Are Perfectionism Dimensions Vulnerability Factors for Depressive Symptoms After Controlling for Neuroticism? A Meta‐analysis of 10 Longitudinal Studies

Extensive evidence suggests neuroticism is a higher‐order personality trait that overlaps substantially with perfectionism dimensions and depressive symptoms. Such evidence raises an important question: Which perfectionism dimensions are vulnerability factors for depressive symptoms after controlling for neuroticism? To address this, a meta‐analysis of research testing whether socially prescribed perfectionism, concern over mistakes, doubts about actions, personal standards, perfectionistic attitudes, self‐criticism and self‐oriented perfectionism predict change in depressive symptoms, after controlling for baseline depression and neuroticism, was conducted. A literature search yielded 10 relevant studies (N = 1,758). Meta‐analysis using random‐effects models revealed that all seven perfectionism dimensions had small positive relationships with follow‐up depressive symptoms beyond baseline depression and neuroticism. Perfectionism dimensions appear neither redundant with nor captured by neuroticism. Results lend credence and coherence to theoretical accounts and empirical studies suggesting perfectionism dimensions are part of the premorbid personality of people vulnerable to depressive symptoms. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Fichte's Creuzer review and the transformation of the free will problem

Fichte's early review of C. A. L. Creuzer's neglected and idiosyncratic skeptical book on free will posed a serious challenge to what at the time was emerging as a consensus Kantian position on the role of free choice (Willkür) in the generation of imputable action. Fichte's review was directed as much against Reinhold's important (and only recently published) letter on freedom of the will as it was against Creuzer himself. In the course of his brief review, Fichte suggests an important recasting of the strategy of the Kantian postulates of rational faith; he poses a dilemma for the Reinholdian understanding of the relationship among an autonomous practical will, a free power of choice, and the actions of natural human organisms; and he hints at a radical reappropriation of the rationalist doctrine of pre‐established harmony in re‐orienting the search for a defensible reconstruction of a broadly Kantian position on the problem of free will.