The relationship between eye movements and spatial attention

Most previous studies of the attentional consequences of making saccadic eye movements have used peripheral stimuli to elicit eye movements. It is argued that in the light of evidence showing automatic “capture” of attention by peripheral stimuli, these experiments do not distinguish between attentional effects due to peripheral stimuli and those due to eye movements. In the present study, spatial attention was manipulated by varying the probability that peripheral probe stimuli would appear in different positions, while saccades were directed by a central arrow, enabling the effects of attention and eye movements to be separated. The results showed that the time to react to a peripheral stimulus could be shortened both by advance knowledge of its likely position and, separately, by preparing to make a saccade to that position. When the saccade was directed away from the most likely position of the probe, the targets for attention and eye movements were on opposite sides of the display. In this condition, the effects of preparing to make a saccade proved to be stronger than the effects of attentional allocation until well after the saccade had finished, suggesting that making a saccade necessarily involves the allocation of attention to the target position. The effects of probe stimuli on saccade latencies were also examined: probe stimuli that appeared before the saccade shortened saccade latencies if they appeared at the saccade target, and lengthened saccade latencies if they appeared on the opposite side of fixation. These facilitatory and inhibitory effects were shown to occur at different stages of saccade preparation and suggest that attention plays an important role in the generation of voluntary eye movements. The results of this study indicate that while it is possible to make attention movements without making corresponding eye movements, it is not possible to make an eye movement (in the absence of peripheral stimulation) without making a corresponding shift in the focus of attention.     

Blood pressure responses to hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestions in normotensive subjects

Forty normotensive subjects participated on a voluntary basis in a study designed to compare the effect of suggestions on blood pressure (BP). Two experimental groups received suggestions presumed to be specific in lowering or raising BP after simple relaxation (relaxation group) or hypnotic induction (hypnotic group). A control group was used to record the BP changes over time. The time variable was significant for both systolic (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP). Induction procedures (hypnosis or relaxation) resulted in significant decreases in DBP in both experimental groups. In the control group there was a significant decrease in SBP. A specific suggestion to increase the BP resulted only in DBP increase in the hypnotic group. This group also gave an increase of both SBP and DBP over the entire experiment, whereas the relaxation group resulted in a significant decrease in SBP. There was no significant group variable, indicating no differences between the groups. Further research is needed to enable firm conclusions of the effect of suggestions on BP.     

Effects of simulated stuttering on listener recall

In an investigation of the effects of simulated stuttering on listener recall, a presentation was varied on two factors: degree of stuttering (mild or severe) and information value of stuttered words (low or high). A control presentation featuring non-stuttered speech also was prepared. Five groups of 16 subjects were randomly assigned to, and participated in, one of the five listening conditions. Then they completed a 20-item recall test. A one-way analysis of variance revealed sognificant differences among the five conditions. Two-way analysis of variance disclosed no main effects. However, a significant interaction showed that recall was lowest in the severe stuttering-high information condition. The results are discussed in terms of attention to critical information.     

Dreaming for the World: A Jungian Study of Dreams During the COVID-19 Pandemic1

This project explores what dreams might reveal about the collective psyche’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in its first year, before the development of vaccines. A brief survey, distributed to Jungian colleagues and organizations, and to various social media sites, invited people to submit online a dream related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Four hundred and thirty-six dreams were submitted. Forty additional Russian dreams were collected and submitted by Russian colleagues. Using qualitative research methods based on phenomenological hermeneutics, the researchers categorized and counted the range of COVID imagery. In addition, the researchers describe a range of psychic responses to the pandemic, including horror, grief, sickness, social discord, and violence, but also images of healing and transformation, increased sense of community, and spiritual renewal. Several healing nightmares are presented. Healing alchemical and anima/animus imagery is described. Twelve dreams are introduced and presented. It is concluded that the collective psyche, rooted in the Self, is a healing resource for social and cultural trauma. This project supports Beradt’s (1968) inspirational study of dreaming in Nazi Germany, as well as recent studies of COVID-related dreams and recent publications on the social nature of dreaming.     

Jung’s Psychoid Monism

Jung’s final psychoid theory of archetypes was an additional attempt to find a solution to the philosophical problem of how to relate mind and matter. In the following essay Jung’s solution is summarized by a set of 17 theses, and Jung’s philosophy will be called psychoid monism. According to psychoid monism, what ultimately and primarily is, is the psycho-physically neutral domain of instinctual experience. The origin of this view can be traced back to Post-Kantian German Idealism (Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hölderlin), and a systematization of the view requires a dialectic approach and, in particular, contradiction-tolerant dialectic logic.     

Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’

This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: ‘Recent Envatment’ (RE), ‘Lifelong Envatment’ (LE) and ‘Nothing But Envatment’ (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of ‘local’ sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an ‘external’ world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a ‘global’ illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein’s anti-private language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private ‘vat-language’, a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.

     

Llamas use social information from conspecifics and humans to solve a spatial detour task

Animal Cognition - Learning by observing others (i.e. social learning) is an important mechanism to reduce the costs of individual learning. Social learning can occur between conspecifics but also...     

Premature conclusions about the signal-to-noise ratio in structural equation modeling research: A commentary on Yuan and Fang (2023)

In a recent article published in this journal, Yuan and Fang (British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 2023) suggest comparing structural equation modeling (SEM), also known as covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM), estimated by normal-distribution-based maximum likelihood (NML), to regression analysis with (weighted) composites estimated by least squares (LS) in terms of their signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). They summarize their findings in the statement that “[c]ontrary to the common belief that CB-SEM is the preferred method for the analysis of observational data, this article shows that regression analysis via weighted composites yields parameter estimates with much smaller standard errors, and thus corresponds to greater values of the [SNR].” In our commentary, we show that Yuan and Fang have made several incorrect assumptions and claims. Consequently, we recommend that empirical researchers not base their methodological choice regarding CB-SEM and regression analysis with composites on the findings of Yuan and Fang as these findings are premature and require further research.