Zwischen transzendentaler Genese und faktischer Existenz. Konfigurationen des Lebensbegriffs bei Natorp, Husserl und Heidegger

Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit der Deutung, die der so vielschichtige Begriff des Lebens Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in der neukantianischen Transzendentalphilosophie sowie in der Ph?nomenologie erfahren hat. Am Beispiel von Natorp, Husserl und Heidegger werden verschiedene Ans?tze analysiert, die darauf abzielen, den Lebensbegriff aus seinen vitalistischen und historistischen Verengungen zu befreien und zur Deutung der Grundstrukturen des Bewusstseins bzw. der faktischen Existenz heranzuziehen. Dabei zeichnet sich eine Entwicklung ab, die von einer wenig differenzierten Verwendung des Lebensbegriffs als Synonym der Bewusstseinsdynamik als solcher (Natorp) über die Dualit?t von vorph?nomenologischem Welterleben und transzendentalem Bewusstseinsleben (Husserl) bis hin zur Einsicht in die vorsubjektive Primordialit?t des „Lebens selbst“ (Heidegger) führt. Das Leben erscheint somit letztlich als kein wie immer geartetes Was, sondern als ein Wie, n?mlich als die M?glichkeit, das Kontinuum des Welterlebens jederzeit zu durchbrechen und es auf den Grad seiner N?he zur Intensit?t des Ursprungserlebens hin transparent zu machen.     

Representing others' actions: the role of expertise in the aging mind

A large body of evidence suggests that action execution and action observation share a common representational domain. To date, little is known about age-related changes in these action representations that are assumed to support various abilities such as the prediction of observed actions. The purpose of the present study was to investigate (a) how age affects the ability to predict the time course of observed actions; and (b) whether and to what extent sensorimotor expertise attenuates age-related declines in prediction performance. In a first experiment, older adults predicted the time course of familiar everyday actions less precisely than younger adults. In a second experiment, younger and older figure skating experts as well as age-matched novices were asked to predict the time course of figure skating elements and simple movement exercises. Both young age and sensorimotor expertise had a positive influence on prediction performance of figure skating elements. The expertise-related benefit did not show a transfer to movement exercises. Together, the results suggest a specific decline of action representations in the aging mind. However, extensive sensorimotor experience seems to enable experts to represent actions from their domain of expertise more precisely even in older age.     

When hearing turns into playing: Movement induction by auditory stimuli in pianists

In this study, pianists were tested for learned associations between actions (movements on the piano) and their perceivable sensory effects (piano tones). Actions were examined that required the playing of two-tone sequences (intervals) in a four-choice paradigm. In Experiment 1, the intervals to be played were denoted by visual note stimuli. Concurrently with these imperative stimuli, task-irrelevant auditory distractor intervals were presented (“potential” action effects, congruent or incongruent). In Experiment 2, imperative stimuli were coloured squares, in order to exclude possible influences of spatial relationships of notes, responses, and auditory stimuli. In both experiments responses in the incongruent conditions were slower than those in the congruent conditions. Also, heard intervals actually “induced” false responses. The reaction time effects were more pronounced in Experiment 2. In nonmusicians (Experiment 3), no evidence for interference could be observed. Thus, our results show that in expert pianists potential action effects are able to induce corresponding actions, which demonstrates the existence of acquired action-effect associations in pianists.     

Beyond Single-Mindedness: A Figure-Ground Reversal for the Cognitive Sciences

A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognized by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying individuals in isolation. On this view, interaction complicates cognition. Here, we explore the more radical stance that interaction co-constitutes cognition: that we benefit from looking beyond single minds toward cognition as a process involving interacting minds. All around the cognitive sciences, there are approaches that put interaction center stage. Their diverse and pluralistic origins may obscure the fact that collectively, they harbor insights and methods that can respecify foundational assumptions and fuel novel interdisciplinary work. What might the cognitive sciences gain from stronger interactional foundations? This represents, we believe, one of the key questions for the future. Writing as a transdisciplinary collective assembled from across the classic cognitive science hexagon and beyond, we highlight the opportunity for a figure-ground reversal that puts interaction at the heart of cognition. The interactive stance is a way of seeing that deserves to be a key part of the conceptual toolkit of cognitive scientists.     

Naïve chicks do not prefer objects with stable body orientation,though they may prefer behavioural variability

Animal Cognition - Domestic chicks (Gallus gallus domesticus) have been widely used as a model to study the motion cues that allow visually naïve organisms to detect animate agents shortly...