全文获取类型
收费全文 | 3470篇 |
免费 | 251篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 39篇 |
2022年 | 38篇 |
2021年 | 55篇 |
2020年 | 92篇 |
2019年 | 134篇 |
2018年 | 153篇 |
2017年 | 165篇 |
2016年 | 173篇 |
2015年 | 114篇 |
2014年 | 142篇 |
2013年 | 433篇 |
2012年 | 236篇 |
2011年 | 212篇 |
2010年 | 136篇 |
2009年 | 130篇 |
2008年 | 165篇 |
2007年 | 162篇 |
2006年 | 150篇 |
2005年 | 130篇 |
2004年 | 116篇 |
2003年 | 86篇 |
2002年 | 91篇 |
2001年 | 48篇 |
2000年 | 45篇 |
1999年 | 40篇 |
1998年 | 30篇 |
1997年 | 28篇 |
1996年 | 19篇 |
1995年 | 12篇 |
1994年 | 19篇 |
1993年 | 19篇 |
1992年 | 21篇 |
1991年 | 15篇 |
1990年 | 19篇 |
1989年 | 20篇 |
1988年 | 13篇 |
1986年 | 11篇 |
1985年 | 16篇 |
1984年 | 13篇 |
1983年 | 13篇 |
1982年 | 15篇 |
1981年 | 18篇 |
1980年 | 13篇 |
1979年 | 13篇 |
1977年 | 12篇 |
1976年 | 10篇 |
1975年 | 9篇 |
1973年 | 9篇 |
1968年 | 13篇 |
1967年 | 8篇 |
排序方式: 共有3721条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
891.
Marie Helweg-Larsen Laurel M. Peterson Sarah H. DiMuccio 《Social and Personality Psychology Compass》2023,17(11):e12873
Research suggests a U.S. political ideology gap for taking COVID-19 precautions, but we do not know the role of cognitive risk (assessed here as perceived risk) and affective risk (assessed here as worry) in explaining why conservative Americans participated in fewer recommended precautions (e.g., mask wearing) and whether governmental trust attenuates the effect. We predicted that conservatives (compared with liberals) would take fewer precautions because they thought they were less at risk and were less worried about COVID-19, but that this would be more pronounced for those with low governmental trust. In this study, U.S. adults (representative sample: N = 738; Mage = 46.8; 52% women; 78% white) who had not had COVID-19 took two online surveys 2 weeks apart during the first wave of the pandemic (April 2020). Participants reported ideology, perceived risk of getting or dying of COVID-19, worry about COVID-19, and trust in the CDC and state officials at baseline. At follow-up, participants reported on COVID-19 precautions: (1) prevention behavior participation (e.g., mask wearing) and (2) behavioral willingness for future behaviors (e.g., vaccination). Results showed that, politically conservative Americans took fewer precautions due to lower worry (but unexpectedly not due to lower perceived risk). As predicted, when trust was high, the ideology gap was muted for predicting precautions as well as for predicting perceived risk and worry. In sum, conservatives worried less about COVID-19 which predicted fewer precautions, but trust in governmental institutions reduced this ideological gap. Improving governmental trust could be one fruitful path to increasing COVID-19 precautions. 相似文献
892.
The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robyn M. Dawes Matthew Mulford 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》1996,65(3):201-211
Thefalse consensus effectand theoverconfidence in judgmenteffect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is inadequate and logically flawed. We argue that, absent other information, using one's own response to a situation as an observation of size 1 could be an effective use of data and could lead to anincreasein the accuracy of predicting others’ behavior. In an empirical examination of such use, we find a robustpositivecorrelation between the degree to which people believe that a majority of others are like them and their accuracy in predicting those others’ responses, whether this correlation is evaluated within items across people, across items within people, or across items across people. In addition, we show that the finding of overconfidence in judgment follows analytically from the functional relationship used to demonstrate it, a “finding” that is easily reversed by considering the inverse relationship. Specifically, we argue that regression effects account for the evidence cited in support of overconfidence. While not definitive, our empirical findings call into the question the acceptance of these two effects—as commonly defined—as facts. 相似文献
893.
894.
895.
