Convergent Validity of the Early Memory Index in Two Primary Care Samples

Karliner, Westrich, Shedler, and Mayman (1996) developed the Early Memory Index (EMI) to assess mental health, narrative coherence, and traumatic experiences in reports of early memories. We assessed the convergent validity of EMI scales with data from 103 women from an urban primary care clinic (Study 1) and data from 48 women and 24 men from a suburban primary care clinic (Study 2). Patients provided early memory narratives and completed self-report measures of psychopathology, trauma, and health care utilization. In both studies, lower scores on the Mental Health scale and higher scores on the Traumatic Experiences scale were related to higher scores on measures of psychopathology and childhood trauma. Less consistent associations were found between the Mental Health and Traumatic Experiences scores and measures of health care utilization. The Narrative Coherence scale showed inconsistent relationships across measures in both samples. In analyses assessing the overall fit between hypothesized and actual correlations between EMI scores and measures of psychopathology, severity of trauma symptoms, and health care utilization, the Mental Health scale of the EMI demonstrated stronger convergent validity than the EMI Traumatic Experiences scale. The results provide support for the convergent validity of the Mental Health scale of the EMI.     

The Association Between Childhood Maltreatment and Coping Strategies: The Indirect Effect Through Attachment

Maladaptive coping strategies represent a potentially treatable component of psychopathologies associated with childhood abuse and neglect. Coping strategies are relatively stable constructs that may be viewed as trait-like behavioral manifestations of larger, albeit less accessible, intra- and interpersonal processes, such as activation of the attachment system. The authors investigated a potential mediational pathway from childhood maltreatment (in the form of physical and emotional abuse experiences) to coping strategies developed in emerging adulthood through attachment organization in a sample of undergraduate psychology research participants at a public Midwestern university (N = 225). Avoidant attachment patterns helped to explain the relationship between increased instances of childhood maltreatment and a decreased use of adaptive coping strategies. Further, both anxious and avoidant attachment mediated the relationship between childhood maltreatment and an increased use of maladaptive coping. By utilizing an attachment theory–informed approach as an explanatory guide, researchers and clinicians may be better able to conceptualize, study, and treat complex cases by understanding the underlying relationships between childhood maltreatment, attachment, and coping.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.