A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.

     

Correction to: The varieties of impartiality,or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?

Philosophical Studies - The citations of Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 were placed after the figures in the original publication of the article. However, they should be placed prior the placement...     

Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency

Synthese - Sosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of “performance normativity,” comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally...     

Distancing or drawing together: Sexism and organisational tolerance of sexism impact women's social relationships at work

This article examines the role of organisational climate in women's social responses to sexism at work. We argue that after experiences of sexism, women “draw together” with other women when they perceive that the organisational climate is intolerant of sexism. We assess the role of organisational climate at three levels: peer-, manager-, and policy-level. We conducted a correlational study (N_study1 = 405) and two experimental studies (N_study2 = 377, N_study3 = 391), in which we examined women's experiences of sexism at work (measured in Study 1; manipulated in Studies 2 and 3). We also measured perceived tolerance of sexism at the peer-, manager- and policy-level in all studies. The main DVs were women's workplace friendships with other women in Studies 1 and 2, and closeness to female co-workers in Study 3. Results showed that perceived tolerance of sexism from peers was especially important in shaping women's social relationships following experiences of sexism; tolerance from managers or at the policy level had less consistent effects. Specifically, experiences with sexism were positively associated with female participants' reported friendship (Studies 1 and 2) and closeness (Study 3) with their female colleagues, but only when peers were perceived not to tolerate sexism. When peers were perceived to tolerate sexism, female participants did not respond to sexism by drawing together.     

Counter-argument self-efficacy predicts choice of belief-defense strategies

Research has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief-inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter-argue belief-inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief-inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter-arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self-efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter-arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter-arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief.     

Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal

Philosophia - I argue for the epiphenomenality of functional properties by means of thought experiments and general principles. General principles suggest that an object’s causal powers...     

Pairing People with Products: Anthropomorphizing the Object,Dehumanizing the Person

We present the first empirical integration of anthropomorphism and dehumanization, two intrinsically linked processes representing the extent to which the concept of humanness is activated for a given target. Across several experiments, we demonstrate that pairing a person and object in an ad, while focusing respondent attention on the object, leads to its being anthropomorphized and evaluated better compared to presenting it alone. However, compared to presenting a person alone, the same pairing leads to inferior evaluations of the person through a process of dehumanization. We rule out two alternative explanations for these effects, namely the transfer of an object's qualities to the person and consumption associations, and conduct a post‐test that provides additional support for our proposed activation/inhibition of humanness account. Finally, we inspect several moderators, finding that anthropomorphism only occurs with moderately and highly functional objects and dehumanization occurs irrespective of the person's gender or fame. By incorporating the literature on dehumanization, we propose new research questions to motivate future inquiry.     

Why not to be a ‘Thomist’: A Critique of the Bañezian Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

Thomas Osborne has asserted that ‘No one has developed an argument against premotion that works if the distinctions made by the Thomists are granted.' This article attempts to form just such an argument. Specifically, it argues that the Thomistic system – even with the distinctions it relies on having been granted – cannot account for human freedom, at least not in a sense sufficiently strong to sustain human guilt for sin. Further, it argues that the Thomists, by their own clear though tacit admission, acknowledge this insufficiency.