Religious Beliefs,Religious Contexts,and Perceived Interactions with Ex-Offenders

Religious institutions can provide a means of support and resources for many people, particularly, individuals who have criminal histories, specifically parolees, sex offenders, and insanity acquittees. When these individuals are released into the community, they often face difficulties in acquiring shelter, work, and social support. Out of their own volition or as a result of faith-based prison programs, they might turn to religious institutions for help reintegrating into the community. However, whether congregation members are more or less accepting of these individuals is unaddressed in the current literature. Two studies assess the relationship between religious beliefs, religious contexts, legal attitudes, and perceived social interactions with parolees, sex offenders, and insanity acquittees. Results suggest that religious beliefs, legal attitudes, and religious contexts play an important role in individuals’ perceived interactions with these individuals. Religious contexts, specifically, might facilitate more positive social interactions with parolees. Implications are discussed.     

Reactionary Deconversion from Mormonism: Polarization of Ideological and Behavioral Religiosity Among Active and Former Mormons

In contrast to a growing body of literature examining the experiences and trends of those who leave their faith tradition—particularly among Christian denominations—relatively little is known about those who specifically disaffiliate from Mormonism, although some evidence suggests that former Mormons may be especially likely to embrace secularity or irreligion rather than other religious beliefs and practices. Pursuant to empirically investigating this reactionary dynamic, the current study compared the relative religiosity and secularity of an online sample of active Mormons (n?=?194) and former Mormons (n?=?109) using the Abbreviated Religiousness Measure (ARM), an updated questionnaire of multidimensional religiosity. Results supported the ARM’s improved psychometrics and its hypothesized three-factor structure with both subsamples. Additionally, multivariate and univariate results indicated that active and former Mormon participants from our sample, significantly polarized in their self-reported level of religious beliefs, rituals, and influence on daily behaviors, with active Mormon reporting high religiosity and former Mormons reporting low religiosity or high secularity. Although these results comport with reactionary deconversion dynamics found in other high cost religions, limits to generalizability are discussed. Reasons for and implications of this reactionary phenomenon are also posited.     

On an Observer’s Reaction to Hearing of Someone Harming Him or Herself

Anthropological studies in India inspired the idea of a distinct domain of moral purity, but a precise characterization of that domain has been elusive. One proposal based on current theorizing in psychology is that prototypical purity violations are self-harming actions, which are perceived as disgusting and immoral whether done accidentally or intentionally. In three studies (Ns?=?400, 80, 132), we examined judgments of self-harming actions in two cultural groups—American and Indian. There was little support for the proposed characterization of the purity domain: Self-harms were slightly to modestly immoral for Indians and Americans. Both Indians and Americans found self-harms to be sad, not disgusting. And intentionality influenced how immoral and how sad the action was judged. Instead, the findings supported a view that all immorality, including those concerning self-harm, depends on perceived harm.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.     

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.     

Living under threat: Mutual threat perception drives anti‐Muslim and anti‐Western hostility in the age of terrorism

This research demonstrates a common psychology of outgroup hostility driven by perceived intergroup threat among three groups and seven cultural contexts: non‐Muslim Westerners, Muslims in Western societies, and Muslims in the Middle East. In Study 1, symbolic, but not realistic and terroristic threats, predicted non‐Muslim Norwegians' intentions to join anti‐Islamic movements. In Study 2, symbolic and realistic, but not terroristic threat, predicted non‐Muslim Americans' willingness to persecute Muslims. In Studies 3 and 4, symbolic threat predicted support and behavioral intentions against the West among Swedish and Turkish Muslims. Finally, in Study 5, a comparison demonstrated that symbolic and realistic threats had the same effects on violent intentions among non‐Muslim and Muslim Danes, and Muslims in Afghanistan. Meta‐analysis showed that symbolic threat was most strongly associated with intergroup hostility. Across studies, participants with high religious group identification experienced higher levels of threat. Implications for intergroup research and prejudice reduction are discussed.     

High self‐monitors modulate their responses as a function of relevant social roles

We reasoned that high self‐monitors' responses may be influenced by the characteristic traits and behaviors associated with social roles. Results across four studies confirmed expectations. The findings from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated that exposure to a particular role (e.g., nurse) led high self‐monitors to respond in a manner consistent with the relevant role. Results from Experiment 4 showed that the effect found in the first three experiments was attenuated when the behavioral guidance of the particular role was reduced. Low self‐monitors' responses were not influenced by exposure to the role. Showing that high self‐monitors use information embedded in a social role to tailor their behavior provides a novel finding that has heretofore been absent from the literature.     

No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension

In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current study, their claim that people develop “unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.     

On Doubt

Despite the prominence of doubt in philosophy since Descartes, the published philosophical literature includes no extended treatment of the nature of doubt. In this paper, I summarize the main contributions that have been made to the subject and then develop a commonsense functionalist account of doubt by specifying (a significant part of) the functional role of doubt that something is the case. After adding two further wrinkles, I show how the resulting account can be used to address the questions of how doubt is related to belief and whether suspension of judgment can be identified with (some appropriate level or levels of) doubt. Although the account is partisan, it should hold interest for those who favor other positions in the philosophy of mind, since (a) much of the account can be taken on board by those in other camps, and (b) the paper demonstrates how a sufficiently detailed account of doubt can be put to work addressing longstanding questions of interest across philosophical sub-disciplines.