Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look

In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fictionalist positions in metaontology. The purpose of this paper is to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection presented by Amie Thomasson against fictionalist strategies in metaontology. The objection can be reconstructed in the following way. Fictionalists need to distinguish between the literal and the real content of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse. In order to make that distinction, they need to assign different truth-conditions to the real and the literal content. But it is hard to see what more is required for the literal content to be true than for the real content to be true. So, fictionalism is an unsatisfactory position. Here I offer a novel reply to Thomasson’s challenge. I argue that the literal and the real content need not be distinguished in terms of their truth-conditions; rather, they can be distinguished in terms of their different subject-matters, leaving it open whether their truth-conditions coincide or not. I explain how replying to Thomasson’s objection is crucial for deepening our understanding of fictionalist strategies in metaontology.     

An experimental analysis of satisficing in saving decisions

Uncertainty of one’s future is the essential problem of saving decisions. Unlike previous experimental studies, we capture this crucial uncertainty by a scenario-based satisficing approach. Decision makers first form aspirations for a few relevant scenarios, and then search for consumption plans guaranteeing these aspirations. Our aim is to investigate whether agents make satisficing choices and, if so, how satisficing relates to optimality. We find that satisficing allocations can be reached easily when aspirations are incentivized, although aspiration levels are rather far from what optimality suggests.     

Are Healthy Eating Policies Consistent with Public Reason?

States are increasingly implementing policies aimed at changing people's dietary habits, such as fat taxes, food bans, and nudges. In this article, we ask whether healthy eating policies are consistent with public reason, the view that state laws and policies should be justified on the basis of reasons that all citizens can accept at some level of idealisation despite their different conceptions of the good. What we intend to explore is an ‘if…, then…’ line of thought: if one is committed to public reason, then may one consistently endorse healthy eating policies? First, we illustrate multiple ways in which contemporary societies are characterised by a reasonable pluralism concerning conceptions of health and values attached to eating practices. Second, we critically assess the implications of three main conceptions of the structure of public reason, i.e. ‘shareability’, ‘intelligibility’ and ‘accessibility’, for the public justifiability of healthy eating policies. We conclude that healthy eating policies are only consistent with public reason under the ‘accessibility’ conception, i.e. if they are based on reasons grounded in shared epistemic and moral evaluative standards, as long as such reasons reflect a reasonable balance of political values and do not overly prioritise or neglect any of these values.     

Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry that if there is a plurality of concepts of explanation, one will not be able to normatively evaluate what counts as good explanation.     

Similarity in depressive symptoms in adolescents' friendship dyads: selection or socialization?

This study examined friendship selection and socialization as mechanisms explaining similarity in depressive symptoms in adolescent same-gender best friend dyads. The sample consisted of 1,752 adolescents (51% male) ages 12-16 years (M = 13.77, SD = 0.73) forming 487 friend dyads and 389 nonfriend dyads (the nonfriend dyads served as a comparison group). To test our hypothesis, we applied a multigroup actor-partner interdependence model to 3 friendship types that started and ended at different time points during the 2 waves of data collection. Results showed that adolescents reported levels of depressive symptoms at follow-up that were similar to those of their best friends. Socialization processes explained the increase in similarity exclusively in female dyads, whereas no evidence for friendship selection emerged for either male or female dyads. Additional analyses revealed that similarity between friends was particularly evident in the actual best friend dyads (i.e., true best friends), in which evidence for socialization processes emerged for both female and male friend dyads. Findings highlight the importance of examining friendship relations as a potential context for the development of depressive symptoms.