Overcoming ego depletion: the influence of exemplar priming on self‐control performance

Self‐regulation research suggested that active self‐control depends on a limited resource. Therefore the capacity for self‐control is lower among people who already exercised control, a phenomenon labelled as ego depletion. This experiment examines whether priming of a persistent person exemplar may help to overcome ego depletion. Half of the participants engaged in a demanding self‐control task (solving extremely difficult labyrinths) whereas the other half took part in a task that demanded little self‐control (solving easy labyrinths). Then, half of the participants received a person exemplar prime related to persistence; the other half received a neutral prime. Finally, participants' persistence on a subsequent self‐control task (squeezing a handgrip) was measured. The effect of a person exemplar prime on a subsequent self‐control task depended on initial self‐control demands. Participants who exercised high initial self‐control and were then presented with a persistent exemplar prime showed assimilation. Their handgrip persistence was higher than the persistence of participants who received a neutral prime. Under conditions of low initial self‐control the opposite pattern was found. A persistent person prime resulted in contrast and resulted in lower handgrip performance as compared to those who received a neutral prime. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Role of Gestalt grouping in selective attention: evidence from the Stroop task

Selective attention has been intensively studied using the Stroop task. Evidence suggests that Stroop interference in a color-naming task arises partly because of visual attention sharing between color and word: Removing the target color after 150 msec reduces interference (Neumann, 1986). Moreover, removing both the color and the word simultaneously reduces interference less than does removing the color only (La Heij, van der Heijden, & Plooij, 2001). These findings could also be attributed to Gestalt grouping principles, such as common fate. We report three experiments in which the role of Gestalt grouping was further investigated. Experiment I replicated the reduced interference, using words and color patches. In Experiment 2, the color patch was not removed but only repositioned (<2 degrees) after 100 msec, which also reduced interference. In Experiment 3, the distractor was repositioned while the target remained stationary, again reducing interference. These results indicate a role for Gestalt grouping in selective attention.     

Happier,faster: Developmental changes in the effects of mood and novelty on responses

Positive mood ameliorates several cognitive processes: It can enhance cognitive control, increase flexibility, and promote variety seeking in decision making. These effects of positive mood have been suggested to depend on frontostriatal dopamine, which is also associated with the detection of novelty. This suggests that positive mood could also affect novelty detection. In the present study, children and adults saw either a happy or a neutral movie to induce a positive or neutral mood. After that, they were shown novel and familiar images. On some trials a beep was presented over headphones either at the same time as the image or at a 200-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), and the task of the participant was to detect these auditory targets. Children were slower in responding than adults. Positive mood, however, speeded responses, especially in children, and induced facilitatory effects of novelty. These effects were consistent with increased arousal. Although effects of novelty were more consistent with an attentional response, in children who had watched a happy movie the novel images evoked a more liberal response criterion, suggestive of increased arousal. This suggests that mood and novelty may affect response behaviour stronger in children than in adults.     

Developing critical awareness: the consequences of action and reflection for perceptions of group injustices

Individuals often cannot address (objective) group injustices until they develop a (subjective) critical awareness of them. In three studies, we tested two potential psychological pathways toward critical awareness: Reflection (deductive, knowledge driven) and action (inductive, action driven) mindsets. Across studies, participants were exposed to an objectively unjust event, enacted by the experimenter. Based on a pilot study (N = 31) and first experiment (N = 28), we developed the hypothesis that action (vs. reflection) mindsets increase group entitativity (due to their reliance on expectancy effects), but not necessarily (subjective) critical awareness of (objective) group injustice. Study 2 (N = 121) confirmed this hypothesis. We discuss the difficulties of developing (subjective) critical awareness of (objective) group injustices.     

The influence of a scene preview on eye movement behavior in natural scenes

Rich contextual and semantic information can be extracted from only a brief presentation of a natural scene. This is presumed to be activated quickly enough to guide initial eye movements into a scene. However, early, short-latency eye movements in natural scenes have been shown to be dependent on the salience distribution across the image (Anderson, Ort, Kruijne, Meeter, & Donk, 2015). In the present work, we manipulated the salience distribution across a natural scene by changing the global contrast. We showed participants a brief real or nonsense preview of the scene and examined the time-course of eye movement guidance. A real preview decreased the latency and increased the amplitude of initial saccades into the image, suggesting that the preview allowed observers to obtain additional contextual information that would otherwise not be available. However, the preview did not completely override the initial tendency for short-latency saccades to be guided by the underlying salience distribution of the image. We discuss these findings in the context of oculomotor selection based on the integration of contextual information and low-level features in a natural scene.     

Integrating who “we” are with what “we” (will not) stand for: A further extension of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action

Collective action refers to any action that individuals undertake as group members to pursue group goals such as social change. In this chapter, we further extend the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) by including not just (politicised) identity but also moral motivations into its core, effectively integrating who “we” are with what “we” (will not) stand for. Conceptually, we utilise self-categorisation theory’s notion of normative fit to elaborate this special relationship between the moral and identity motivations for collective action. Empirically, we review two research projects (the experimental and survey-based Value-Identity Fit Project and the longitudinal Politicisation Project) that both suggest that the SIMCA needs to be extended to include, both conceptually and empirically, a broader range of (violated) moral beliefs and a focus on identity content. We discuss key implications of expanding the core of the SIMCA for the social psychology of collective action and social change, and suggest new directions for future theorising and research in this field.     

Proclus on the order of philosophy of nature

In this paper I show that Proclus is an adherent of the Classical Model of Science as set out elsewhere in this issue (de Jong and Betti 2008), and that he adjusts certain conditions of the Model to his Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics. In order to show this, I develop a case study concerning philosophy of nature, which, despite its unstable subject matter, Proclus considers to be a science. To give this science a firm foundation Proclus distills from Plato’s Timaeus the basic concepts Being and Becoming and a number of basic propositions, among others the quasi-definitions of the basic concepts. He subsequently explains the use of these quasi-definitions, that are actually epistemic guides, in such a way that he obtains a connection between a rational and an empirical approach to the natural world. A crucial task in establishing the connection is performed by the faculty of doxa and by geometrical conversion. The result is that Proclus secures a universal, necessary and known foundation for all of philosophy of nature.     

The meaning of indifference in choice behavior: Asymmetries in adjustments embodied in matching

Measuring and assessing people’s preferences is an intricate task that can be realized by different methods. Evidently, the different methods do not necessarily yield consistent results. In the present paper we examine the matching procedure and demonstrate inconsistencies within the method itself. It is shown that the inconsistencies stem from: (1) asymmetry in upward and downward matching (i.e., matching options by increasing or lowering values do not yield the same tradeoffs) and (2) participants’ tendency to match (adjust) the options such that they become more similar, eventually facilitating the choice process. Matching is the most straightforward method of eliciting indifference. Hence, the observed inconsistencies, encapsulated in the matching procedure, have direct implications for the construction of indifference curves (equal-utility contours) that are examined in the final section.