Cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention decreases the prevalence of depression and enhances benefit finding among women under treatment for early-stage breast cancer.

The authors tested effects of a 10-week group cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention among 100 women newly treated for Stage 0-II breast cancer. The intervention reduced prevalence of moderate depression (which remained relatively stable in the control condition) but did not affect other measures of emotional distress. The intervention also increased participants' reports that having breast cancer had made positive contributions to their lives, and it increased generalized optimism. Both remained significantly elevated at a 3-month follow-up of the intervention. Further analysis revealed that the intervention had its greatest impact on these 2 variables among women who were lowest in optimism at baseline. Discussion centers on the importance of examining positive responses to traumatic events--growth, appreciation of life, shift in priorities, and positive affect-as well as negative responses.     

What constitutes globalised evidence? Cultural tensions and critical reflections of the evidence-based movement in New Zealand

The evidence-based movement (EBM) is grounded in a well-intentioned desire to ensure resources are invested in high quality initiatives that generate the intended impact. Nevertheless, recent critiques contest the appropriateness of translating an approach rooted in a medical model to socially complex initiatives. Globalised notions of evidence can also be damaging for programs operating in small, culturally diverse countries with limited resources. Given these polemic views, our aim was to examine local perceptions of the EBM in New Zealand, a small, vibrant, bicultural society with a mix of homegrown and imported programs. Using a snowball sampling approach, 79 professionals working in the education and social sectors completed an anonymous online survey that contained a series of closed and open-ended questions. The results show that although participants positively endorsed a variety of quality evidence markers, traditionally positivist methodological leanings received lower and more varied endorsements compared to more inclusive and pluralistic approaches. Many also expressed concern that the EBM emphasises a narrow and colonised view of evidence that does not align with Māori and Pacific worldviews, and undermines innovation. We discuss the implications as an avenue for advancing intervention and social programming research in an increasingly multicultural and globalised world.     

On the relation between feeling of knowing and lexical decision: persistent subthreshold activation or topic familiarity?

Experiment 1 replicated Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) finding that lexical decision and episodic recognition performance was better for words previously yielding high-accessibility levels (a combination of feeling-of-knowing and tip-of-the-tongue ratings) in comparison with those yielding low-accessibility levels in a rare word definition task. Experiment 2 yielded the same pattern even though lexical decisions preceded accessibility estimates by a full week. Experiment 3 dismissed the possibility that the Experiment 2 results may have been due to a long-term influence from the lexical decision task to the rare word judgment task. These results support a model in which Ss (a) retrieve topic familiarity information in making accessibility estimates in the rare word definition task and (b) use this information to modulate lexical decision performance.     

Commentary: Writing About Clients: Ethical and Professional Issues in Clinical Case Reports

From the standpoint of a former journal editor and long‐time professional, this commentary challenges the direction of the profession as demonstrated in this special section. The ongoing creation of more and more ethical constraints not only harms the profession but also loses sight of fundamental ethical principles.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.