Knowledge and True Belief in Early Analytic Philosophy1

Abstract

I argue that the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge was accepted by some principal figures in the early history of analytic philosophy, including Russell, Schlick, McTaggart, and Moore, among others.     

Metacognition in argument generation: the misperceived relationship between emotional investment and argument quality

Overestimation of one’s ability to argue their position on socio-political issues may partially underlie the current climate of political extremism in the U.S. Yet very little is known about what factors influence overestimation in argumentation of socio-political issues. Across three experiments, emotional investment substantially increased participants’ overestimation. Potential confounding factors like topic complexity and familiarity were ruled out as alternative explanations (Experiments 1–3). Belief-based cues were established as a mechanism underlying the relationship between emotional investment and overestimation in a measurement-of-mediation (Experiment 2) and manipulation-of-mediator (Experiment 3) design. Representing a new bias blind spot, participants believed emotional investment helps them argue better than it helps others (Experiments 2 and 3); where in reality emotional investment harmed or had no effect on argument quality. These studies highlight misguided beliefs about emotional investment as a factor underlying metacognitive miscalibration in the context of socio-political issues.     

Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.     

Age-related differences in brain electrical activity during extended continuous face recognition in younger children, older children and adults

To examine the development of recognition memory in primary-school children, 36 healthy younger children (8-9 years old) and 36 healthy older children (11-12 years old) participated in an ERP study with an extended continuous face recognition task (Study 1). Each face of a series of 30 faces was shown randomly six times interspersed with distracter faces. The children were required to make old vs. new decisions. Older children responded faster than younger children, but younger children exhibited a steeper decrease in latencies across the five repetitions. Older children exhibited better accuracy for new faces, but there were no age differences in recognition accuracy for repeated faces. For the N2, N400 and late positive complex (LPC), we analyzed the old/new effects (repetition 1 vs. new presentation) and the extended repetition effects (repetitions 1 through 5). Compared to older children, younger children exhibited larger frontocentral N2 and N400 old/new effects. For extended face repetitions, negativity of the N2 and N400 decreased in a linear fashion in both age groups. For the LPC, an ERP component thought to reflect recollection, no significant old/new or extended repetition effects were found. Employing the same face recognition paradigm in 20 adults (Study 2), we found a significant N400 old/new effect at lateral frontal sites and a significant LPC repetition effect at parietal sites, with LPC amplitudes increasing linearly with the number of repetitions. This study clearly demonstrates differential developmental courses for the N400 and LPC pertaining to recognition memory for faces. It is concluded that face recognition in children is mediated by early and probably more automatic than conscious recognition processes. In adults, the LPC extended repetition effect indicates that adult face recognition memory is related to a conscious and graded recollection process rather than to an automatic recognition process.     

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.     

The effect of visual word features on the acquisition of orthographic knowledge

Research with adults has shown that the distortion of visual word features, and in particular of the multiletter features within words, hampers word recognition. In this study, "CaSe MiXiNg" was employed to examine the effect of disrupting visual word features on the acquisition of orthographic knowledge in children. During the training, 18 beginning and 27 advanced readers (in Grades 2, 4, and 5) repeatedly read a set of pseudowords in either lowercase or mixed case. During this training, case mixing appeared to impair reading speed in both reader groups. At posttest, 1 day after the training, case format was either the same as or different from that during the training. Lowercase pseudowords were recognized faster after a lowercase training than after a mixed-case training. In a second study, case was found not to affect the rapid naming of single letters. The combined results suggest that case mixing disrupted the multiletter features in pseudowords and that the disruption of these features can affect the acquisition of orthographic knowledge.     

Do anxious parents interpretive biases towards threat extend into their child's environment?

Anxiety disorders are known to run in families [Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C., & Costello, A. (1987). Psychopathology in the offspring of anxiety disorder patients. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(2), 229–235] and environmental factors may largely account for the concordance between parental and child anxieties. Cognitive psychology models emphasise the importance of interpretive biases towards threat in the maintenance of anxiety and it is well established that anxious adults and children display similar interpretive biases and that these biases in anxious parents and their children are correlated. This raises the question of whether anxious cognitions/cognitive style may be transmitted from parent to child. We propose that this is more likely if anxious parents demonstrate interpretive biases not only about potential threats in their own environment but also about potential threats in their child's environment. Forty parents completed a recognition memory measure of interpretation bias adapted from Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, and Mathews (1991) [Bias in interpretation of ambiguous sentences related to threat in anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(2), 144–150] to measure biases in response to potentially threat provoking situations involving themselves and their child. The interpretive biases demonstrated by parents were similar across situations involving themselves and their children. As expected, parental interpretive biases were further modified by anxiety with higher levels of parental anxiety associated with more negative interpretive biases about situations in their own and their child's environment, although this association was significantly stronger for potentially threat provoking situations in their own environment. These results are consistent with parent's interpretive biases extending beyond their own environment into their child's environment, although future research should continue to consider the mechanisms by which anxious parents may transmit fear cognitions to their children.     

The use of structured experiences in family therapy

Structured experiences such as sculpting, psychodrama, rôle-play and growth games are frequently used in family therapy. This article puts forward a framework for the use of structured experiences which can be used in the context of a family session to ensure that the family will gain the maximum learning and change. Use of the framework is illustrated with examples from practice.     

An item gains and losses analysis of false memories suggests critical items receive more item-specific processing than list items

In a repeated testing paradigm, list items receiving item-specific processing are more likely to be recovered across successive tests (item gains), whereas items receiving relational processing are likely to be forgotten progressively less on successive tests. Moreover, analysis of cumulative-recall curves has shown that item-specific processing produces a slower, but steadier rate of recall than relational processing. The authors relied on these findings to determine the type of processing that both list items and critical lures receive in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory procedure. The first 2 experiments revealed that critical lures produced more item gains, but only the list items resulted in a decrease in item losses across successive tests. The critical lures also produced slower but steadier cumulative recall. In Experiments 3 and 4, the critical items were physically presented during study, which resulted in the lures producing progressively fewer losses across successive tests. The authors concluded that critical items receive more item-specific processing than list items but that unless they are presented in the list, they do not become part of participants' organized retrieval scheme.