Two experiments were conducted to examine the development of a theory of mind in 265 children aged 3 to 5 years from families of varied size. Even after verbal mental age was controlled, those who had a sibling aged 12 months to 12 years outperformed only-children in both experiments. However, the presence of a very young infant, or of siblings who were teenagers or young adults, exerted no benefit. Also, in contrast to some previous studies, younger child siblings and twins were just as helpful as older child siblings. The presence of multiple child siblings of varied ages above and below that of the participant predicted advanced theory of mind development over and above the effects of own age and verbal ability, despite the fact that neither overall family size nor birth order were significant predictors. These findings were reconciled with those of previous sibling constellation research around a model of family social influences in which the opportunity to play, converse, and disagree in distinctively childish ways with brothers and sisters provides unique insights into the workings of the human mind. 相似文献
896.
Gregory R. Peterson 《Zygon》2000,35(3):469-480
Much ink has been spilled on the claim that morality and religion have evolutionary roots. While some attempt to reduce morality and religion to biological considerations, others reject any link whatsoever. Any full account, however, must acknowledge the biological roots of human behavior while at the same time recognizing that our relatively unique capacity as cognitive agents requires orienting concepts of cosmic and human nature. While other organisms display quasi-moral and proto-moral behavior that is indeed relevant, fully moral behavior is only possible for organisms that attain a higher level of cognitive ability. This, in turn, implies a significant role for religion, which has traditionally provided an orientation within which moral conduct is understood. 相似文献
897.
Correlations between aggressive attitudes and sexual coercion have consistently been found in numerous empirical studies across social science disciplines. Extrapolating from sociological research linking indices of legitimate aggression by state to statewide frequencies of rape, we have extended the investigation of legitimate aggression and coercive sexuality to the individual level. The specific purposes of this research were to index the breadth and level of endorsement of legitimized aggression at the individual level and to measure the association between such an index and coercive sexual behavior. These purposes were achieved across the course of three studies in which we created a new dispositional measure, the Proclivity for Legitimized Aggression Questionnaire (PLAQ), and replicated a sociocultural level correlation with coercive sexual behavior (Study 1); assessed the individual differences level construct validity of the PLAQ (Study 2); and tested whether endorsement of items on the PLAQ were related to content‐relevant behaviors (Study 3). The PLAQ was internally consistent, modestly but significantly correlated with a measure of self‐reported coercive sexual behavior, and characterized by promising construct validity. Aggr. Behav. 27:26–43, 2001. © 2001 Wiley‐Liss, Inc. 相似文献
898.
Sandip Sinharay Matthew S. Johnson 《The British journal of mathematical and statistical psychology》2020,73(3):397-419
According to Wollack and Schoenig (2018, The Sage encyclopedia of educational research, measurement, and evaluation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 260), benefiting from item preknowledge is one of the three broad types of test fraud that occur in educational assessments. We use tools from constrained statistical inference to suggest a new statistic that is based on item scores and response times and can be used to detect examinees who may have benefited from item preknowledge for the case when the set of compromised items is known. The asymptotic distribution of the new statistic under no preknowledge is proved to be a simple mixture of two χ2 distributions. We perform a detailed simulation study to show that the Type I error rate of the new statistic is very close to the nominal level and that the power of the new statistic is satisfactory in comparison to that of the existing statistics for detecting item preknowledge based on both item scores and response times. We also include a real data example to demonstrate the usefulness of the suggested statistic. 相似文献
899.
Matthew Kuhner 《Heythrop Journal》2020,61(2):267-274
Matthias Joseph Scheeben has been described as one of the greatest and least read theologians of the modern era. This article provides an overview of his theology of predestination, which remains a significant but little-studied aspect of his thought. Section I offers a general sketch of Scheeben's theology of predestination, employing the chapter on this topic in The Mysteries of Christianity as a primary source. Section II takes a deeper look at Scheeben's theology of predestination through an engagement with relevant sections of his untranslated masterwork, the Dogmatik. This section will highlight Scheeben's relationship to both the de auxiliis controversy and the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Connections between Scheeben's theology of predestination and his other theological positions are noted throughout. 相似文献
900.
Democracies across the globe are shaken by a new class of populist right-wing politicians. A defining element of right-wing populism is a preference for antagonistic rhetoric to describe opponents. Three studies connect support for right-wing populist rhetoric to collective nostalgia for the past. Importantly, the results show that collective nostalgia can both increase and decrease support for right-wing populist antagonistic rhetoric, depending on how the past is conceptualized. Nostalgia for a past characterized by political incorrectness is associated with increased support, whereas nostalgia for the past's greater decorum is associated with decreased support for right-wing populism. Studies 1 and 2 show this with vignettes. Study 3 measures support for Trump and the GOP in the 2018 midterm elections. Although right-wing populism is often seen as the result of a wave of nostalgia, our results show that this link can be disconnected and even reversed. 相似文献