidence of effective and appropriate drug and alcohol treatment for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This paper contributes to addressing the evidence gap by examining the feasibility and acceptability and conducting a pre/post-evaluation of the Aboriginal-adapted Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) delivered in New South Wales, Australia. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal clients (n = 55) received tailored CRA delivery between March and November 2013. Compared to the original US version, tailored CRA had reduced technical language, reduced number of treatment sessions, and the addition of group delivery option. An Australian training manual with local case studies was developed. Alcohol, Smoking and Substance Involvement Test (ASSIST), Kessler-5 (K-5) and the Growth Empowerment Measure were used. 58% of participants were followed-up at 3 months. Tailored CRA was feasible to deliver in a rural, community-based health setting, and rated by clients as highly effective and acceptable. CRA was associated with statistically significant reductions in the use of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, amphetamine and over the counter medication, and levels of psychological distress, and an increase in levels of empowerment for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal clients. This study provides evidence for the feasibility and acceptability of an Aboriginal-adapted psychological intervention addressing drug, alcohol and mental health outcomes.     

A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.