Pierre Hadot,Albert Camus and the orphic view of nature

Continental Philosophy Review - Albert Camus repeatedly denied the label “existentialist,” and pointed to his formative experiences of natural beauty and his early introduction to...     

On the Structure of the Non-dominated Set for Bicriteria Programmes

In multiple-objective programming, a knowledge of the structure of the non-dominated set can aid in generating efficient solutions. We present new concepts which allow for a better understanding of the structure of the set of non-dominated solutions for non-convex bicriteria programming problems. In particular, a means of determining whether or not this set is connected is examined. Both supersets and newly defined subsets of the non-dominated set are utilized in this investigation. Of additional value is the use of the lower envelope of the set of outcomes in classifying feasible points as (properly) non-dominated solutions.     

A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.

     

Correction to: The varieties of impartiality,or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?

Philosophical Studies - The citations of Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 were placed after the figures in the original publication of the article. However, they should be placed prior the placement...     

Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency

Synthese - Sosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of “performance normativity,” comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally...     

Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal

Philosophia - I argue for the epiphenomenality of functional properties by means of thought experiments and general principles. General principles suggest that an object’s causal powers...     

Effects of Gender and Appearance Comparisons on Associations Between Media-Based Appearance Pressure and Disordered Eating: Testing a Moderated Mediation Model

Sex Roles - Appearance pressure from mass media and appearance social comparisons have been implicated in theory and research on disordered eating. However, mediating effects of upward and downward...     

Why not to be a ‘Thomist’: A Critique of the Bañezian Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

Thomas Osborne has asserted that ‘No one has developed an argument against premotion that works if the distinctions made by the Thomists are granted.' This article attempts to form just such an argument. Specifically, it argues that the Thomistic system – even with the distinctions it relies on having been granted – cannot account for human freedom, at least not in a sense sufficiently strong to sustain human guilt for sin. Further, it argues that the Thomists, by their own clear though tacit admission, acknowledge this insufficiency.