Eysenck's incubation of fear hypothesis: an experimental test

The present experiment was designed to test Eysenck's hypothesis that repeated exposure to an unreinforced CS of brief duration following acquisition of a classical aversive CR may lead to a progressive increase in the strength of that CR, provided that the UCS is intense and the CR has drive-like properties. Using a between-groups design, normal human subjects were given identical classical acquisition trials, followed by extinction trials where CS duration was either 2, 8 or 16 sec. The UCS was of fixed high intensity. Dependent measures were tonic and phasic heart rate and skin conductance. No evidence of incubation was found as a function of CS duration. Nor was there any indication that CS duration differentially affected resistance to extinction. A small number of subjects showed evidence of incubation with heart rate measures during extinction. However, there was no indication that this enhancement was governed by the parameters suggested by Eysenck. UCR amplitude, which showed a positive correspondence with CS-bound activity throughout the trials, did not reliably predict incubation. Problems concerning both the definition and the demonstration of incubation are discussed.     

Empathy and justice motivation

Empathic distress is defined as an aversive feeling contingent on another's physical, emotional, or economic distress. The paper (1) summarizes a developmental scheme consisting of four stages of empathic distress; (2) suggests that causal attributions may partly transform empathic distress into sympathy, empathic anger, feeling of injustice, and guilt feeling; (3) notes the evidence that these empathic affects often serve to motivate moral behavior, and therefore that they qualify as moral motives; (4) points up limitations of these affects/motives and the need to embed them in justice principles; (5) discusses links between empathic affects/motives and principles of distributive justice/ (6) argues that Rawls' theory of justice, which excludes empathy, may nevertheless require it for the difference principle to influence behavior in real life; (7) hypothesizes a functional equivalence between empathy and the veil of ignorance; and (8) speculates that the conjunction of empathic affect and justice-principle thinking — in life and in abstract didactic contexts like Rawls' original position — may produce a principle having the motivational and stabilizing properties of a hot cognition.     

Are professors likely to report having “beliefs” about the intelligence and competence of students who stutter?

Some university students who stutter report that they avoid participating in class discussions and talking with professors because they believe that if their professors find out they stutter, the professors are likely to view the students as being less intelligent and/or competent than they otherwise would. The purpose of this study was to determine whether professors, as a group, are likely to report such beliefs. A random sample of 87 professors at Marquette University, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, and the State University of New York at Stonybrook rated “A Student Who Stutters” on each of 81 seven-point, bipolar semantic differential scales, including intelligent/unintelligent and competent/incompetent. Although there was considerable scatter in their ratings for the majority of the scales, 85 of the 87 rated the student at the center or “positive” end of the intelligent/unintelligent scale and 83 of the 87 did so on the competent/incompetent one. Assuming that the attitutes reported by the professors reflect their “real” ones, these data suggest that many—perhaps the majority—do not have negative attitudes about the intelligence and competence of their students who stutter.     

Estimating the false positive rate for alternative measures of integrity

Estimates of the false positive rate were computed for three methods of assessing integrity: 1) a paper and pencil integrity test; 2) a weighted application blank and; 3) the traditional selection interview. Based on available validation research, the integrity test yielded the most acceptable false positive rate. This type of analysis highlights the need to compare alternative assessment procedures when evaluating the utility of a selection instrument.     

The consequences of reduced memory span for the comprehension of semantic versus syntactic information

Aphasic patients with restricted memory spans were assessed on their comprehension of syntactically simple sentences varying in numbers of content words and on their comprehension of sentences matched in content words but varying in syntactic complexity. Three different presentation modes were used: unlimited visual presentation, limited visual presentation, and auditory presentation. The difference between performance in the unlimited and limited modes was used as a measure of the extent to which memory decrements caused comprehension failure. These difference scores were related to memory span in order to assess whether the memory involved in sentence processing overlaps that assessed by a memory span task. For the sentences varying in number of content words, performance was worse for the limited presentation modes than the unlimited mode, and the difference between unlimited and limited presentation modes was highly related to memory span. For the sentences varying in syntactic complexity, there was no clear reduction in performance for limited presentation modes, and the difference scores did not relate to memory span. The results support the view that the processing of sentences with many content words draws on the short-term memory capacity assessed by memory span, while the processing of syntactic complexity does not.     

Low accuracy in judgments of others' psychological well-being as seen from a phenomenological perspective

The generally low degree of agreement between self-ratings on personality traits and ratings by others may be interpreted from the viewpoint that self-reports reflect people's experience of themselves but not necessarily their behaviors. A detailed analysis of self and other ratings on subjective well-being as a central dimension of human experience is consistent with this phenomenological view. Ratings of well-being were not significantly correlated with rated behaviors either in self-ratings or in ratings by others. Screening subjects in terms of avowed consistency and observability on a trait did not improve self-other agreement for well-being, nor did it replicate the individual trait effects reported by Kenrick and Stringfield (1980). Judgments by others were found to have poor interjudge reliability and to reflect biases associated with projection of own well-being and a halo effect organized around the subject's perceived friendliness or likability. It was demonstrated that pooling the judgments of several observers should not and does not lead to accurate prediction of the phenomenal personality, and that accuracy may generally depend on the level of self-disclosure.     

How do people influence in jury deliberation? a social psychological view

Research in small-group decision making suggests two means by which discussion shifts the responses of individual members—Nonmative influence and informational influence. The former is based on pressure to conform to the normative positions of group members, and the latter involves changes due to the informational content of persuasively or passively shared facts. Which influence mode is used depends on the group decision rule, whether the response is public or private, the perceived nature of the task, and the nature of the issue. Specifically, normative influence is likely to prevail in public judgments, under group cohesion sets, and with value-laden issues, while informational influence will emerge when responses are private, the group is oriented toward the immediate task, and the issue is intellective. Suggestions are made regarding strategy and tactics for anticipating, harnessing, and shaping the form of influence that will take place during deliberation.     

A causal model for causal priority

Recent attempts to fix the direction of causal priority without reference to the direction of temporal priority have begun with an analysis of the causal relation itself. I offer a method, based on causal modelling theory, designed to determine the direction of causal priority while remaining as agnostic as possible about the nature of the causal relation.