The Self-Knowledge Gambit

If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold that if we don’t know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we don’t know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledge—our second-order knowledge—and thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue that the Self-Knowledge Gambit is not satisfactory, because the dreaming skeptic can avail herself of a normative counterpart to the KK-principle: When we lack second-order knowledge, we should suspend our first-order beliefs and thereby give up any first-order knowledge we might have had. The skeptical challenge is essentially a normative challenge, and one can raise it even if one rejects the KK-Principle.     

Factorial and Diagnostic Validity of the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) in Croatian Primary Health Care

The aim of this study was to examine the factorial and diagnostic validity of the Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II) in Croatian primary health care. Data were collected using a medical outpatient sample (N = 314). Reliability measured by internal consistency proved to be high. While the Velicer MAP Test showed that extraction of only one factor is satisfactory, confirmatory factor analysis indicated the best fit for a 3-factor structure model consisting of cognitive, affective and somatic dimensions. Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis demonstrated the BDI-II to have a satisfactory diagnostic validity in differentiating between healthy and depressed individuals in this setting. The area under the curve (AUC), sensitivity and specificity were high with an optimal cut-off score of 15/16. The implications of these findings are discussed regarding the use of the BDI-II as a screening instrument in primary health care settings.     

Therapeutic Implications of Religious-Related Emotional Abuse

Religion can play a positive role in preventing all types of abuse. Consequently, it is often difficult to believe that religion or a particular manner of religious awareness can also be conducive to the degradation and humiliation of individuals, and that it can be maneuvered to justify abusive behavior. In this article we discuss the emotional repercussions of religious-related abuse in the family, an aspect that is rarely documented in the field of psychotherapy, but has many negative consequences. Religious-oriented emotional abuse is traceable to several levels of human functioning: the individual's internal level of experiencing themselves, the interpersonal and systemic levels, where the individual enters relationships, as well as within the framework of the individual's relationship with God.     

The ground is dominant in infants’ perception of relative distance

When making relative distance judgments, adults attend to information provided by the ground surface and generally ignore information provided by ceiling surfaces. In the present study, we asked whether this ground dominance effect is present in infancy. Groups of 5- and 7-month-old infants viewed a display depicting textured ground and ceiling surfaces. Two toys, which were attached to vertical rods, were affixed to the display. The toys/rods were positioned so that one toy was specified as being nearer by the ground surface but farther away by the ceiling surface, while the other toy was specified as being farther away by the ground surface but nearer by the ceiling surface. Under monocular viewing conditions, the infants in both age groups reached preferentially for the toy that was specified as being nearer by the ground surface. This effect was significantly stronger than that observed under binocular viewing conditions. The findings indicate that the infants responded to the distance information provided by the ground surface to a greater extent than to information provided by the ceiling.     

Existential Social Theory After the Poststructuralist and Communication Turns

Thomas Flynn's work on Sartre and Foucault, the first of a two-volume project, offers a unique opportunity for examining an existential theory of history. It occasions rethinking existential-social categories from the vantage point of the poststructuralist turn. And it contributes to developing existential variants of critical theory. The following questions guide me in each of the three above areas. First, how is human history intelligible, given not only our finite sense of ourselves but also claims that we have reached the end of history? Second, with the poststructuralist eclipse of dialectics, can we render existential categories in social terms and vice versa? Third, critics decry grand theorizing even in fallibilist reason, e.g., of Habermas, while others are worried by the normative deficits of poststructuralist nominalism, e.g., of Foucault. Can existential variants of critical social theory, anticipated before Sartre by Marcuse, split the difference?     

What's wrong with promising to try?

There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, I contend that sometimes the promise to try places undue burdens on the promisee.     

“Who said it?” How contextual information influences perceived profundity of meaningful quotes and pseudo-profound bullshit

Psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit—randomly assembled buzz words plugged into a syntactic structure—has only recently begun. Most such research has focused on dispositional traits, such as thinking styles or political orientation. However, none has investigated contextual factors. In two studies, we introduce a new paradigm by investigating the contextual effect on pseudo-profound bullshit and meaningful quotes. In Study 1, all participants rated the profundity of statements in three contexts: (a) isolated, (b) as allegedly said by a famous author, or (c) within a vignette (short story). Study 2 serves as a conceptual replication in which participants rated statements in only one of three contexts. Overall, our results demonstrate that although contextual information such as author's name increases the perceived profundity of bullshit, it has an inconsistent effect on meaningful quotes. The present study helps to better understand the bullshit receptivity while offering a new line of research.