Cognitive Functioning in Treatment-Seeking Gulf War Veterans: Pyridostigmine Bromide Use and PTSD

Gulf War (GW) deployed veterans have reported health symptoms since returning from the war that suggest dysfunction of the central nervous system (CNS). These symptoms include memory and concentration difficulties, fatigue, and headaches. Leading hypotheses for the etiology of these cognitive complaints include psychological factors and/or exposures to chemicals with neurotoxic properties. In this study, cognitive functioning was compared in treatment-seeking GW-deployed veterans and a treatment-seeking non–GW-deployed veteran control group. Results indicated that GW-deployed veterans performed significantly worse than the comparison group on tests of attention, visuospatial skills, visual memory, and mood. GW-deployed veterans who reported taking pyridostigmine bromide (PB) performed worse than GW-deployed veterans without PB use on executive system tasks. Treatment-seeking GW-deployed veterans with diagnoses of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) did not differ on cognitive test measures compared with GW-deployed veterans without PTSD. No interaction effect of PTSD and PB use was found.     

HOW DID FREGE FALL INTO THE CONTRADICTION?

Quine made it conventional to portray the contradiction that destroyed Frege's logicism as some kind of act of God, a thunderbolt that descended from a clear blue sky. This portrayal suited the moral Quine was antecedently inclined to draw, that intuition is bankrupt, and that reliance on it must therefore be replaced by a pragmatic methodology. But the portrayal is grossly misleading, and Quine's moral simply false. In the person of others – Cantor, Dedekind, and Zermelo – intuition was working pretty well. It was in Frege that it suffered a local and temporary blindness. The question to ask, then, is not how Frege was overtaken by the contradiction, but how it is that he didn't see it coming. The paper offers one kind of answer to that question. Starting from the very close similarity between Frege's proof of infinity and the reasoning that leads to the contradiction, it asks: given his understanding of the first, why did Frege did not notice the second? The reason is traced, first, to a faulty generalization Frege made from the case of directions and parallel lines; and, through that, to Frege's having retained, and attempted incoherently to combine with his own, aspects of a pre‐Fregean understanding of the generality of logical principles.     

EFFECTIVENESS OF FUNCTIONAL COMMUNICATION TRAINING WITH AND WITHOUT EXTINCTION AND PUNISHMENT: A SUMMARY OF 21 INPATIENT CASES

Functional communication training (FCT) is a frequently used treatment for reducing problem behavior exhibited by individuals with developmental disabilities. Once the operant function of problem behavior is identified by a functional analysis, the client is taught to emit an appropriate communicative response to obtain the reinforcer that is responsible for behavioral maintenance. Studies on FCT have typically used small numbers of participants, have reported primarily on clients for whom FCT was successful, and have varied with respect to their use of other treatment components. The main purposes of the present study were to evaluate the efficacy of FCT for treating severe problem behavior in a relatively large sample of individuals with mental retardation (N = 21) and to determine the contribution of extinction and punishment components to FCT treatment packages. FCT with extinction was effective in reducing problem behavior for the majority of clients and resulted in at least a 90% reduction in problem behavior in nearly half the applications. However, when demand or delay-to-reinforcement fading was added to FCT with extinction, treatment efficacy was reduced in about one half of the applications. FCT with punishment (both with and without fading) resulted in at least a 90% reduction in problem behavior for every case in which it was applied.     

Eye-movement-contingent display changes are not compromised by flicker and phosphor persistence

The eye-movement-contingent display change technique has been used in a large number of studies to control the visibility of text when eye movements are monitored. Recently, the validity of the method has been questioned. O’Regan (1990) argued that technical imperfections in the implementation of the display change, rather than manipulation of visible text, account for some of the reported effects. This view was tested in the present study by manipulating characteristics of the display change and the linguistic task. Consistent with prior results, reading was hampered when eye-movement-contingent display changes were used to mask segments of text prior to their fixation. However, these costs were unrelated to the quality of the implemented display change and appear to have derived solely from the masking of useful text.     

The analytic initiation: the effect of the archetype of initiation on the personal unconscious

The author proposes the term 'analytic initiation1' to describe a rite of passage from childhood to adult life effected by psychotherapy. He suggests this passage is based upon a personal regression within the embrace of an archetypal symbolic process. Archetypal symbols orientate the analysand towards the transformative potential of a regressive experience. They also contain him as he separates from parental complexes and tolerates their dissolution. The analysand's growth depends on his submitting to an intrapsychic and interpersonal experience of the initiatory process with its attending regression. Correspondingly, it relies on the analyst being available for both the personal and impersonal transference/countertransference interaction. Over time, the analysand's participation in this process brings his ego in greater relationship to the Self.
The most important outcome of a successfully constellated analytic initiation is not the dissolution of a group of complexes. Rather, it is the establishment of a symbolic process that allows the individual to continue to evolve. The author supports his findings with a critical review of Jung's writings on initiation and additional case material.     

The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well‐being are discussed.     

Discourse bootstrapping: preschoolers use linguistic discourse to learn new words

When children acquire language, they often learn words in the absence of direct instruction (e.g. ‘This is a ball!’) or even social cues to reference (e.g. eye gaze, pointing). However, there are few accounts of how children do this, especially in cases where the referent of a new word is ambiguous. Across two experiments, we test whether preschoolers (2‐ to 4‐year‐olds; n = 239) can learn new words by inferring the referent of a new word from the surrounding linguistic discourse. Across two experiments, we show that children as young as 2 can learn a new word from the linguistic discourse in which it appears. This suggests that children use the linguistic discourse in which a word appears to learn new words.