On the experiential link between spatial and temporal language

How do we understand time and other entities we can neither touch nor see? One possibility is that we tap into our concrete, experiential knowledge, including our understanding of physical space and motion, to make sense of abstract domains such as time. To examine how pervasive an aspect of cognition this is, we investigated whether thought about a nonliteral type of motion called fictive motion (FM; as in The road runs along the coast) can influence thought about time. Our results suggest that FM uses the same structures evoked in understanding literal motion, and that these literal aspects of FM influence temporal reasoning.     

“Hey,let me hold your guns for a while”: A qualitative study of messaging for firearm suicide prevention

A recommended component of suicide prevention is encouraging at‐risk individuals to voluntarily and temporarily reduce access to firearms and other lethal methods. Yet delivering counseling on the topic can be difficult, given the political sensitivity of firearm discussions. To support such counseling, we sought to identify recommended framing and content of messages about reducing firearm access for suicide prevention. Through qualitative interviews with firearm owners and enthusiasts, we identified key points for use in framing (identity as a gun owner, trust, voluntary and temporary storage, and context and motivation) and specific content (preference for “firearm” over “gun,” and legal issues such as background checks for transfers). These findings build on prior work and should enhance efforts to develop and deliver effective, acceptable counseling and—ultimately—prevent firearm suicide.     

Spatial and linguistic aspects of visual imagery in sentence comprehension

There is mounting evidence that language comprehension involves the activation of mental imagery of the content of utterances ( Barsalou, 1999 ; Bergen, Chang, & Narayan, 2004 ; Bergen, Narayan, & Feldman, 2003 ; Narayan, Bergen, & Weinberg, 2004 ; Richardson, Spivey, McRae, & Barsalou, 2003 ; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001 ; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002 ). This imagery can have motor or perceptual content. Three main questions about the process remain under‐explored, however. First, are lexical associations with perception or motion sufficient to yield mental simulation, or is the integration of lexical semantics into larger structures, like sentences, necessary? Second, what linguistic elements (e.g., verbs, nouns, etc.) trigger mental simulations? Third, how detailed are the visual simulations that are performed? A series of behavioral experiments address these questions, using a visual object categorization task to investigate whether up‐ or down‐related language selectively interferes with visual processing in the same part of the visual field (following Richardson et al., 2003 ). The results demonstrate that either subject nouns or main verbs can trigger visual imagery, but only when used in literal sentences about real space—metaphorical language does not yield significant effects—which implies that it is the comprehension of the sentence as a whole and not simply lexical associations that yields imagery effects. These studies also show that the evoked imagery contains detail as to the part of the visual field where the described scene would take place.