The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Using the shifting standards model of stereotype-based judgments to examine the impact of race on compensation decisions

The Shifting Standards Model (SSM) of stereotypic judgments is presented as a model of implicit bias that produces a psychological mechanism contributing to continued racial wage disparities. The SSM is used to explain race-based differences in subjective evaluations of compensation decisions. We report three experimental studies in which research participants made compensation decisions for either a White or Black employee. Across three studies, participants judged a Black employee's raise as subjectively better than a comparably described White employee's raise. Participants who work in Human Resources fields (Study 3) and those with experience making compensation decisions (Study 2) were as likely as other participants to show evidence of the shifting standards effect. The findings are discussed in the context of individual implicit biases contributing to continued wage disparities and potential organizational practices to ameliorate these influences.     

Pierre Hadot,Albert Camus and the orphic view of nature

Continental Philosophy Review - Albert Camus repeatedly denied the label “existentialist,” and pointed to his formative experiences of natural beauty and his early introduction to...     

On the Structure of the Non-dominated Set for Bicriteria Programmes

In multiple-objective programming, a knowledge of the structure of the non-dominated set can aid in generating efficient solutions. We present new concepts which allow for a better understanding of the structure of the set of non-dominated solutions for non-convex bicriteria programming problems. In particular, a means of determining whether or not this set is connected is examined. Both supersets and newly defined subsets of the non-dominated set are utilized in this investigation. Of additional value is the use of the lower envelope of the set of outcomes in classifying feasible points as (properly) non-dominated solutions.     

A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.

     

Correction to: The varieties of impartiality,or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?

Philosophical Studies - The citations of Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 were placed after the figures in the original publication of the article. However, they should be placed prior the placement...     

Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency

Synthese - Sosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of “performance normativity,” comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally...     

Distancing or drawing together: Sexism and organisational tolerance of sexism impact women's social relationships at work

This article examines the role of organisational climate in women's social responses to sexism at work. We argue that after experiences of sexism, women “draw together” with other women when they perceive that the organisational climate is intolerant of sexism. We assess the role of organisational climate at three levels: peer-, manager-, and policy-level. We conducted a correlational study (N_study1 = 405) and two experimental studies (N_study2 = 377, N_study3 = 391), in which we examined women's experiences of sexism at work (measured in Study 1; manipulated in Studies 2 and 3). We also measured perceived tolerance of sexism at the peer-, manager- and policy-level in all studies. The main DVs were women's workplace friendships with other women in Studies 1 and 2, and closeness to female co-workers in Study 3. Results showed that perceived tolerance of sexism from peers was especially important in shaping women's social relationships following experiences of sexism; tolerance from managers or at the policy level had less consistent effects. Specifically, experiences with sexism were positively associated with female participants' reported friendship (Studies 1 and 2) and closeness (Study 3) with their female colleagues, but only when peers were perceived not to tolerate sexism. When peers were perceived to tolerate sexism, female participants did not respond to sexism by drawing together.     

Counter-argument self-efficacy predicts choice of belief-defense strategies

Research has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief-inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter-argue belief-inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief-inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter-arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self-efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter-arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter-arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief.