Minority Minds: Mental Disability and the Presumption of Value Neutrality

Elizabeth Barnes has recently developed an account of disability that is sensitive to the role of self-evaluation. To have a physical disability is, according to Barnes, to have a body that is merely different from the norm. Yet, as Barnes notes, some disabilities will genuinely frustrate some life plans. It may be the case, therefore, that a disability is instrumentally bad for a person and that acquiring one may be a genuine loss. Equally, however, a person may genuinely value a disability such that it is instrumentally good for them and that they experience the acquiring of it as a gain. Notably, Barnes explicitly restricts this analysis to physical disabilities, leaving open the status of mental disabilities. Nevertheless, Barnes does not rule out the extension of her model to this category, and she expresses a desire to see future work on other disabilities built upon it. This article takes up this challenge, making the case that to possess a mental disability is merely to possess a minority mind.     

Food, mood, and attitude: reducing risk for eating disorders in college women.

Food, Mood, and Attitude (FMA) is a CD-ROM prevention program developed to decrease risk for eating disorders in college women. Female 1st-year students (N = 240) were randomly assigned to the intervention (FMA) or control group. Equal numbers of students at risk and of low risk for developing an eating disorder were assigned to each condition. Participants in the FMA condition improved on all measures relative to controls. Significant 3-way interactions (Time x Condition x Risk Status) were found on measures of internalization of sociocultural attitudes about thinness, shape concerns, and weight concerns, indicating that at-risk participants in the intervention group improved to a greater extent than did low-risk participants. At follow-up, significantly fewer women in the FMA group reported overeating and excessive exercise relative to controls.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.