How are inflectional affixes organized in the mental lexicon?: evidence from the investigation of agreement errors in agrammatic aphasics

Recent psycholinguistic studies have provided evidence that regularly inflected words are decomposed into stems and affixes, both of which have their own representations in the mental lexicon. Specific models of the lexical organization of inflectional affixes have, however, only rarely been investigated in psycho- or neurolinguistic work. We test two recently proposed theoretical models: a representation of affixes (i) in default inheritance trees (Corbett and Fraser, 1993) and (ii) in underspecified paradigms (Wunderlich, 1996). Based on an analysis of agreement errors in elicited speech-production data of German agrammatic aphasics, we argue that affixes are organized with respect to the morphosyntactic features they encode. Specifically, our data indicate that inflectional affixes are best captured within an underspecified paradigm.     

Inflectional morphology in German Williams syndrome

In a recent paper, Clahsen and Almazan (1998) reported a dissociation between unimpaired regular and impaired irregular past tense morphology in English Williams syndrome (WS). Our aim is to investigate whether these findings carry over to another language with different morphological systems. We present data on regular and irregular participles and noun plurals from 2 German WS subjects and 10 controls matching in mental age. For noun plurals, regular morphology is intact in WS, whereas irregular forms are impaired. A similar dissociation is observed for participles: while regular inflection is unimpaired, WS subjects, unlike controls, apply the regular suffix incorrectly to frequent irregular verbs. We discuss our findings against the current debate between connectionist and dualistic approaches to the language faculty.     

Action-effect coupling in pianists

Recent theories have stressed the role of effect anticipation in action control. Such a mechanism requires the prior acquisition of integrated action-effect associations. The strength of such associations should directly depend on the amount of learning, and therefore be most pronounced in motor experts. Using an interference paradigm, we investigated whether evidence of such representations can be demonstrated in expert pianists. Participants were required to play chords on a keyboard in response to imperative visual stimuli. Concurrently, task-irrelevant auditory stimuli (potential action effects) were presented that were congruent or incongruent with the chords to be played. In Experiment 1 we found evidence that expert pianists, compared with non-musicians, have acquired such action-effects representations. Response times were slower when the auditory stimulus was incongruent with the required response. In order to ascertain the locus of interference, we varied imperative stimuli and responses in Experiments 2 and 3. The results indicate that, for the most part, interference occurs on the response level rather than on an abstract level. However, the perception of action effects also evokes processing of abstract features, like the concept of major–minor mode.     

Depth cues do not underlie attentional modulations of the Stroop effect

The well-known Stroop effect is usually attributed to the automaticity of word reading. Recently, Wühr and Waszak (2003) had participants name the color of one of two rectangles and found that words in the relevant object produced larger Stroop effects than did words in the irrelevant object or in the background. They attributed this difference to an object-based mechanism of attentional selection that amplifies processing of all the features of an attended object. However, in the displays used by Wühr and Waszak, occlusion suggested the presence of different depth planes. Hence, the increased Stroop effect could have resulted from perceiving the words to be in the same depth plane as the relevant object and not from perceiving the words to be parts of the relevant object. Two experiments tested between these accounts by using displays without monocular depth cues. The results of both experiments replicate those of Wühr and Waszak, supporting their object-based account.     

Contextual variation and objectivity in olfactory perception

Synthese - According to Smell Objectivism, the smells we perceive in olfactory experience are objective and independent of perceivers, their experiences, and their perceptual systems. Variations in...