Attention doesn’t slide: spatiotopic updating after eye movements instantiates a new, discrete attentional locus

During natural vision, eye movements can drastically alter the retinotopic (eye-centered) coordinates of locations and objects, yet the spatiotopic (world-centered) percept remains stable. Maintaining visuospatial attention in spatiotopic coordinates requires updating of attentional representations following each eye movement. However, this updating is not instantaneous; attentional facilitation temporarily lingers at the previous retinotopic location after a saccade, a phenomenon known as the retinotopic attentional trace. At various times after a saccade, we probed attention at an intermediate location between the retinotopic and spatiotopic locations to determine whether a single locus of attentional facilitation slides progressively from the previous retinotopic location to the appropriate spatiotopic location, or whether retinotopic facilitation decays while a new, independent spatiotopic locus concurrently becomes active. Facilitation at the intermediate location was not significant at any time, suggesting that top-down attention can result in enhancement of discrete retinotopic and spatiotopic locations without passing through intermediate locations.     

The analytic state of consciousness as a form of play and a foundational transference

The analytic state of consciousness is a particular regressive altered state in the patient characterized by an increased sensitivity and reactivity to impressions arising from both the inner world and the analyst, a heightened sense of dependence and vulnerability, a permeability of boundaries in regard to the analyst, and a shift toward functioning on the basis of omnipotent fantasy in the analytic relationship. These changes are accompanied by a feeling of realness of one's psychic reality, but without any true loss of reality testing. Based on an analysis of the structure of play, this state can itself be understood as a kind of play; it serves as a foundational transference underlying more specific transference manifestations; and it is central to the analytic process. Over time, in response to physical aspects of the analytic setting, its safety, the analyst's emotional accompaniment, and a generally restrained analytic stance (an issue I discuss in some detail), it emerges in a more developed form that promotes symbolization and ownership of aspects of self, greater emotional presence, and a deeper sense of meaning in one's experience. Additionally, the concept of the analytic state of consciousness provides a new look at the role of abstinence and frustration in analytic process.     

Dual Diathesis-Stressor Model of Emotional and Linguistic Contributions to Developmental Stuttering

This study assessed emotional and speech-language contributions to childhood stuttering. A dual diathesis-stressor framework guided this study, in which both linguistic requirements and skills, and emotion and its regulation, are hypothesized to contribute to stuttering. The language diathesis consists of expressive and receptive language skills. The emotion diathesis consists of proclivities to emotional reactivity and regulation of emotion, and the emotion stressor consists of experimentally manipulated emotional inductions prior to narrative speaking tasks. Preschool-age children who do and do not stutter were exposed to three emotion-producing overheard conversations—neutral, positive, and angry. Emotion and emotion-regulatory behaviors were coded while participants listened to each conversation and while telling a story after each overheard conversation. Instances of stuttering during each story were counted. Although there was no main effect of conversation type, results indicated that stuttering in preschool-age children is influenced by emotion and language diatheses, as well as coping strategies and situational emotional stressors. Findings support the dual diathesis-stressor model of stuttering.